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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to provide a new perspective on the development of South Korea’s 
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) Business Environment by 
taking a cross-disciplinary look at the area. Most studies on this subject have tended 
to remain within the boundaries of a single discipline.  In this study, an 
interdisciplinary approach is taken to trace more of the paths that have influenced the 
development. This will provide a better understanding of the area and this insight 
should make it easier for any prospective organisation hoping to enter the Korean 
market to be successful. In little over two generations, South Korea has transformed 
from being one of the poorest countries in the world into a global business leader. 
Currently, Information Technology products are at the forefront of exports from the 
country and the world’s largest electronics company hails from a city just south of 
Seoul.  
 
In order to understand how this transition took place and how some of these small 
infant startups became international giants, this study begins with a look at Korean 
history with the focus on early interactions with foreign cultures. The information 
provides a foundation for understanding why certain decisions were taken when 
Korea began its post-war journey towards industrialisation in the 1960s.  
 
Then, using these details, Korea’s modern ICT Business environment is analysed 
using case studies to show how the strategies taken earlier have evolved but not 
disappeared. In today’s world of free trade agreements and international bodies 
aiming to remove barriers, the rules governing business and the role of government 
have morphed into a more complex but subtle framework.  This thesis shows how 
ICT companies who can operate within this changing framework can use the situation 
to their advantage, providing a springboard to international business success. The 
conclusions from this study will provide an insight into the approaches taken in South 
Korea to nurture innovation in enterprises and track the paths that these companies 
took.   
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction to the research 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the research 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) have become just as important in 
modern life as electricity and water. In business and the public sector, ICT has been 
used to reduce costs, streamline processes, generate innovation and boost 
productivity. Studies on the impact of ICT have become an interdisciplinary area 
because it makes both a direct and indirect contribution to economic growth. For 
example, communication systems indirectly influence economic growth by making it 
possible to distribute information quickly, market new products and encourage the 
adoption of emerging innovations. Information technology has now become 
intrinsically embedded in most business models, and its importance is continually 
growing because Internet connectivity is becoming omnipresent in most people’s 
lives due to convergent devices like smartphones. Therefore, the study of ICT trends 
from an interdisciplinary perspective is an area that may hold the key to determining 
the economic direction of both countries and business organisations going forward.   
 
The aim of this research is to provide a new perspective on South Korea’s ICT 
business trajectory by linking the past to the present. The focus of this study was to 
trace the path of Korea’s early international experiences and explore how these 
formative interactions still resonate today even in high-technology business areas. 
This will provide a better understanding of the subject and this insight should make it 
easier for any prospective organisation hoping to enter the Korean market to be 
successful. South Korea is an ideal country to look at in terms of rapid economic 
development and more specifically ICT business development. In little more than five 
decades the country has transformed from a poor, war-torn nation into one of the 
world’s most advanced countries at the forefront of technology adoption and 
development. 
 
As one of the most industrialised and economically advanced countries in Asia, South 
Korea is obviously a key nation to consider when conducting studies on ICT Business 
from a Global perspective.  Korea’s economic success is even more impressive when 
  22 
placed in the context of how quickly it was achieved. During the Korean War in the 
early 1950s, four million people were killed in a bloody three-year conflict. This 
decimated the country and many businesses had to start up again from scratch. For 
example, more than 75% of the railway lines in the country were destroyed in the 
fighting, along with half of the country’s factories. In the aftermath of the war, the 
region was an impoverished war-torn area, where people were struggling for survival.  
For example, in 1961 South Korea’s yearly income per person was US$82,less than 
half of Ghana’s yearly income in the same year (Huntington, 1996).   
 
A quick look at today’s South Korea paints a very different picture. The majority of 
the economic analysis organisations now place the country firmly in the group of 
Developed or More Developed Countries (MDCs).  One indicator that is used to 
compare the progress of countries is the United Nation’s Human Development Index 
(HDI). According to the UN (2013), this indicator measures how income is channeled 
into education and health opportunities, thereby enabling higher human development 
levels. On this list, South Korea was ranked in 12th place just behind Canada and 
Japan but ahead of Hong Kong, Iceland and Denmark. Furthermore, South Korea is 
included on the list of the thirty-five most advanced economies in the world based on 
the IMF’s classification system (2013).  This is supported by data from the OECD 
(2013), which classifies South Korea as a high-income country. Japan and Korea and 
are currently the only Asian countries that feature on the list. 
 
It is clear from the above information that South Korea has transitioned from one of 
the poorest countries in the world to one of the richest in little over a single 
generation.  Because of the rapid change, analysts used the expression ’Miracle on the 
Han’ when referring to Korea’s economy1. This expression was adapted from the 
‘Miracle on the Rhine’ description used to discuss West Germany’s economic 
progress after World War II (Henderson, 2008 p15).   
 
Many economists and analysts rushed to try to figure out how South Korea managed 
to achieve so much in such a short time. Initially, some economists tried to attribute 
                                                        
1 The Han River is the waterway that runs east to west through central Seoul. 
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Korea’s success to neo-liberal, free-market practices including keeping inflation low, 
encouraging free trade, promoting foreign investment, minimising government 
involvement in business and allowing private enterprise to drive growth (World Bank, 
1993, 91). However, this view was later challenged by other economists, who claimed 
that what actually happened in South Korea was that the Government and a small 
number of business leaders worked together to select, protect and nurture new 
industries. They did this by imposing punitive tariffs and other import barriers on 
competing international products while subsidising manufacturing and encouraging 
exports. One of the more prominent economists putting forward this modified view of 
South Korea’s development process is Chang (2000, 2007). In his books ‘Kicking 
Away The Ladder’ and ‘Bad Samaritans’ (2000, 2007), Chang argued that the 
approaches that Korea took in the second half of the twentieth century were similar in 
many ways to those taken by the British Empire and the U.S.A centuries earlier when 
they were developing.  These policies were based on semi-protectionism and those 
same countries now use the IMF, World Bank and United Nations to ‘kick away the 
ladder’ to development for poorer nations by forcing them to open up to foreign 
imports too early, effectively killing small local businesses who cannot compete with 
the global giants.   
 
The argument put forth by Chang (2002, 2008) is that in Korea, the net effect of a 
protectionist approach was that certain businesses operated in a safe cocoon until they 
were strong enough to both export their products internationally and compete 
effectively with imports inside their domestic market.  Chang also suggested that 
South Korea’s emergence as a high-income economy means that the country is now in 
a position to open up and allow free trade with a number of regions because it now 
stands to benefit from open access to these markets without threatening their domestic 
economy. The number of free trade area agreements signed or in negotiations 
supports this viewpoint (MOFAT, 2013)
2
. 
                                                        
2 FTAs in effect: Korea-Chile (Since 2004), Korea-Singapore (Since 2006), Korea EFTA (European 
Free Trade Association)  (Since 2006), Korea Asean (Association of South East Asian Nations) (Since 
2009), Korea-India (Since 2010), Korea-EU (Since 2011), Korea-Peru (Since 2011). Korea-USA 
(Since 2012). 
 
FTAs agreed but awaiting implementation: Korea-Turkey, Korea-Columbia. 
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However, in parallel with the removal of tariff-based trade barriers, countries seeking 
to protect their domestic businesses, have erected new types of trade barriers.  Some 
common examples of these are shown below (Yu, 2000): 
 
 License barriers:  In this system, a government stipulates that a permit is 
needed for foreign trade transactions of certain commodities. This can 
introduce difficult procedures and requirements that effectively restrict or even 
block the import of certain goods if that is a desired outcome. 
 Quotas: This involves setting a quantitative restriction on the import of certain 
goods. This can be based on the value or volume of the imports. It can be used 
to stop companies from getting a solid foothold in a country because they 
cannot meet the demand or supply enough product to establish their brand in 
the marketplace. 
 Standards:  Some countries create a standard that goods must reach in order to 
be eligible for importation. These can include classification, labeling, testing 
or quality standards. The standards can be very rigorous and can result in the 
complete or partial blocking of a product or service.  
 Administrative or bureaucratic delays: Timing is very important in business. If 
the importation of products can be delayed, it can give local companies 
enough time to reverse-engineer the product, mass produce it and undercut the 
importer.  This is another technique that is sometimes used by countries to 
protect domestic producers. 
In ICT and technology-related industries, non-tariff trade barriers can be especially 
punitive and effective because they can be hugely complex. When a licensing or 
standard barrier is erected using a very detailed technical explanation, it can become 
extremely difficult to navigate through the details in order to comply or object with it. 
In addition, ICT business and products change very fast so barriers can sometimes 
quickly come and go before attention can even be drawn to their existence.  
                                                                                                                                                              
 
FTAs under negotiation: Korea-Canada, Korea-Mexico, Korea-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), 
Korea-Australia, Korea-New Zealand. 
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Given their export-orientation, Korean companies trying to sell their products abroad 
now have to try and navigate their way through non-tariff trade barriers. According to 
the Korea Times (2013), the Korean Government opened an office in September 2013 
specifically to deal with the barriers being raised by other countries. They explained 
that 30% of Korean small–medium enterprises exporting to Japan and almost 17% of 
companies trying to do business in China have been affected by non-tariff trade 
barriers in those countries. In addition, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
announced that technical barriers to trade have been rapidly increasing globally in 
recent years and they now pose a serious problem for international business. This 
suggests a shift towards the use of these types of barriers as an additional or 
alternative trade control mechanism.  
 
 
1.2 Objectives, Questions and Themes 
 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a new perspective on the development of the 
ICT sector in Korea by using an interdisciplinary approach to analyse the trajectory 
the area has taken beginning with its historical roots.  Using Korea as the focus of the 
study is an ideal choice because the country is a global ICT leader and technology 
constitutes a substantial part of the country’s economic activity. Other countries, such 
as China, India and Brazil, now look to Korea as an early adoption country in the 
field, so it is likely that they will follow in the country’s footsteps. 
 
Two main research questions will be addressed in this thesis: 
 
1. Can South Korea’s rise as an ICT-based economy be attributed to a free-
market policy or to a government-controlled, protectionist policy and to what 
extent can these policies be attributed to path-dependent events in Korean 
history and the country’s social structure? 
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2. Can case studies provide practical examples that show tariff-based trade 
barriers are now sometimes replaced by Technical Barriers to Trade in the ICT 
Industry to protect domestic businesses in South Korea? 
The theme of this study is how FTAs and globalisation through FTAs is influencing 
and affecting the fast moving ICT business in Korea. By factoring in historical and 
social considerations, some associations between different factors can be inferred. 
This may provide clues about what is likely to happen in the near future.  
  27 
1.3 Introduction to Research Methodology 
 
In this thesis, a holistic timeline approach was taken to analyse each area and then all 
the pieces were linked together at the end to give an overall view. To provide a strong 
foundation for the study, the study began with historical evidence and then used path 
dependency to show how it affected the different areas that were covered. This 
allowed the chapters to branch off into parallel streams so that each section contains a 
complete timeline narrative.  
 
Most of the research presented here is qualitative. Therefore, the conclusions are 
propositions.  In order to support the argument put forward in this document, a 
number of case studies are supplied. The case studies were compiled by carefully 
gathering data from various academic and media sources.  This was a true cross-
disciplinary study because it required information from History, Sociology, 
Economics, Business and Information Technology to form a complete picture. As this 
study took a wide-ranging, cross-discipline approach it was essential to maintain 
coherent threads. The historical approach formed the coherent thread uniting the 
different disciplines. 
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1.4 Thesis Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 2 pinpoints the pivotal moments in Korean history that shape South Korea 
today. This section charts the debates about Korean origins and territory and explains 
how historic interactions with other countries and cultures have a profound influence 
on how people think within the country today.  The information in Chapter 2 will 
provide a foundation for all of the other areas that follow. This literature presented 
outlines South Korea’s transition from one of the poorest countries in the world to one 
of the richest. It will show how strong Government control and centralised decision-
making actually benefitted Korea economically at the expense of human rights and 
political freedom. Chapter 2 will answer the research question on how South Korea’s 
meteoric rise was achieved and how the tactics used are identifiable and 
understandable.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the Neo-Confucian Ethical and Philosophical System that 
underpins Korean Society. This chapter will trace the pivotal path-dependent role 
Neo-Confucianism holds in the development of Korea’s economy. The old Confucian 
academies may have closed and its influence has weakened but this system still 
strongly influenced the relationships between people at home and in work within 
Korea while the country was quickly developing.  Neo-Confucianism also strongly 
affected decision-making at all levels of Korean Government.  Perhaps the most 
prevalent influence of Neo-Confucianism was in the education area. The Chapter will 
analyse how ICT education in Korea, with encouragement from the Neo-Confucian 
meritocracy, helped to propel Korea towards becoming a world leader in the area. 
Business relationships based Neo-Confucianist traditions also act as a barrier to 
incoming non-Korean businesses seeking to enter the marketplace. This will be 
explored in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on the ICT industry’s role in economic development 
in Korea. The Chapter shows how the Korean Government strongly supported ICT in 
order to create an ecosystem that allowed companies in the area to thrive. Then, to 
illustrate the results of this initiative, an overview of the importance of ICT to Korea’s 
economy is presented. This is followed by a review of some studies showing where 
Korea ranks globally on ICT when compared to its peers. This information then 
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provided the basis for the research methodology employed in this thesis. In the second 
half of Chapter 4, that methodology is presented and justified, explaining why each 
research decision was made and what the expectations were.  
 
Chapter 5 charts the rise of the Netizens in Korea as a social force. These fluid groups 
provide a real insight into the attitudes of large swathes of the population. Certain 
events are almost ignored by Internet Users, whereas other events lead to national 
protests that have at times brought the Government to the verge of collapse. In the 
context of this study, the key point is identifying which events were the triggers for 
large movements and what conclusion we can draw about society from these triggers.  
These triggers may be attributable to Korean history. As all of these interactions take 
place through online ICT channels, they provide indicators about what kind of 
international business activity in Korea is likely to lead to social unrest and resistance 
at a consumer or governmental level.  
 
Chapter 6 is a case study that traces the battle between Microsoft’s Office Suite and 
Korea’s domestic Hancom Hangul Office Product. This is a good example of a 
globally dominant product attempting to enter the South Korean market that shows 
some of the difficulties they faced. It is also a good illustration of the path a small 
start-up company took when attempting to expand and grow. The study will show 
how consumer activism prompted the Korean Government to get involved in the area 
to support the domestic product and erected barriers to ensure the survival of the local 
company.  
 
Chapter 7 examines online transaction security systems in Korea. This case study 
shows how Government involvement strongly shaped the direction of ICT business in 
South Korea. It also displays Korea’s willingness to go it alone and take a different 
direction than the prevailing global direction. This is a trait that has been exhibited on 
a number of occasions in Korean history. In this case, a unique ecosystem was created 
that benefitted one international company and some Korean organisations, but 
effectively shut out all others.   
 
Chapter 8 analyses the Telecommunications and Mobile Phone business area in South 
Korea. This section follows the path Korean handset makers took in order to reach the 
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forefront of the international market. The case study presented in Chapter 8 traces the 
rise of Samsung and LG as they went from being minority players in their own 
country to world leaders in their fields.  This rise involved significant interaction 
between the public and private sectors in a market where international companies 
were active with a substantial market share.  
 
Chapter 9 provides a summary review of the main findings of the research, and 
concludes the research thesis by identifying limitations within the research, whilst 
also suggesting possibilities for further research.  This Chapter also takes another look 
at the research questions to check if they have been adequately addressed and 
resolved. This is then summarised into an overall conclusion with final thoughts.  
 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
When choosing an ICT business study subject, it is important to choose a country that 
is significant globally.  In this respect South Korea is an ideal country, as it is a world 
leader and exhibits early adoption characteristics and heavy usage patterns in the ICT 
field.  Revenue from ICT products is now a key driver of the Korean economy.  Many 
emerging economies look to Korea as a role model when they are carrying out 
planning, especially when it comes to technology. This means that the decisions and 
approaches taken by Korea now have large-scale repercussions for other countries 
because of reciprocal trade agreements. This thesis tries to identify how Korea has 
evolved into an ICT world leader and analyse what trajectory the country is on.  
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Chapter 2: How history still resonates today in Korea 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The effects of South Korea’s history still resonate on a daily basis within the country. 
There is a feeling that even ancient history is still being written and debated. This 
ranges from disagreements on the origins of Korean people right up to whether the 
Japanese occupying forces actually improved Korea’s economy or not during their 
colonial period at the start of the twentieth century. In this Chapter, the key historical 
moments that still influence and shape modern Korea’s relationship with the outside 
world will be pinpointed and discussed. 
 
This Chapter begins with a high-level overview of the shifting territories of the 
ancient Korean Kingdoms. China and Japan’s role in Korea’s history is always under 
scrutiny as certain groups in each country still regularly attempt to legitimise their 
past incursions on the peninsula using various perspectives on the past. The literature 
presented will show how the skirmishes and battles led to the Korean Kingdoms  
developing a type of siege mentality. This situation eventually progressed to a 
scenario where no foreigners were even allowed to land on Korean soil and trade with 
any country other than China was virtually non-existent. Some examples will be 
presented of what happened to Europeans and then Americans when they did happen 
to venture into Korean territory at that time.   
 
During the 19th century, when many countries were aggressively expanding and 
creating empires, it was inevitable that eventually some country would investigate the 
idea of controlling Korea. As will be shown in this Chapter, Japan, Russia and China 
all managed to get a foothold in Seoul at the time, and were looking for opportunities 
to gain more influence. The evidence presented will show how war broke out between 
China and Japan first, and then Japan and Russia later, with Korea caught in the 
middle each time. The fallout of these wars ended up with Japan in control of the 
entire peninsula. This inability of the Korean people to defend their land from these 
external powers is now seen as a source of collective national shame and is never far 
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from the surface when Korean people have international dealings even today. This 
Chapter also outlines how Korean people learned from the industries the Japanese set 
up while occupying their country and then used that information along with 
investment and donations from abroad to transition from an agricultural country into a 
high-tech manufacturing centre in the region. As the Japanese colonisation of Korea 
progressed, this Chapter will show how Japan’s policies changed from occupation 
towards attempted cultural genocide. This triggered a wave of survivalist Korean 
nationalism that still exists in a diminished form today. 
 
Next, the aftermath of the colonial period is traced showing how the U.S initially 
were not sure if Korea should be treated as an occupied hostile country, as in Japan’s 
case, or as a liberated ally. This indecisiveness ended up in a situation where the U.S 
did not fully support the South Korean leaders and left the country open to an attack 
by North Korea who were strongly backed by the USSR.  This attack was the opening 
salvo of the Korean War. The Chapter then moves on the post-war period when 
Korea’s economy stagnated in the aftermath of the fighting under a dictatorship. It 
was in this environment that Park Chung-Hee took control of Korea using a military 
takeover.  This was when the fortunes of the country started to change through a 
series of economic and legislative decisions that stimulated industrial progress. This 
section will analyse how heavily these changes were influenced by governmental 
manipulation.   
 
From here, the topic of study will move on to the road to democracy in South Korea. 
It will show how economic growth continued even while the country was quite 
unstable politically. It was during this time that Korea hit a major financial obstacle 
now known as the 1997 IMF crisis. Then, throughout the first decade of the twenty-
first century, successive elections saw Korea swinging back and forth from one 
political side to the other in an unprecedented series of moves. It demonstrated how 
far Korea had come from its military dictatorships while also showing that there was 
still lot of work to be done on social equality. This will bring the study right up to 
today’s South Korea providing an insight into how the country’s business 
environment ticks and how it got there. 
  34 
2.2 Korea’s Ancient Warring Kingdoms 
 
2.2.1 The Gojoseon Kingdom 
 
The ancient Kingdom of Gojoseon, which was located in modern day Chinese 
Manchuria and North Korea, was the first civilisation to emerge on the Korean 
Peninsula (Seth, 2006). According to the Chinese history book the Weilue, Gojoseon 
became powerful enough by the 4th century Before the Common Era (BCE) to clash 
with one of the Seven Warring States of China (Lewis, 2007). This was one of the 
earliest examples of conflict between ancient Korean and Chinese Kingdoms.  During 
the transitional period between the Qin and Han dynasties many people fled to 
Gojoseon. One of the refugees brought together a group of refugees and natives and 
overthrew King Jun of Gojoseon in 108 BCE. The revolution marked the end of the 
Gojoseon period (Ebrey, 1986). One example of how China became Korea’s window 
to the world was the arrival of iron through refugees during this time.  
 
2.2.2 The Three Kingdoms Period (75 BCE – 668) 
 
The three kingdoms referred to in this period were Goguryeo, Baekje and Silla as 
marked as in Figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1 The Three Kingdoms of Korea including Kaya before its annexation 
into Silla (Data Source: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011) 
 
Goguryeo was first referenced in Chinese records from 75 BCE describing an attack 
on a Chinese Commandery (Nishijima, 1986). As this region overlapped with Chinese 
Manchuria, regular battles took place for control of land. Therefore, the territorial 
boundaries were in constant flux, so the above map should be considered to be a 
rough estimation. Despite the frequent wars, the cultural influence of the 
neighbouring Chinese tribes on the Goguryeo people was apparent in their beliefs as 
Buddhism was adopted as their official religion and a Confucian university was 
founded in 372 (Best, 2007).  
 
The second of Korea’s three kingdoms at the time was Baekje. Baekje was first 
described in Chinese historical texts in 345 (Bingham, 1941; Byington, 2003). 
Evidence suggests that the Baekje Kingdom had significant interaction with Japan. 
According to the Nihon Shoki (translation: The Chronicles of Japan), diplomatic 
missions from Baekje to Japan began around 367 (Sakamoto, 1991; Kim, 1999). 
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The third kingdom of this period was Silla. This kingdom was established around 51 
BCE in the southeast of the peninsula (Sin, 2000). Goguryeo and Baekje recognised 
that the growth of Silla was becoming a threat and responded by forming an alliance 
and attacking Silla. In reaction, Silla exploited its relationship with the Chinese Tang 
Dynasty by using their newly gained access to the Yellow Sea as a communication 
channel (Akaboshi, 1975). The Tang-Silla army rapidly conquered Gaya in 562, 
followed by Baekje in 660, and Goguryeo in 668 leading to the Unified Silla period. 
 
Recently, Goguryeo has become a subject of debate in both China and South Korea. 
As the Goguryeo territory lies partly in modern day China and also in North Korea, 
both sides are preparing for possible future ownership claims when North Korea and 
South Korea reunify by building up their historical evidence. The Chinese Academy 
of Social Science (CASS) created a research group called ‘The Northeast Project’ in 
2002 (Sun, 2004). The Chinese Government supported this project and one of its aims 
was to establish that the Goguryeo kingdom was culturally, linguistically and 
ethnically Chinese. This was seen as another attempt to undermine Korea Sovereignty 
by nationalists in South Korea and they reacted with protests and a publicity 
campaign (Mohan, 2011). The disputes over this region are another bone of 
contention that contributes to the prevalent defensive mindset in South Korea. It was 
pinpointed as another example of a large foreign power preparing to try and take 
Korean territory if an opportunity arises (Kim, 2007). This kind of mindset drives 
Korean people to try and collectively make their country as strong as possible so that 
the Chinese claims can be rebuffed if they try to take North Korean territory or 
possibly even lay claim to the whole Northern half of the peninsula using the premise 
of Chinese Goguryeo History (Kim, 2007). 
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2.3 United Korean Dynasties 
 
2.3.1 The Goryeo Dynasty and Mongol Invasions (918 – 1392) 
 
The Goryeo Kingdom was established in 918 by Emperor Taejo in the central part of 
the Korean Peninsula. The area at the time was filled with warring factions and Taejo 
seized the opportunity to start a successful rebellion against the ailing Queen Jinsung 
of Silla (Lee and DeBary, 1997; Nahm, 1988). The Goryeo Dynasty was a relatively 
stable time for Korea. Goryeo managed 22 successions without dividing the Kingdom 
(Akaboshi, 1975). By 1225, King Gojong was the 23rd leader of Goryeo but he was 
living under the shadow of new aggressive Mongol neighbours. Their leader Genghis 
Khan sought to rapidly expand his territory in all directions (Atwood, 2004). While on 
a visit, one of the Mongol envoys was killed and an invasion of Goryeo was launched 
using this premise in 1231. The Goryeo defences were no match for the experienced 
Mongol armies and within one year, Goryeo had conceded defeat and was forced to 
pay tribute to their conquerors. The King of Goryeo then decided to resist the 
Mongols by moving his Imperial court to Ganghwa Island (Howorth, 1965). When 
the Mongols attacked again, their army took over most of the peninsula but despite 
the short distance to Ganghwa Island, the Mongols did not manage to take the island 
so they eventually withdrew. 
 
This prompted a short respite from Mongol attacks but it did not last long. From 1235 
to 1238, the battles raged again but Ganghwa Island still eluded the attackers. By 
1258, Goryeo was completely devastated and was forced to concede to a peace treaty. 
The treaty decreed that Goryeo would retain basic autonomy, but the Goryeo King 
would have to marry a Mongolian princess and obey the Great Khans (Jackson, 
2006). The king was not in a position to refuse the Mongol demands so he accepted 
the treaty. By the end of the 1350s, Goryeo managed to regain its independence 
without another Mongol invasion as their focus had turned west (Rossabi, 1990). This 
success encouraged the monarchy, and in 1388 the son of King Gongmin, Yu, 
decided to invade present-day Chinese Liaoning. This destabilised Goryeo and the 
regime eventually fell to Yi Seong-Gyege who established the Joseon Dynasty in 
1392 as King Taejo. 
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2.3.2 The Joseon Dynasty (1392 – 1897) 
 
The near 500-year Joseon Dynasty was the most stable dynasty in Korea’s history and 
it provided most of the foundations of modern Korea’s social structure, culture and 
language. The Joseon leaders favoured absolute rule and formality, and strongly 
imposed Neo-Confucian ideals and doctrines on Korean society (Ch’oe et al., 2000). 
In the early period of the Dynasty, the most significant ruler was King Sejong. He 
managed to expand Korean territory northwards to regain territory lost to Chinese 
Manchuria and also carried out attacks on Japanese pirate communities on Tsushima 
Island to stop raids on Korean merchant ships (Haboush, 1988). 
 
However, his most significant impact on Joseon lay in the areas of science and 
literature. King Sejong encouraged innovation and supervised the invention of water 
clocks and sundials, which allowed lunar and solar eclipses to be predicted in Korea 
for the first time. Furthermore in 1446, he sought to replace the Chinese Hanja writing 
system in Korea, as he deemed it to be overcomplicated and therefore elitist. To 
achieve this, he encouraged the creation of the simple 28-letter Hangul writing system 
as an alternative to the thousands of Chinese symbols that were formerly used. The 
Hangul characters were initially rejected by Joseon scholars but they were embraced 
and learned by peasants, so the new writing system grew in popularity over 
successive centuries and eventually became the primary writing method of the 
Dynasty (Joe, 2000).  
 
The main feature of the 16th century Joseon Empire was the rise of Japan. Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, one of the regional leaders under the Imperial Japanese Shogun managed 
to unite the various factions of Japan so he then turned his sights on Joseon and Ming 
Dynasty China (Berry 1982). The first invasion during 1592-1593 managed to seize 
territory all the way up to modern day Pyeongyang but the battle eventually reached a 
stalemate because the Joseon navy led by Admiral Yi cut off the Japanese supply 
lines at sea and the Ming Dynasty intervened in land battles (Lewis, 2003). This 
resulted in a truce between China and Japan whereby all Japanese forces left the 
Korean peninsula except for a small garrison on the South Coast. In 1597, Hideyoshi 
decided on a second attempt to take Joseon. The Chinese again came to Joseon’s aid 
and in a repeat of the first invasion, the naval battles were the key, with Japan unable 
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to establish sea dominance to support their ground forces (Lorimer, 2008) After the 
war, communication between Joseon and Japan was cut off and the Korean Kingdom 
became increasingly isolationist (Ha, 1979). 
 
The next significant international event for Joseon was an invasion by the Chinese 
Manchus in 1627. The Joseon armies provided Ming China with 10,000 soldiers when 
Ming attacked Manchuria in 1619. The Manchus did not forget this, and in 1627 they 
invaded Joseon territory (Smith, 1994). The result of the first invasion was that Joseon 
was forced to open their markets and pay tribute to the Manchus, but they did retain 
their autonomy. However, as time went by Joseon started to reject the Manchu 
demands and this prompted a second invasion in 1636. This time the Manchus did not 
stop until they forced King Injo of Joseon to bow in submission to The Manchu leader 
on a platform floating on the Han River. The result was that Joseon remained a 
tributary state of the Chinese Qing (Manchu) Dynasty for the next 200 years. 
 
2.3.3 Joseon’s first contact with Europe and the U.S.A 
 
It was during this period that Joseon got its reputation as the Hermit Kingdom. While 
the European powers were starting to explore the far reaches of the world and 
establish colonies, Joseon became increasingly inward-looking and isolated. A   
feature of this time was a deep distrust of outsiders or foreigners. It was in this 
environment that one of the first European visitors literally washed up on Joseon’s 
shores. In 1653, Hendrick Hamel, a Dutch bookkeeper, was shipwrecked on Joseon’s 
Jeju Island with thirty-five of his crewmates while working for the Dutch East India 
Company (Hamel, 1981). The Dutchmen were brought to the royal palace in Seoul for 
closer study, as they had never seen Europeans before. They asked if they could be 
released but their request was denied. and they were then informed that they now had 
to adhere to Joseon customs and their movement would be restricted. The end result 
was that the crew remained in captivity for thirteen years until they managed to 
escape to Japan and then go home to the Netherlands. After this experience, the ruling 
Emperors continued their policy of closing all doors to foreign countries. In most 
cases visitors were just rebuffed without violence. For example, in 1853 an American 
Naval ship visited Busan for ten days without incident before moving on. Furthermore, 
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the crew of another American ship that ran aground in Korea in the 1850s were 
reportedly treated well until they were sent to China to be repatriated (Kane, 1999). 
 
The first military exchange between Joseon and a European Power was when the 
French Catholic missionaries of the Paris Foreign Missions Society arrived without 
official Joseon approval in the 1840s to preach to the locals. The missionaries had 
moderate success and even managed to convert some influential members of society. 
Then, in January 1866, Russian ships arrived on the east coast of Joseon demanding 
trading and residency rights. Some Korean Catholics saw in this an opportunity to 
forge an alliance between France and Korea to repel the Russian advances and the 
French Bishop Berneux offered his help to the Joseon leaders. Berneux was duly 
summoned to the capital, but upon his arrival he was seized and executed and a purge 
of Korean Catholics began to punish them for their political interference (Kim, 2001). 
 
One French priest named Father Felix-Claire Ridel managed to escape to China via a 
fishing vessel. There, he met the French Admiral Roze who decided to take revenge 
by attacking Joseon’s Ganghwa Island. He occupied Ganghwa Island in the Han River 
estuary and made a few unsuccessful incursions onto the Joseon mainland. Eventually 
in November as the weather became bad and the number of Joseon soldiers nearby 
swelled, so Roze retreated and sailed to Japan (Orange, 1976). Another incident took 
place in August 1866 when the British trading firm Meadows and Co. sent the well-
armed General Sherman steamer to Joseon hoping to engage with local officials and 
agree a trade treaty. The Koreans declined a trade deal but they did give the ship’s 
crew supplies and food. However, when the ship became stranded at Yangjak island 
near Pyongyang during low tide, the Joseon leader Prince Gung demanded they leave 
or be killed (Grimmet, 2004). In this tense standoff, violence flared up and after four 
days of conflict, the steamer was set on fire and all of its crew were forced to evacuate 
where they were hacked to death by locals. 
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2.3.4 Annexation into the Japanese Empire 
 
As shown earlier, the reach of the European powers was growing in the region and 
Japan developed a plan to open and exert influence on Korea before somebody else 
did. To achieve this, they employed a forced diplomacy approach that was similar to 
the strategy U.S Commodore Matthew Perry used with his fleet of Black Ships to 
open up Japan in 1853. In 1875, a small Japanese warship was sent to survey Korea’s 
coastal region without permission. On September 20th the ship arrived close to 
Ganghwa Island, which was a sensitive area based on earlier skirmishes with the 
French and Americans as detailed earlier (Chung, 2005). Upon arrival, Commander 
Inoue launched a small boat with the official aim of searching for drinkable water.  
Predictably, the Korean cannons opened fire and then the Un'yō returned fire. Then, 
the Japanese attacked one other Korean port before returning to Japan. This battle was 
the basis for discussions that resulted in the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876. Its aim was 
to open up Korean ports for trade with Japan, but it also put an end to Korea's position 
as a protectorate of Qing China from Japan’s perspective (U.S Gov., 1919). 
 
By 1882, Joseon had become very unstable and factions with support from Japan, 
China and Russia were all vying for control of the territory. To add to the turmoil, the 
Korean Peninsula suffered a long dry spell, leading to food shortages and unrest. 
Some groups saw this as an opportunity to attempt to overthrow the Government and 
riots broke out in Seoul. On July 23rd, one rioting group attacked the Japanese 
legation and this gave Japan a reason to increase their forces in the region (Hsu, 1999). 
Japan sent four warships and additional soldiers to Seoul to safeguard Japanese 
interests, but also to try to establish a grip on Seoul. China then reacted by sending 
4,500 soldiers to Seoul (Beasley, 2000). In 1884, violence flared again when a pro-
Japanese faction managed to displace the pro-Chinese Joseon Government in a coup 
d'état. This did not last long though as the pro-Chinese faction, helped by Chinese 
soldiers, quickly regained control with a counter-coup (Duus, 1995). The situation led 
to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Tientsin Convention in 1885 that set rules and 
conditions under which Chinese troops could enter Joseon territory. 
 
The final flashpoint that led to all-out war occurred in 1894 was the Donghak Peasant 
Revolution. The revolt was started by locals in southwest Korea. The group took to 
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the streets and attacked regional Government offices, demanding reform and the end 
of external influence in Korean affairs (Rhee and Kim, 2001). The Joseon leaders then 
asked for Chinese assistance to stamp out the revolt. China sent 3,000 troops into 
Korea to quell the resistance and notified Japan as per the Tientsin Convention.  
However, Japan interpreted this as a violation of the treaty and responded by sending 
in 8,000 of its own troops (Lone, 2004). Since the Meiji Period beginning in 1868, 
Japan had been modernising its society and military based on European and North 
American technology so China was no match for their greater numbers and firepower 
(Jansen, 2002). By July 1894, Japan had seized the Joseon Emperor, occupied the 
Royal Palace in downtown Seoul, replacing the existing Government with a pro-
Japanese regime. The new rulers in Seoul quickly issued a statement approving the 
use of force by Japan to remove the retreating Chinese from Joseon and war was 
declared on 1st August 1894. Most of the fighting took place in modern North Korea 
and nearby at sea. The war did not last long due to Japan’s dominance and on the 17th 
April 1895, the Chinese signed the treaty of Shimonoseki that recognised the 
independence of Korea and ceded Taiwan and other territory to Japan (Paine, 2003). 
 
With China now out of the picture, only Russia and Japan were now influential in 
Korean affairs. Empress Myeongseong was still the official leader of the country and 
she tried to create stronger ties with Russia in order to weaken Japan’s grip on Seoul. 
To counter this, the Japanese Minister to Korea arranged the assassination of the 
Empress on 8th October 1895 by Japanese agents within the royal palace in Seoul and 
installed her father Heungseon Daewongun as regent in a Japan dominated regime  
(Han, 2001). On the 11th February 1896, King Gojong, the husband of Empress 
Myeongseong, moved, along with his family, from Gyeongbokgung Palace in Seoul 
to the city’s Russian legation building and asked for protection.  They attempted to 
govern in defiance of Japan from this location for about one year (Schmid, 2002). 
With assurances of Russian protection, King Gojong announced the establishment of 
the Korean Empire in 1897. This allowed him to return to the Royal Palace in Seoul 
but his power was limited (Yu, 2003).  
 
The status quo continued in Korea until 1904, when tensions between Russia and 
Japan erupted into war. Japan defeated Russia in decisive sea battles and because their 
country was further weakened by internal revolts, Russia had no choice but to 
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concede  (Olender, 2010). As part of the Treaty of Portsmouth, agreed in 1905, Russia 
agreed to Japan's ‘paramount political, military, and economic interest in Korea’ and 
thus removed Korea’s final buffer to Japan’s control (Jukes, 2002). This allowed 
Japan to force the signature of Korean officials to the Eulsa Treaty despite protests, 
which effectively made Korea a protectorate of Japan (Pak, 2000). This treaty was 
later classified as ‘null and void’ as part of The Treaty on Basic Relations between 
Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965 as coercion was used on the signatories 
(Hook, 2001). 
 
Emperor Gojong continued to work against Japanese rule and he sent a representative 
to the World Peace Conference in Holland to protest against Japan’s actions in Korea. 
The response from Japan when they found out was to force Emperor Gojong to 
abdicate his crown in favour of his son Sunjong on 18th July 1907 and then they 
created a treaty that transferred the administration of Korea completely to Japan. 
Neither Gojong nor Sunjong attended the treaty accession ceremony. The final step in 
Japan’s plan was taken on August 22th 1910 with the creation of the Japan–Korea 
Annexation Treaty. Emperor Sunjong of Korea would not sign the treaty so instead 
Korea’s Prime Minister Lee Wan-Yong and Japan’s General Terauchi Masatake acted 
as signatories (Beasley, 2000). 
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2.4 Korea under Japanese Rule 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
The Japanese colonial period was a key turning point in Korean history.  In modern 
Korea, it is mostly seen as a humiliating experience and resentment is never far from 
the surface when Korean people are reminded of it. However, as with most colonial 
experiences, the legacy is mixed. As part of the Japanese Empire, Korea transitioned 
from being mainly an agricultural, insular country into the second most industrialised 
country in Asia.  Undoubtedly this industrialisation drive was aimed solely to benefit 
the Japanese Empire rather than Korea, but many of Korea’s modern business giants 
learned from their formative experiences with the Japanese at this time. 
 
2.4.2 Social Unrest and the March 1
st
 Movement 
 
The first major flashpoint in Korea under Japanese rule was the death of former 
Emperor Gojong in January 1919 (Kim, 1997).  This coincided with a speech 
delivered at the Paris Peace Conference during the same month by U.S President 
Woodrow Wilson in which he put forward a list of fourteen points underlying the 
rights of nations to self-determination (Snell, 1954). His comments were not 
specifically aimed at Korea but they did encourage a group of Korean students 
studying in Japan to publish a statement calling for freedom for their country. These 
events sparked protests across Korea including various declarations of independence 
by nationalist groups in March 1919 (Wells, 1989). The Japanese authorities reacted 
by violently suppressing the movement and over 7,000 people were killed in the 
ensuing troubles during the following twelve months (Rummel, 1999). Another 
significant event occurred in April 1919 when the Provisional Government of the 
Republic of Korea was formed in Shanghai fronted by future South Korean President 
Rhee Syngman (Ryang, 2000).  
 
An important step by Japan in their attempts to diminish attempts at Korean 
Sovereignty was the assimilation of the Korean Royal Line. Yi-Eun, the Imperial 
Crown Prince of Korea, was forced to marry Princess Masako Nashimoto of Japan in 
Tokyo in 1920 and live in Japan. In addition, 76 Koreans who collaborated with Japan 
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were given peerages under the Japanese Kazoku System (Lebra, 1993).  However, 
ethnically Korean citizens were not allowed to vote in elections or be elected to 
Japan’s House of Representatives (Jowett, 2004). This shows how Japan was willing 
to annex Korea but not fully integrate Korean people into their Empire on the same 
footing as their own citizens. In the aftermath of the March 1st protests, Japan did 
make some small concessions to Korean demands though.  In 1920, a civilian force 
replaced the military police, and two new newspapers, the Dong-a Ilbo and the 
Chosun Ilbo, were founded (Schmid, 2002). 
 
2.4.3 Changes to the Korean economy and education system 
 
The Japanese annexation of Korea saw profound changes to the economy and 
infrastructure of the country. As seen earlier, the Joseon Empire in Korea had been 
effectively isolated from the world, with an emphasis on domestic agriculture and 
local small-scale traditional industries including weaving and pottery. Initially, Japan 
exploited Korea’s agricultural potential by growing rice and establishing the roads 
needed to export it to Japan (Ban, 1974).  However, in the 1930s, as the threat of war 
loomed larger, Japan progressed towards creating factories and industries to provide 
the materials needed for their military efforts. This was a priority for Japan as Korea 
was the main land route for supplying arms to the front lines in China and later in 
South East Asia. The port of Busan close to Japan was extensively developed and a 
freight railway was built running the length of Korea to transport supplies (Suh, 
1978).   
 
In the early days of the colonial period, almost all of the companies in Korea were 
entirely Japanese-owned and managed. By 1938, however, Japanese companies were 
down to 39.9% of the total, and almost 60% were Korean owned (Haggard et al., 
1997).  Despite the fact that Japan retained control of the key industries, many of 
these Korean entrepreneurs went on to found the post war companies that drove 
Korean growth in the 1960s to the 1980s.  This structural change can be seen in Table 
2.1 where from 1910 to 1940, the proportion of manufacturing in Korea’s GDP rose 
from 3.5% to 22%, while agriculture dropped from 95.2% to 69.7% (Cha, 2000).
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Structural Change in Korea (Proportion of each Sector to total GDP) 
Year Agriculture & Fishing Mining Manufacturing 
1910-15 95.2% 1.3% 3.5% 
1916-21 93.1% 1.4% 5.5% 
1922-27 90.2% 1.2% 8.6% 
1928-33 87.4% 2.0% 10.6% 
1934-39 75.6% 5.8% 18.3% 
1940 69.7% 8.3% 22.0% 
 
Table 2.1 Korean Manufacturing Versus Agriculture in Colonial Times (Source: 
Cha, 2000 p88) 
 
Japan also introduced their education system to Korea. In 1912, at the beginning of 
the colonial period, the Korean school enrolment rates were at 20% for young men. 
By 1940, this figure had climbed to 60% (Ban, 1974). However, this was not 
altogether a positive experience for Korean people, as the system’s official aim in 
both Japan and Korea was ‘The Formation of the Imperial Citizen’ and therefore the 
glorification of the Imperial House of Japan was a key goal. Japan also founded a 
university in Seoul, called Keijo Imperial University, for Japanese students and the 
Korean elite.  This university eventually became part of Seoul National University in 
post-war Korea (Kimura, 1993).   Initially, some attempts were made to include 
traditional Korean elements in education curricula but these were phased out in the 
1930s. 
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2.4.4 A change in Japan’s policy in Korea 
 
In 1937, the Japanese policy in Korea changed when war broke out again between 
China and Japan. The new approach was to strongly attempt to assimilate the Korean 
people into the Japanese Empire (Cumings, 1997). One change as part of this, that 
caused major resentment, was that the Japanese began forcing Koreans to adhere to 
the Shinto religion at school.   Worship of the Japanese emperor was also promoted, 
and new Shinto shrines were constructed all over the country. Then, in 1937, the 
Japanese governor general issued a command that all teaching in Korean schools 
should take place in Japanese only and students must not be permitted to use their 
native language during or after school hours (Gill, 1998). 
 
The next step taken was in 1938 when the Japanese Government began to enlist 
Korean youths in the Japanese army as volunteers. Following on from this, in 1939, a 
policy called Sōshi-kaimei was created declaring that Koreans must stop using their 
traditional Korean names, and instead they were given Japanese names (Mizuno, 
2004). Officials forced people to use these new Japanese names to register at school, 
get married, buy property, or apply for jobs. By 1940, it was estimated that 84% of 
Korean families had changed their names. In a further suppression of the Korean 
language, leaders of the Korean Language Society were accused of crimes during the 
1940s for putting together a Hangul dictionary. These steps are the main reasons why 
accusations of cultural genocide are often leveled at Japan by Korean people today 
(Maga, 2001). 
 
The path that the Japanese were on in Korea was accelerated further by their attack on 
the U.S Navy base in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii in 1941. Now, faced by a war at sea with 
the U.S and land battles against the British in South East Asia, Japan sought to 
maximise all of the resources at their disposal. Therefore, in 1942, the Japanese 
National Mobilisation Law was extended to include Korean Men, and 5,400,000 
Koreans were conscripted to work for Japan (Morison, 2001). Close to 1,000,000 
were sent to work within Japan. In addition, nearly 8,000 Koreans were employed in 
some sort of police work during 1942 but Japanese control was ensured because they 
never held more than 3% of the jobs in the police department above the lowest levels 
(Dear & Foot, 1995). In 1944, conscription was extended to include Korean men in 
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the Japanese military. The total number of Korean military personnel in the Japanese 
army at its peak was 242,341 (Jowett and Andrew, 2002). 
 
As part of the international response to Pearl Harbor, the exiled Provisional 
Government of the Republic of Korea declared war on Japan on the 9th December 
1941. The Provisional Government banded together with the Korean Liberation 
Army, who were supporting the war against Japan in China and South East Asia 
(Frank, 2001). In 1945, Korean rebels entered Japanese controlled Manchuria, where 
they trained soldiers from the ethnic Korean groups there. These fighters eventually 
formed the Korean People's Army of North Korea at a later stage.  Therefore, an 
unusual and tragic situation occurred with thousands of Korean soldiers fighting on 
opposing sides throughout the war. 
 
2.4.5 Legacy of the colonial period: The Korean disapora. 
 
By the time Japan finally surrendered in August 1945, Korea was the second-most 
industrialised region in Asia after the main Japanese islands. By early 1945, 32% of 
Japan's labour force was migrant Koreans (Zeiler, 2004). As a result of conscription 
and war, Korea went from a country with virtually no emigration to having a large 
diaspora. In 1945, close to eleven percent of the entire Korean population lived 
outside of Korea. For example, the Korean workers that were sent to the island of 
Sakhalin, north of Japan, mostly remained there for their entire lives, because they 
were unable to return home after the Soviet Union took over the territory. In August 
1945, when the United States used nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
approximately 25% of the casualties were Korean Nationals (Piccigallo, 1979). 
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2.5 The Korean War 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
The Korean War was the first large-scale conflict of the Cold War that came to 
dominate the world in the second half of the 20
th
 Century. The resulting struggle split 
families, decimated any industry left in Korea and sent the country spiraling back into 
extreme poverty. In a bitter irony, the war ended with a stalemate drawn almost 
exactly along the same lines that divided the North and South before the combat 
began.   
 
2.5.2 Arrival of the U.S and Soviet Forces 
 
On the 9th August 1945, as World War II was moving towards a conclusion, the 
USSR declared war against Japan and their army reached the northern part of Korea 
within two days. This forced the United States Government to quickly devise a plan 
for Korea. Thus, on August 15th, 1945, President Harry S. Truman suggested to 
Stalin to divide Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel and one day later Stalin agreed. On 
the 26th August, the advancing Soviet forces stopped at the 38th parallel and waited 
for the U.S army moving up from the south (Zhang, 1995). The American forces 
arrived in Korea a few weeks later on September 8th, 1945. The Korean Provisional 
Government, led by Rhee Syngman, then returned from exile to Seoul but the United 
States said they would not recognize any group as the Government until an agreement 
was made between the Western Allies (Carpenter, 1980).  In December 1945 a 
meeting was held in Moscow where the Allied representatives decided to set up a 
five-year trusteeship for Korea (Ohn, 1988).  
 
U.S and Soviet representatives met regularly in Korea from March 1946 until talks 
broke down in October 1947 (Goulden, 1982). The U.S struggled to manage the 
southern part of Korea during this period. When the Japanese left Korea, most of the 
mines and factories lost their managers, engineers and capital resources (Dower, 
1999). This caused widespread unemployment and shortages. Furthermore, 
subsequent months saw vast arrivals of Koreans arriving back home. South Korea's 
population was approximately 16 million in 1945, but it increased by 21% in the next 
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year with workers returning, mainly from Japan and China (Olsen, 2005). The 
situation was worsened by food shortages and by runaway inflation, partly caused by 
the Japanese who saturated Korea with freshly printed yen just before leaving. By 
1947, only about half the available labour force had jobs and strikes, stoppages and 
protests in opposition to the U.S Military Government took place regularly (Robinson, 
2007). 
 
Meanwhile, the Korean Communist Party re-emerged in Southern Korea in October 
1945, and quickly built a substantial following (Hunter, 1999). Due to the uncertain 
political climate, the U.S shelved their plan to donate US$500 million for South 
Korean development. The situation was then submitted to the United Nations (U.N) 
by the U.S for resolution. In November 1947, the U.N General Assembly accepted 
Korea's petition for independence and proposed the creation of a new Government 
along with the removal of occupation forces. U.N representatives arrived in Korea 
during May 1948 to monitor the election but Soviet Union officials denied them entry 
to Northern Korea (Foot, 1991). It was starting to become apparent that two distinct 
regimes would be established on the peninsula. 
 
2.5.3 The outbreak of war 
 
In May 1948, an election took place in the southern half of Korea that the Soviets first 
opposed, and then boycotted (Brune and Higham, 1994). The new Government 
created a constitution and elected President Rhee Syngman as president in July 1948 
(Hickey, 1999). North Korea then held elections three months later and established a 
communist government led by Kim Il-Sung, who proclaimed himself the legitimate 
leader of the whole country (Millett, 1997). The South Korean army was founded in 
September 1948 and President Rhee's regime immediately banned all left-wing 
groups.  In reaction, members of the groups made preparations for a guerrilla war, so 
President Rhee responded with a series of purges. One significant example was the 
Jeju Island Peasant Uprising in April 1948 where over 20% of the island’s population 
were killed (Carpenter, 1980). The American representatives in Jeju documented the 
massacre, but did not get involved. In addition to the purges, there were a series of 
border skirmishes and raids between the North and South. 
 
  51 
The Soviet Union officially withdrew their forces from Korea as agreed in 1948, but 
continued to support Kim Il-Sung with supplies and training. Meanwhile, the wave of 
purges in South Korea left the U.S with a difficult dilemma. The killings were 
keeping the U.S-friendly regime in power but they were also starting to get 
international attention (Casey, 2008). The decision was made to withdraw and by July 
1949, the United States forces left, except for some military advisers, and Korea had 
been removed from the official United States defence perimeter. 
 
By June 1950, North Korean forces had over 200,000 troops with Soviet-made 
weapons, tanks and planes.  Conversely, the South Korean army had fewer than 
100,000 soldiers with only a handful of tanks, heavy artillery and combat airplanes. 
Official requests were made to the U.S for tanks but they were rejected (Millett, 
2005). The North Korea People’s Army (KPA) began their invasion at dawn on 
Sunday 25th June 1950 (Yang, 1981). South Korea's army was caught by surprise and 
was unable to defend themselves. Seoul was captured within three days and in little 
over a month, South Korean forces were pushed back all the way to the southeast 
corner of the country. 
 
2.5.4 U.N and Chinese involvement 
 
The U.N held a meeting on the 25th June and condemned the attack. Next, the 
Security Council published a resolution recommending that their members offer 
assistance to South Korea. The USSR was unable to issue a veto because they had 
refused to attend council meetings since early 1950 (Pak, 1980). The U.S had 
maintained a large military force in Japan since the end of WWII so they were able to 
deploy their forces quickly. Initially, American forces arrived in Busan to defend the 
city. Then, the UN forces launched an attack behind enemy lines at Incheon near 
Seoul on September 15th. The attack fractured the North Korea supply lines and 
within weeks, the UN forces took South Korea back. The North Korean army 
continued to be pushed back until almost all of Korea was in U.S - ROK hands. 
 
With hostile forces nearing their border, the People’s Republic of China, led by Mao 
Zedong, decided to intervene. Mao created the concept of a Chinese People's 
Volunteer Army (PVA) on the 8th October 1950 to avoid official Chinese 
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involvement and his troops attacked the U.N forces (Zhang, 1995).  Initially, the 
Chinese pushed the U.N forces all the way back to an area south of Seoul but the 
remaining two years of the war were characterised by small territory gains by each 
side (Edwards, 2006). The conflict reached a stalemate around the 38th parallel and 
eventually India proposed an armistice, which both sides accepted on July 27th, 1953 
(Blair, 1988). As part of the agreement, a four kilometre wide DMZ (a demilitarized 
zone) was created between the two Koreas that still exists today but no peace treaty 
was ever signed. 
 
 
2.6 The Economic Transformation of South Korea 
 
2.6.1 Introduction 
 
The period between 1950 and 1979 in South Korea saw some of the most dramatic 
changes witnessed in any country during the 20
th
 century. Emerging from the debris 
of war and colonial occupation, Korea managed to reshape itself into a modern 
country, able to compete effectively in many business areas with Europe and North 
America. The achievement is even more remarkable considering the fact that a lot of 
the development took place under oppressive dictatorships with a backdrop of almost 
continual civil unrest. South Korea’s President for most of this period, Park Chung-
Hee, is now seen as the architect of South Korea’s modern economy. Unusually, for a 
dictator coming from a military background, he had a keen grasp of economics and 
business, and he used this to completely transform South Korea. This transformation 
came at the expense of personal freedom and the people that did not directly benefit 
from Korea’s industrial revolution were marginalised and became disenfranchised. As 
will be seen in the next sections, Park steadily increased his grip on all areas of South 
Korea’s society until his measures went too far for even his own supporters and they 
assassinated him. Therefore, his legacy can only been seen as lying somewhere 
between economic success and social failure. 
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2.6.2 Post-War South Korea 
 
The Korean War devastated the country’s infrastructure and industry. Some 43% of 
the country’s manufacturing facilities, 41% of electrical generating capacity and 50% 
of the coalmines were destroyed. Economically, Korea in the 1950s was 
predominantly an aid-dependent economy with one of Asia's lowest per capita 
incomes behind even Papua New Guinea (Lee, 1968). By 1957, South Korea had a 
lower per capita GDP than Ghana. Aid financed nearly 70% of total imports and 73% 
of the Government’s borrowing requirements, and in 1960 South Korea had a US$100 
per capita annual income (Buss, 1982). 
 
After he again won the 1954 elections, President Rhee passed an amendment to the 
previous two-term limit so he could continue in office (Cole and Princeton, 1971; 
(Cho, 1984). This, along with alleged election irregularities, triggered large protests 
spearheaded by University Students. On March 15th 1960, at a major protest, the 
police opened fire and the subsequent deaths drew the attention of the international 
media (Han, 1974). By April 1960, civic groups, citizens and academics had joined 
the demonstrations, and this time the police had no choice but to hold back.  The 
unrest seriously undermined President Rhee, so he stepped down (Jacobs, 1985).  A 
new Government was formed on August 13th, 1960 but this did not quell the public 
dissatisfaction. The situation started to spiral out of control and the Government felt 
they had no choice but to step back and allow General Park Chung-Hee to assume 
military control via a coup d'état on May 19th 1961 (Henderson, 1968). 
 
2.6.3 Park Chung-Hee’s Coup D’état 
 
Park Chung-Hee’s coup was largely welcomed by South Korean people, as they had 
grown weary of the constant disputes and protests. In June 1961, the new regime 
quickly consolidated their power by setting up the Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency (KCIA) to block any potential countercoup attempts (Kim, 1975). This was 
followed by the creation of a new constitution in December 1962 that gave the 
President the authority to order emergency financial and economic measures (Mason, 
1980).  While making the move from a military to a political leader, President Park 
also began a transformation of the South Korean economy so as to lift it from poverty 
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and to allow it to become independent from foreign aid. When the military took over, 
they announced that they intended to stamp out the corruption that had held their 
country back (Oliver, 1978). This resulted in the arrest of some leading industrialists 
but the new Government then realised that it would need their assistance to modernise 
the economy. A compromise was agreed where some of the accused company 
managers were fined instead of imprisoned, and this allowed businesses to continue 
operating while also providing the platform President Park needed to begin 
implementing his economic agenda. One major benefactor of the amnesty was Lee 
Byung-Chul, the founder and owner of Samsung, who initially fled to Japan when the 
military seized power, but then returned to Korea to take part in President Park’s new 
initiative (McNamara, 1990). 
 
In 1961, President Park tightened Governmental control of finance by nationalising 
the banks and consolidating the agricultural cooperative movement and the 
agricultural bank. This gave his administration direct control of all institutional credit 
and allowed them to steer the business community in certain directions. To manage 
this new system, an Economic Planning Board was set up and this became the focal 
point of future development plans. President Park’s regime decided that his 
Government must directly control the economy. This resulted in an economic strategy 
that included features of both state capitalism and enterprise (Steinberg, 1989). 
 
2.6.4 The First Five-Year Plan 
 
President Park launched the first of a series of five-year plans in 1962 in order to 
stimulate and move the economy forward. The first five-year plan (1962-66) sought to 
make South Korea self-sufficient and create capital for investment. The plan involved 
the construction of a self-sufficient industrial structure that was not consumption-
oriented or very dependent on oil imports (Hong and Krueger, 1975).  Target areas 
including electricity generation, fertiliser production, oil refining, synthetic fibres and 
cement were emphasised. Currency control measures were also introduced and the 
South Korean won was drastically devalued in 1964 while import quotas for raw 
materials were loosened. Personal saving accounts were encouraged by interest rate 
increases and capital loans from abroad provided funding. Exports were supported by 
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Government subsidies while taxes and restrictions on the importation of intermediate 
items that were utilised to create export products were abolished (Grajdanzev, 1978). 
 
In the early stages of this new economic direction, most South Koreans worked in 
agriculture and over sixty percent of the country’s people lived in rural areas 
(Amsden, 1989). Up until this point, North Korea had been racing ahead of the South 
in terms of industrialisation based on the substantial economic, technical and financial 
assistance it received from the Soviet Union and catching up was a key aim for the 
South. Since the Korean War, family-owned businesses, called ‘Chaebol’ in the 
Korean language, had been sprouting up, but they lacked the cash needed to grow 
successfully.  The main exception was the Samsung organisation, which already 
operated a large sugar business and a textile company throughout the late 1950s and 
early 1960s (Eckhert, 1991).    
 
President Park identified an opportunity to get the capital he needed during 
negotiations leading to the ‘Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic 
of Korea’ in 1965 (Fairbank, 1973). The official South Korean documents outlined 
the following:  
 
 The South Korean leadership agreed to ask for no further compensation, either 
by the government or individuals, in return for US$800 million in grants and 
soft loans from Japan. 
 All treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the 
Empire of Korea on or before August 22nd, 1910 were considered null and 
void. 
 The South Korean Government agreed that they would manage the 
distribution of compensation to individuals who suffered from Japan's colonial 
actions and rejected Japan's suggestion to directly compensate individuals. 
Instead the Government received the compensation on the behalf of the 
victims. 
 
Many South Koreans questioned Park's decision to normalise relations with Japan and 
while it resulted in widespread unrest, it did not manage to destabilise his regime. The 
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South Korean Government used the majority of the money on economic initiatives, 
eventually paying only the small sum of around US$280 per death as compensation in 
the mid-1970s to the families of those that were previously employed in forced labour 
(Kihl, 1984). To complement the incoming foreign capital, the South Korean 
Government stimulated domestic capital by promoting savings, controlling the type of 
factories constructed using these grants, and reviewing what products were suitable 
for exportation. Their Economic Planning Board published export targets that 
triggered extra government-subsidised credit bonuses and increased access rights to 
Korea’s expanding domestic consumer base. Conversely, failure to reach targets 
meant that credit was withdrawn (Kim, 1980). 
 
The South Korean Government spent most of this new money on the development of 
infrastructure. They built motorways and hydroelectric dams using technology 
expertise given by Japanese companies (Koo and Han, 1985). The company that 
benefited most from this investment was another family owned Chaebol. Chung Ju-
Yung, the founder of Hyundai, had experience with construction from his time 
working on projects with the U.S military in the 1940s and 1950s. This allowed 
Hyundai to construct a major bridge over the Han River in Seoul and Korea’s first 
motorway. President Park’s Government steered private industry using these export 
and production targets to control credit along with informal pressure and persuasion 
in parallel with more traditional monetary and fiscal approaches. The Government 
aimed to exploit existing technology and be competitive in businesses where more 
advanced countries had already managed to succeed. Their goal was that their 
workers could make low cost, high-quality products that would sell in the U.S and in 
other industrialised countries (Rhee et al., 1984). Then, the revenue generated from 
selling these exports could then be used to provide additional capital, create new jobs, 
and repay loans. 
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2.6.5 State control over enterprise 
 
The main goal of the second five-year economic plan (1967–1971) was to move 
Korea into heavy industries by making the country more competitive in the global 
marketplace. One of the features of this plan was that the Government began to push 
and steer companies into industries that were deemed to be beneficial for the country. 
It was a very successful approach and the South Korean economy expanded so 
quickly that the U.S opted to gradually decommission their aid program, deciding it 
was no longer needed. One example of a successful company that emerged during this 
time was POSCO in Pohang.  
 
During the mid-1960s, President Park’s regime decided that self-sufficiency in steel 
production and the establishment of domestic steel production plants were key parts 
of their economic development plan. Most international economic observers were 
sceptical because the consensus of opinion was that countries like South Korea with a 
surplus of labour but a small amount of capital should not make capital-intensive 
products like steel. Another fact that cast doubt on the viability of the move was that 
Korea produced negligible amounts of the raw materials needed for steel. 
Furthermore, the nearest reserves of these ingredients were not available because the 
cold war was blocking trade between China, the USSR and South Korea. This meant 
that the raw materials would have to be shipped from Australia, the USA and Canada 
which were over 8000 km away, adding to the production costs (Lee and Lee, 2009).      
 
Based on the above details, along with the fact that South Korea did not have a steel 
processing factory prior to 1968, potential foreign investors were wary of the 
Government's decision to invest in establishing a steel plant even though Park’s 
Government proposed to subsidise the steel mill, provide free infrastructure, tax 
incentives, fast depreciation of the value of capital technology used (so tax 
responsibilities could be kept to a minimum in the initial years) and discounted power 
and water bills (Lieberman and Kang, 2008). More factors that discouraged most 
potential European and North American investors was that Park Tae-Joon, a former 
Korean army general with limited business experience, was chosen to head up the 
company as a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and that the operation was to be located 
in a small fishing village called Pohang (Cumings, 1987).   
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In April 1969, all investors backed out of the project but President Park forged ahead 
with his plans by diverting the continuing soft loan reparations from Japan into the 
project. The project was financed by US$73.7 million in Government grants, a US$50 
million loan from the Japanese Export-Import Bank and with technical help from 
Nippon Steel and other companies (Lim, 1998). POSCO began production in 1972 
and initially aimed their sales strategy towards domestic companies.  At the same 
time, an effort was made to produce high-quality iron and steel below international 
export prices to strengthen the company’s global competitiveness. This protection, 
along with the growth of complimentary industries that depended on steel, allowed 
POSCO to expand their production (Song, 2000). Throughout the 1970s, POSCO 
continued growing, and by the late 1980s they became the fifth largest steel company 
in the world and were consistently rated the world's best steel manufacturer in 
productivity and facility metrics. Then in 1987, the Korean Government outlined 
plans to privatise POSCO in line with their new policies for state-run organisations 
but it did not affect the company’s growth (Stern, 1995). As of 2013, POSCO was the 
4th biggest steel producing company in the world (POSCO, 2013).  
 
One distinct feature of the Korean Government during this period was that they 
steered a number of private sector companies into industries that they would probably 
not have chosen to enter willingly. This was often done through incentives such as 
subsidies or tariff protection from imports, although these measures were also used to 
punish under performers by keeping them out of the loop and restricting their 
competitiveness. Some of the businesses steered in this fashion by the government 
turned out to be very successful. One example from the late 1960s was the LG group. 
The company was banned by the Government from entering its desired textile 
industry and was forced to enter the electric cable industry (Taniura, 1993). Now, LG 
is one of the largest consumer electronics companies in the world.  
 
Another example from the 1970s came from the Hyundai Group. The Korean 
Government exerted pressure on Chung Ju-Yung of the Hyundai Group to start a 
shipbuilding company. Hyundai did not have any experience in building ships and no 
manufacturer in South Korea had built a ship larger than 10,000 tons before that time. 
Hyundai was given the target of building 260,000-ton oil tankers. The first group of 
European bankers that Hyundai approached for financing loans turned them down and 
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the Korean Shipbuilding Association did not help when they told prospective lenders 
that the project was not feasible (Lim, 2002). Despite the setbacks, Hyundai 
eventually managed to get a loan from British bankers and secured an order from a 
Greek company for two large tankers. Hyundai bought permission to use a design 
from a Scottish shipbuilding company and started construction of one of the ships 
before their shipyard was even finished. When the ships were completed in 1973, the 
Greek firm refused to buy the ships because of a sudden drop in oil prices. After an 
intense search, alternate buyers were found for the ships saving the company from an 
early collapse (Fieldes, 2004). It was from these modest beginnings in the industry 
that Hyundai eventually managed to develop into the world’s largest shipbuilding 
company with a 15% share of the market globally as of 2013 (Hyundai, 2013).  
 
As these companies grew, South Korea’s foreign exchange reserves also grew 
because of increased exports and foreign receipts. In addition, the Government began 
to increase tax and try to cool consumer product price inflation but a lot of these 
changes had a negative effect on farmers, who had to accept the Government's policy 
of cheap grain prices. Overall, considerable success was achieved during the initial 
two five-year economic plans. Manufacturing led the way, growing by 15% and 21%, 
respectively, in each of the first two five year plans. The number and value of 
domestic savings accelerated and export figures grew quickly (Hinton, 1983).  In 
1971, President Park won another election. This allowed his Government to create a 
new constitution, known as the Yusin Constitution (Kang, 2002). The new system 
increased the President’s power and transformed the presidential election system to an 
electoral college instead of a popular vote. To illustrate how these changes cemented 
President Park’s leadership, the elections in 1972 and 1978 saw his regime re-elected 
without any opposition (Gleysteen, 1987). 
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2.6.6 Assassination and Legacy of Park Chung-Hee 
 
Under the third five-year economic plan, the Government aimed to further develop 
South Korea's heavy and chemical industries by investing in steel, machinery 
production, shipbuilding, electronics, chemical processing and non-ferrous metals. 
The plan was created to ensure that South Korea was globally competitive and to 
make it possible to produce weaponry domestically as part of the cold war arms build-
up. The managers of heavy and chemical organisations worked to supply industry 
with the raw materials and capital goods they needed to diminish or even eliminate 
any dependence they had on imports. However, the downside of this tightly managed 
approach was that the giant family-run Chaebols continuously received preferential 
treatment, dominating the domestic market and stifling competition (Yoo and Lee, 
1987). Furthermore, as the majority of the development came from external loans, a 
lot of the profits had to be sent abroad to repay the loans and service the interest 
repayments. 
 
Despite the economic progress, student and activist groups continued their protest 
campaigns calling for the dismantling of the Yushin Constitution. Threats and 
attempted violence became a regular phenomenon. One close call came in August 
1974, when Park had a narrow escape from an attempted assassination by a Japanese-
born North Korean, but the stray bullets killed the president's wife (Ma, 1999). After 
this tragedy, President Park became reclusive and his administration extended 
emergency measures, which resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of dissidents. 
At this time, his daughter and future South Korean President Park Geun-Hye took 
over the role of first lady and accompanied him to meetings.  
 
The fourth five-year economic development plan (1977-81) was launched with a 
backdrop of ever-increasing protests against President Park’s regime.  By 1978, 
economic growth had started to level off and inflation emerged as a big problem (Lee, 
2001). In late 1978, Park tried to implement a stabilisation plan to control the 
economy, but the moves triggered a deep recession, causing bankruptcies and higher 
unemployment. In September 1979, students in Daegu, Busan and Seoul took part in 
violent exchanges with police, prompting the Government to declare martial law 
(Hwang, 1985). The harsh clampdown on the protests divided opinion in Park’s 
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Administration. On October 26th, 1979, a small group of the nation's most powerful 
figures from the military and KCIA gathered in a private restaurant to talk about the 
situation. In the disagreement that followed, the head of the KCIA assassinated 
President Park and his bodyguards in what seems to have been a premeditated attack 
(Kirk, 2001).  
 
In his eighteen years as leader from 1961-79, Park Chung-Hee worked to drive his 
country into the ranks of developed nations and achieved significant results. His 
approach was somewhat similar to the steps taken in Japan's Meiji period (1860-
1930), in which a feudal society evolved into a modern nation. During his rule, South 
Korea saw some dramatic changes to the country’s economy and society. In the early 
days of Park’s rule in the 1960s, approximately 58.7% of the national workforce was 
involved in agriculture and fishing, but this figure dropped to 50.4% in 1970 and then 
38.4% near the end of his Presidency in 1978 (Kim, 1996). Furthermore, the 
proportion of employees working in secondary industries, like mining, processing and 
manufacturing, increased from 10.3% in 1965 to 35.2% in 1970 and 38.4% in 1978. 
 
The rapid industrialisation of the country led to a sharp jump in Korea's urban 
dwellers. The numbers in this category increased from 28.3% of the population in 
1960 to 54.9% in 1979 (Balassa, 1985). This urban migration led to a large change in 
the lifestyles of the people as they moved from the quiet countryside into dense 
hyper-competitive cities. The migration coincided with giant economic leaps during 
the 1970s, when the annual industrial production growth rate averaged close to 25% 
(Cho, 1994). This triggered a fivefold increase in GNP between 1965 and 1978. 
Furthermore, throughout the mid-1970s, exports accelerated by close to 45% per year. 
Another area that saw massive changes was the field of education. In 1960 
approximately thirty percent of children between twelve and fourteen years old went 
to middle school. That percentage shot up to 53.3% by 1970 and then to 74.0% by 
1975. Furthermore, around 19.9% of teenagers from fifteen and seventeen years old 
went to high school in 1960 but the total increased to 29.3% in 1970 and then up to 
40.5% by 1975 (Bosworth and Collins, 2003).  
 
A further measure of Korea’s progress was the lessening of the country’s dependency 
on foreign aid. Between 1953 and 1974, the country received close to US$4 billion in 
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aid but afterwards grant assistance dwindled to a tiny amount. Around US$3 billion 
was given prior to 1968, contributing an average of 60% of the total investment in 
South Korea.  Between 1966 and 74, foreign aid totaled around 4.5% of GNP and had 
dropped to below 20% of all investment. This growth in independence increased 
Korea’s ability to stand on its own feet and make decisions without having to answer 
to benefactors.   
 
During the eighteen years of Park’s rule, South Korea transitioned from being a 
mainly rural, agricultural country into an urban, industrialised nation. Debates will 
continue about whether his giant economic strides forward were tarnished by his 
crackdowns on democracy movements but one thing is indisputable. President Park’s 
time in office was the key turning point in modern Korean history and South Korea’s 
business environment continues to benefit from the decisions that he made. 
 
 
2.7 Korea’s path to Democracy 
 
2.7.1 Introduction 
 
South Korea had managed to make giant strides while catching up on developing 
countries by concentrating on heavy industries and manufacturing. The progress was 
built upon low-cost labour combined with efficient reverse engineering in order to 
create cheaper products that could often undercut the prices coming from Japan, 
North America and Western Europe.  However, now the country was faced with 
another challenge. The success meant that labour costs had increased, so the country 
was forced to move towards more high-end products including consumer electronics 
and semiconductors to stay competitive. 
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2.7.2 Filling the political vacuum 
 
After Park Chung-Hee's assassination, South Korea was in turmoil. Choi Ky-Ha, who 
had previously served as the South Korean Prime Minster under Park, was elected 
president in late 1979 (Kim, 2005). However, this new Government turned out to be a 
very short-lived affair. University students and labour unions increased the scale of 
their protests against the Government to a point where continued operation was 
impossible. General Chun Doo-Hwan took advantage of the anarchy to stage another 
military coup (Lindauer, 1997). This move did not dissuade the opposition and on 
May 18th, 1980 a confrontation took place in Gwangju City between students and the 
army. The incident expanded into a citywide protest that resulted in a massacre where 
200 protesters were killed with 850 injured (Scott-Stokes and Lee, 2000). General 
Chun reacted by dissolving the National Assembly and assuming complete control of 
Government.  
 
New tight monetary laws and low interest rates from the Chun administration 
achieved price stability so the economy expanded, partially driven by electronic, 
semi-conductor and automobile growth.  However, the foremost performer at this 
time was the Chemical Industry, which grew by 51.8% in 1981. A doubling of 
investment in electrical power, integrated manufacturing systems, engine efficiency 
and heavy construction vehicles also contributed to growth (Kim, 1997). The rise in 
investment can be partially attributed to the opening up of the country to foreign 
capital and this triggered a rise in GDP as exports increased. The growth coincided 
with a slump in the heavy and chemical industries of more developed nations towards 
the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s as production shifted towards emerging 
economies.  The above progress paved the way for the fifth five-year plan (1982 - 86) 
which planned to move the focus away from heavy and chemical industries towards 
technology-intensive industries including precision manufacturing and consumer 
electronics (TVs, VCRs and semiconductors).  The new ventures were a success and 
South Korea managed to achieve an average of 9.2% real GDP growth from 1982 to 
1987 (EIU, 1990). One downside of the rapid economic growth was the fact that it 
increased the divide between those who were rich and poor who were now mainly 
split between the urban and rural regions. The economic divide caused strong rural 
and student unrest, and protests took place throughout the decade (Human Rights 
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Watch, 1990). Over a million students and citizens participated in anti-government 
rallies throughout the country during the summer of 1987 in a campaign now known 
as the June Democracy Movement (Kirk and Choe, 2008). 
 
2.7.3 The Path to Democracy 
 
As President Chun was not allowed run for the Presidency again after his seven-year 
term, he nominated his colleague Roh Tae-Woo as his replacement in the 1987 
election. Roh’s Government tried to liberalise South Korea somewhat after taking 
office. Freedom of the media was improved, university independence was permitted 
and some international travel restrictions were removed. However, economic 
expansion slowed because strong labour union activity and increased salaries reduced 
the competitiveness of Korea’s products on the global market (Pyo, 1989). This 
caused in flat export figures even though the price of commodities continually rose in 
the same period.  
 
From 1987 to 1991, the sixth Five-Year Economic Plan (1987-91) was implemented, 
intending to expand import liberalisation and to reduce some of the non-tariff 
obstacles to imports (Cho and Koh, 1996).  Promises were included to stop corruption 
and end direct Government assistance to certain businesses while implementing 
employee training schemes and promoting research and development in all areas, 
especially for the small and medium-sized enterprises that didn’t get a lot of help 
before. This coincided with continued economic growth, averaging 12.5% between 
1986 and 1988 (Noland, 2005). 
 
President Roh’s loosening of the military’s grip on power made it possible for the 
election of the country’s first non-military president for three decades during the 1992 
elections. Former activist Kim Young-Sam won the Presidential election and he 
continued the series of five-year economic plans by unveiling its seventh iteration 
(1992-96). This plan aimed to promote high-technology industries, including 
microelectronics, fine chemical products, bioengineering, optics and aerospace 
engineering. Other economic initiatives were also implemented at this time including 
financial reform and joining the OECD (Takatoshi and Rose, 2006).  
  65 
2.7.4 The 1997 IMF Crisis 
 
Because South Korea’s economy grew so quickly, it created a financial bubble effect. 
This took place at the same time as a number of other bubbles developed in the East 
and South East Asian region. As with most financial bubbles, a culture of over-
reliance on borrowing despite underlying bad debt evolved.  These debts built up in 
the mid-1990s due to fixed exchange rates that encouraged excessive external 
borrowing at a time when interest rates were low due to a recession in the U.S. 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea were all common culprits in this regard (Noland 
et al., 1998).  When the U.S economy began to recover, interest rates were raised in 
an attempt to control inflation. Investment money then began to be re-routed to 
America, which caused the U.S dollar to strengthen leaving the indebted export-
orientated countries that were pegged to the dollar exposed. This triggered massive 
debt problems across South East and East Asia (Kaufman et al., 1999). 
 
In Korea, many of the problems stemmed from large non-performing loans given 
from the banks to the giant Chaebol companies to fund aggressive expansion plans. 
With Government backing, the companies soaked up increasing capital investment 
while failing to ensure returns and profitability. The first company to go public with 
their problems was Kia Motors when they requested emergency Government loans in 
July 1997. As the scale of the debt unfolded, Korea’s credit rating and share prices 
plummeted.  The Seoul stock exchange dropped by 4% on the 7th November 1997 
followed by its biggest ever drop of 7.2% the day after. Intervention was needed and 
in December 1997, the IMF agreed a USD$21 billion loan with Korea, along with a 
USD$58.4 billion bailout scheme (Kang, 2002). 
 
Initially, the capital injection and financial restructuring demanded by the IMF did not 
alleviate the slide. Korea's economy contracted at an average rate of -6.65% per 
quarter throughout 1998. The US$170.9 billion drop was equivalent to 33.1% of the 
1997 GDP. The Korean national debt-to-GDP ratio shot up from almost 13% to 30% 
due to the crisis (Blustein, 2001). During this time some large companies ended up as 
casualties. Hyundai Motors took over Kia Motors and the entire Daewoo Chaebol had 
to be dismantled by the Government. The electorate of South Korea voted after they 
  66 
saw their savings and jobs wiped out and the opposition, led by former democratic 
activist Kim Dae-Jung, swept into power in the 1998 elections. 
 
2.7.5 Reform and The Sunshine Policy 
 
The Korean people heralded the Presidential election win by Kim Dae-Jung as a 
democratic triumph. Subsequently, he spent thirty years on the political sidelines 
protesting against military rule. His past perseverance and determination made him a 
very attractive candidate in Korea at a time when the country was ravaged by the 
economic effects of the 1997 IMF crisis. A significant program of reform was kicked 
off by the new administration in 1998 to try and arrest the slide put into motion by the 
financial crisis. President Kim attempted to implement the economic restructuring 
plan recommended by the International Monetary Fund.  A national pension scheme 
was put in place, the education system was reformed, Governmental support for the 
ICT area was expanded and cultural locations were approved for classification as 
UNESCO Cultural Heritage sites. President Kim's Government also aggressively 
pursued foreign investment and cooperated with industry to try and stimulate 
business. One large campaign started at this time to address the huge debts incurred 
by the bailout involved asking all citizens to donate their gold, which would then be 
sold on international markets to help the country. Ten tons of gold were collected in 
just the first two days of the campaign (Song, 2003).   
 
In order to comply with the terms of the IMF rescue package, a number of important 
reforms were carried out by the Government. In 1999, twenty loss-making ventures 
associated with the five largest Chaebol companies were forced to cease trading. 
Then, five banks that had accumulated bad debts were closed down. Another change 
made was that employment laws were modified to allow organisations to lay off 
workers more easily. Within the Government, a major restructure also took place, 
with 108 public corporations closed or merged into 13 Government run bodies. In 
addition, 15 public enterprises were privatised and about 27,000 Civil Servants were 
let go (Ahn and Kim, 2000).  When the possibility of some of these public enterprises 
being bought by non-Korean investors came up, a series of protests were held by 
labour unions and other groups. This resulted in the creation of a Citizen Share 
Ownership (CSO) system, whereby the sales of shares in public enterprises could be 
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controlled to ensure that a non-Korean investor could not hold a majority stake in any 
of the organisations (Jin, 2006).  
 
By quickly implementing reforms and mobilising Korea’s collective will to recover, 
the nation was able to bounce back from the crisis in a reasonably short period of 
time. Much of South Korea's recovery was attributed to workforce adjustments (i.e. 
improving productivity with lower wages) and securing alternative funding sources.  
By the end of the first quarter of 1999, GDP growth had increased to 5.4%, and 
further increases along with deflationary currency moves resulted in annual growth of 
10.5% (OECD, 1999). By December 1999, President Kim Dae-Jung felt confident 
enough to officially declare that the currency crisis was over. The strong growth 
continued into 2000 with a 9.08% GDP increase but the recovery slowed to 3.8% in 
the early 2000s due to the uncertain global economic conditions, reduced exports and 
a prevailing attitude that the corporate and financial reforms had lost momentum 
(Kim, 2001).  
 
One of Kim Dae-Jung’s defining actions was the initiation a new strategy called ‘The 
Sunshine Policy’ after his election in 1998. The goal of this policy was to reach out to 
North Korea and try to build a better relationship by promoting interaction and 
providing economic development help. South Korea’s national security policy was 
based on three basic principles at this time (Han, 2002): 
 
 ‘No armed provocation by the North will be tolerated. 
 The South will not attempt to absorb the North in any way. 
 The South actively seeks cooperation’. 
Under this framework, Kim Dae-Jung travelled to Pyeongyang to take part in a 
summit meeting with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Il, in 2000. This was the first 
ever meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The meeting led to Kim Dae-
Jung being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. However, his legacy was 
tarnished in 2003 when the cash-for-summit scandal broke (Bandow, 2005). Kim 
Dae-Jung faced allegations centred around a secret multimillion dollar payment by his 
administration to the North Korean leadership to permit the North-South summit and 
that he set up an organisational lobby group to help him to win the Nobel Peace Prize. 
  68 
2.7.6 The Participation Government Movement 
 
In the 2002 election, President Kim Dae-Jung decided not to seek another term and 
this resulted in a very open election campaign (Horne, 2002). Political outsider Roh 
Moo-Hyun managed to take advantage of a positive wave of enthusiasm based on a 
‘Participation Government’ campaign and won a narrow election victory. This was an 
inconsistent time for the South Korean economy. Despite the stagnant global 
conditions in 2002 the country did manage 5.8% growth based on heavy industries 
and construction. Conversely, investment capital was also leaving the country, youth 
unemployment rose, and apartment prices in Seoul ballooned past what most people 
could afford.  Economic growth then dipped in 2004, but manufacturing rose 5% in 
2006, based on the exports of consumer electronic products including HDTVs and 
mobile phones (Kim and Park, 2007). Roh Moo-Hyun decided not to contest the next 
election as his approval rate had fallen to an extremely low level. In 2008, Roh Moo-
Hyun's brother was jailed for illegally taking bribes from construction executives. As 
the investigation progressed, it became apparent that Roh Moo-Hyun's aides along 
with members of his family would become involved (Moon, 2010). Roh Moo-Hyun 
died on the 23rd May 2009 after allegedly jumping off a cliff while hiking near his 
countryside home. 
 
2.7.7 Korea Inc. 
 
Due to Roh Moo-Hyun’s extremely low approval ratings, it became apparent that 
voters would seek an alternative type of president. Lee Myung-Bak, the mayor of 
Seoul, seized upon this opportunity as his background was the polar opposite of Roh 
Moo-Hyun. Roh always portrayed himself as a political outsider who came in to 
provide an antidote to Korea’s elitist parties that consisted of graduates from a small 
group of Seoul Universities and former executives of Chaebol Companies. On the 
other hand, Lee Myung-Bak was an insider right from the start, serving as student 
council President and graduating from Korea University (most of Korea’s elite study 
at one of the SKY Universities i.e Seoul National, Korea or Yonsei University). He 
then worked at Hyundai for 27 years, eventually as a top executive, before moving 
into politics (Choe, 2008).  The election turned out to be a landslide victory for Lee 
Myung-Bak and it gave him a platform to steer Korea in a different direction than the 
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previous administration. He emphasised the need for Korea to create a business-
friendly environment to kick-start the economy.  
 
However, his plans were dealt a major blow right from the outset as a major global 
downturn occurred in 2007. Growth dropped by 3.4% during the final quarter of 2008 
compared to the previous quarter. This was the first negative quarterly growth figure 
in a decade, and the trend continued into 2009. Many areas of the economy declined, 
with manufacturing levels dipping 25.6% by the beginning of 2009, and consumer 
product sales falling 3.1%. Exports in the key areas of automobiles and 
semiconductors shrank 55.9% and 46.9% respectively, and overall exports dropped by 
33.8% in January, followed by 18.3% in February 2009 compared to the previous 
year. As with the 1997 crash, the Korean Won also fluctuated significantly, sliding 
34% in value against the U.S Dollar.  
 
Economic growth dropped to 2.3% in 2008, and was predicted to dip even lower, but 
Korea managed to hold the downward momentum to 0.2% in 2009 (OECD, 2010). 
Unlike most industrialised economies, South Korea was able to avoid a recession at 
this time due to effective stimulus measures and strong domestic consumption figures 
that countered the sharp reduction in exports. In 2010, South Korea recovered by 
bouncing back with an economic 6.1 % growth rate. This was partially attributable to 
a rise in exports to China that counterbalanced the sluggish European Markets (Lee, 
2010; Herman, 2010). 
 
In 2012, another Presidential Election was held and the Saenuri Party won again 
ensuring continuity from the Lee Myung-Bak regime and a continued conservative 
approach for the country. Korea’s latest President was Park Geun-Hye, the daughter 
of previous President Park Chung-Hee. As Korea’s first female leader, this was a 
milestone moment in the country’s history (Shinawatra, 2013). While running for 
election, she had to face many accusations about her father’s poor human rights 
record and she tried to distance herself from his actions. As President, she is trying to 
emulate her father’s economic successes while avoiding the civil unrest and social 
problems of the past.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter covered a number of key historical events and details that continue to 
shape Korea today. Certain groups in China, both North and South Korea and Japan 
are all trying to place their own spin on Korean history to support certain arguments. 
Some Korean people see any interpretations that do not match with the majority view 
inside Korea as a major threat to the country’s sovereignty. In the past, China 
provided Korea’s only window to the world and cultural, trade and religious 
knowledge were passed down the peninsula using this channel. Examples of this as 
seen above include both Buddhism and Confucianism. However, at the same time, the 
ancient Korea kingdoms seemed to have almost constant running battles with the 
Chinese tribes in the Manchurian areas for control of land. 
 
Based on historical evidence, the Joseon Dynasty was the longest and most stable of 
Korea’s kingdoms. Joseon was also heavily dependent on exchanges with China. 
However, the creation of the Hangul writing system was a real turning point for 
Joseon. It displayed a willingness to come out from under China’s wing and go in an 
independent direction. Also, it was an attempt to make the country less elitist and 
spread literacy amongst the population. This is why it is still a source of great pride to 
Korean people today both North and South of the border.  It also became a symbol of 
the resistance to the Japanese Annexation in the first half of the 20th Century. In 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, a case study is included that shows how important the 
symbolism of Hangul still is. When Microsoft was perceived to be threatening a 
product that was associated with Hangul, it resulted in a strong reaction from the 
media and activist groups.  
 
When looking at the territorial struggles between China, Korea and Japan, the 
available literature shows that the Korean peninsula became increasingly seen as a 
strategic bridge between China and Japan that needed to be controlled by Korea’s 
neighbours.  Initially, China and then the Mongols ventured south through Korean 
territory to invade the Japanese islands only to be thwarted by bad weather and rough 
seas. Later, the situation was reversed with Japan viewing the peninsula as a stepping-
stone into Mainland China and beyond.  This led to the famous Korean proverb that 
says, ‘when two whales fight, it is the shrimps whose backs are broken’. The result of 
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these wars was that the Joseon Empire decided to try and shut the door entirely to 
outside visitors. They banned trade and contact with all foreign countries. As seen 
above, the door opened a little when Catholicism arrived but when the priests started 
to become influential, immediate action was taken and they were either expelled or 
killed. 
 
One of the driving forces for Korea’s development, and for North Korea’s continued 
existence, is the burning desire to never let the perceived humiliation of occupation 
happen again. The logic behind this is that Korea must keep up with progress in other 
countries to ensure nobody can look down on their country as weak peasants and 
inferiors again. For example, in North Korea, the Juche idea of self-reliance and the 
Songun ‘Military-First’ doctrine is entirely focused on never allowing the country to 
be ashamed and suppressed again. The only difference is that the main enemy that 
North Korea wants to protect itself against today is the USA instead of Japan or China 
as in the past. In South Korea, this manifests itself as a desire to never allow the 
country to fall so far behind again technologically. This is the driving force behind 
Governmental decisions made to nurture and protect domestic innovation.  Based on 
their bad historical experiences, Korean people and institutions are now suspicious of 
the motivation behind foreign influence and products. This is why even if the trade 
barriers to imports are removed through FTAs, the natural inclination of Korea people 
is to be wary and place hurdles in the way of anything that may threaten local 
industries. This will be seen clearly in the case studies presented later in the thesis. 
 
The most dramatic transition in Korea’s history was undoubtedly the industrial 
development drive that took place when President Park Chung-Hee was in power.  
However, to identify where the entrepreneurial Chaebol families came from, it is 
necessary to look back a little further as this Chapter shows.  It was during the 
Japanese Colonial period that the Korean people really got first-hand experience of an 
industrial and military powerhouse. As with almost all colonial scenarios, Korea had a 
large number of people trying to resist the Japanese takeover, along with a group of 
opportunistic collaborators trying to benefit from the new ruling regime, while the 
majority of the population was just trying to survive and get food and shelter for their 
families.  As shown by development statistics, Japan quickly attempted to reduce 
Korea’s focus on subsistence agriculture, replacing it with heavy industries and 
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mining. However, it is also clear that Japan’s motivation for investing in Korea was to 
use the country as a gateway to Manchuria and China. One indicator for this was the 
first railway built in the country. As explained earlier, this ran from Busan in the 
south east of the country to the northern border areas and was used to transport 
military arms and supplies. 
 
As Japan was expanding its reach very quickly across East and South East Asia 
during this period, Japanese business owners were in no position to run every 
operation in Korea using Japanese managers and workers. Even in their own country, 
many factories were understaffed so Korean workers were brought to Japan 
(sometimes voluntary, sometimes not). These exchanges allowed Korean workers to 
learn how the Japanese businesses worked by collaborating with the Japanese. It was 
during this process that knowledge and skills transfer took place providing the 
foundation for the post-war entrepreneur explosion in South Korea.  The key indicator 
of this transfer is that by the end of the second world war, Korean immigrants 
comprised 32% of Japan’s labour force and 11% of the total Korean population ended 
up outside of their homeland with the vast majority working for the Japanese 
Empire’s war effort. From 1937 on, Japan took the extra step of trying to really 
integrate the Korean people into their Empire by forcing them to use Japanese names, 
discouraging the use of Hangul and venerating the Japanese Gods and Emperor in 
schools.  Japan was aware at this stage that war was brewing and they wanted their 
empire to be united and strong.  This is the period that has left the most scars in 
modern Korea as many people now see these moves as an attempt to erase their 
nation’s identity and culture. 
 
When Japan was defeated by the USA at the end of World War II, the U.S initially 
seemed unsure as to what to do with South Korea so they installed a flimsy 
trusteeship. In contrast, The USSR had no such indecision problems and quickly 
made Kim Il-Sung the leader in Pyeongyang. These decisions set about a chain of 
events that eventually led to the Korean War, which decimated and divided the 
country in a North-South split. From analysing the literature, it is apparent that the 
allies made big mistakes while establishing South Korea, effectively tempting the 
USSR and North Korea into thinking the path was clear for a hostile takeover. This is 
the basis for why some South Korean groups today still criticise the USA and the U.N 
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for their part in causing the Korean War by not providing enough protection for the 
new country that they set up from the ashes of the Japanese Empire. The Minjok 
concept of an ethnic Nation-State is still strong in Korea, so supporters of this idea 
suggest that the Korean War only took place because the USSR, China and the U.N 
all contributed to make an environment where war was inevitable even between 
reluctant brothers. This is yet another source of the wariness directed towards external 
influences in Korea today. 
 
The Korean War saw Korea as a shrimp between two new whales: the U.S and the 
USSR. This time the peninsula was not really seen as a bridge between two territories 
but instead as another line in the sand between Communism and America’s form of 
Democracy. The U.N did manage to save South Korea from being unified under Kim 
Il-Sung’s leadership but it came at a cost with cities in both North and South reduced 
to piles of rubble and millions killed.  It left South Korea as a country entirely 
dependent on foreign aid with high unemployment and an unstable government. 
 
The instability continued, forming the catalyst for the coup d’état led by General Park 
Chung-Hee in 1961. When he transitioned from his military role to a political one, 
President Park immediately showed he had an appreciation for business by inviting 
the owner of Samsung back from exile in Japan to encourage entrepreneurship.  Also, 
his regime nationalised the banks and centralised all economic decision-making. This 
was the precursor to the first of the five-year economic plans that began the complete 
transformation of South Korea.  The President needed capital to fund these plans and 
this was where the Basic Relations Agreement between Japan and South Korea 
became essential. The soft loans included in this agreement were then mostly 
allocated through the nationalised banks to fledgling businesses.  In exchange for the 
credit, the Korean Government steered the companies into the industries they wanted 
to target. It was an extremely centralised approach right from the start. The 
Government used protectionist mechanisms both domestically and internationally. 
Companies that the government supported got all the credit and the help they needed 
and others were blocked and shut out. 
 
It is testament to the force of character of President Park that he was able to control 
the economic direction of the country despite the U.S having a preference for opening 
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up the country to foreign imports. Perhaps one reason Park managed to do this 
without major U.S resistance is because Korea started off so far behind and the 
country’s growth rate and ambition took the majority of people by surprise. The 
literature suggests that Korean companies would not have ventured into some of the 
industries they went into unless they were forced to by President Park.  The success of 
South Korea goes against the economy theory of comparative advantage put forward 
by David Ricardo, which suggested that countries should focus only on industries 
where they can be internationally competitive, and then trade with countries to get 
items they do not produce domestically (Hollander, 1979).  Instead, Korea’s 
development success is closer to an example of the competitive advantage economic 
theory. Korea’s economy began with what could be described as a Cost Leadership 
Strategy where products and services were provided at a lower cost than competitors. 
Later, this evolved into a hybrid Cost Leadership / Innovation Strategy when Korea 
began to produce high-end technology products, but still tried to sell them at a lower 
cost that many of their competitors to ensure that they remained competitive 
internationally (Rijamampianina et al., 2003).  
 
From the evidence provided, there can be no doubt that South Korea’s development 
did not take place due to free market practices.  Decision-making was very centralised 
and closely managed. It was funded from abroad but those providing the money did 
not seem to have a strong influence in how it was used. In the years that followed the 
assassination of President Park, Korean business continued to develop amid social 
and political turmoil. The military seized power again and political opponents were 
imprisoned. This kind of upheaval would seem to be counter-productive to economic 
development but apart from a few setbacks the growth continued.  The can be 
attributed to the momentum built up from earlier business development being 
sustained by a slight opening to international investment while maintaining domestic 
protection barriers and centralised decision-making. 
 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990, a shift in Korea’s economic focus took place 
moving from heavier industries to consumer products. This was a very successful 
move and again showed Korea’s ability to quickly adapt to an emerging opportunity. 
Even the dramatic crash of the 1997 IMF crisis turned out to be just a blip as Korea 
returned to economic growth within just two years. In the following decade, the 
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country started to really stand up as a part of the developed world to become a world 
leader in technology. Some examples of this will be seen in Chapter 8 in the 
telecommunications area. 
 
In summary, the key points of this Chapter are that Korea’s economic development 
plan and approach was extremely centralised and consistently led by the Government 
and a small number of handpicked businesses. As the country developed into a 
leading world economy, these strategies have been loosened. FTAs have been signed 
and import barriers have been removed but the Government still retains a heavy 
involvement in the Korean business world. This involvement is unlikely to be 
dismantled any time soon.   Based on this macroeconomic overview, it should come 
as no surprise that the Government is still deeply involved in the ICT business area as 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. This will also be shown in the case studies later in this 
thesis. Based on the evidence provided within this Chapter, Neo-Confucianism was 
one of the key factors that influenced economic growth by its prioritisation of a 
metocratic system of Government and education. In Chapter 3, this area will be 
explored in depth to analyse how it influenced the path that Korea took to 
modernisation.    
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Chapter 3: The role of Neo-Confucianism in Korean Business and 
Society 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
One of the central tenets that consistently occupied a pivotal, but diminishing place 
throughout Korea’s economic development was Neo-Confucianism. Neo-
Confucianism is an ethical and philosophical system that originated in China and was 
brought across to the Korean Peninsula and localised over the past two thousand 
years. Today, it still strongly influences how Korean people interact with each other 
both domestically and internationally. Korea’s version of Neo-Confucianism evolved 
from its Chinese roots by adapting to local customs and co-existing alongside 
traditional Korean Shamanism and Buddhism.  
 
This Chapter begins by providing a simple definition of Confucianism that shows 
how it works at the most basic level. The definition will then be used to pinpoint what 
areas of Korean society today still exhibit strong Confucian influences. Next, a brief 
look at how Confucianism arrived in ancient Korea will be presented. It will show 
that Confucianism spread slowly and was not instantly accepted. It only really began 
to be important when it was used as an exam assessment system for Government 
scholars. At times, there was a struggle between the acceptance of Buddhism and 
Confucianism, but eventually the two systems managed to find a way to co-exist 
alongside each other while not always being complementary. Eventually, a localised 
version of Confucianism emerged in Korea through co-existence with other systems 
that became known as Neo-Confucianism. 
 
Next, the influence of Neo-Confucianism in Korean Organisation Culture will be 
explored in this Chapter. This takes five important characteristics of the system and 
drills in to each one to see what effect it has and how prevalent it is.  Each of these 
characteristics are important pieces of the puzzle that together help to define Korea’s 
business culture. Practical examples of these characteristics from Korean companies 
will also be provided. Another essential area that Neo-Confucianism touches on is in 
education. The connection between Confucianism, education and civil service exams 
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in Korea goes right back to when the system was first introduced onto the peninsula 
from China. An investigation will be included in this Chapter to see how the 
importance of education and qualifications within Confucianism has become 
embedded in Korean society 
 
By providing an understanding of how important this system still is in Korea, this 
Chapter aims to act as a building block for later sections. It will illustrate how 
difficult it is for products, companies or people who do not fit into the system to 
become accepted as insiders. This in turn will help to show why barriers can be put in 
place that may not be easily surmountable for foreign business seeking to enter the 
Korean market.    
 
3.2 A Simple Definition of Confucianism 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
Confucianism is an ethical and philosophical system of patterned uniform behaviour 
that aims to develop harmonious cooperation between people, while minimising the 
need for legal intervention to control communities. The original basis for the 
philosophy centres on a value written as Ren in Pinyin. Ren is usually translated as 
benevolence or humaneness (i.e the essence of being human). The aim of a Confucian 
follower should be to ensure that all of one’s interactions are governed by this value 
(Do-Dinh, 1969).  
 
3.2.2 Yi and Li 
 
The principle of Ren is associated with two other concepts, written as Yi and Li in 
Pinyin. All three of these concepts are closely interrelated. Yi is sometimes translated 
as justice, righteousness or morality (Nylan, 2003). It relates to the will to treat people 
fairly and honestly. This value is common to many religions and belief systems. Li is 
a more difficult concept to grasp. Li is often translated as customs, etiquette or the 
rules of proper behaviour. As it encourages standard consistent approaches to 
activities, it is often described by comparing it to religious rituals. Li applies to a wide 
range of activities and goes beyond human interaction. Some examples of where it 
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can be seen in Confucian traditions include mourning, tea drinking, study techniques 
and governance (Twitchett, 1962).      
 
When using the Confucian system, members of society should seek to perfectly 
balance themselves according to a value system in which filial piety based upon Ren 
commences with service to one’s parents, proceeds to service to the ruler (or the state 
or the public) based on Yi while using Li, and finally is completed through making 
one’s name famous in the world by his achievements for the benefit of society, 
thereby glorifying their parents. When a person achieves Ren, they become an 
‘exemplary person’, written as Gunja in Pinyin (Yao, 2000).  
 
This leads on to one of the key Confucian doctrines known as The Three Commands 
and Five Morals, which apply to most human relationships within the system (Leys, 
1997). Underlying this principle is the assumption that people have different roles 
depending on their station and the proper relationship stems from that role. In 
Confucianism, it is essential for everyone to know his or her proper place in a 
relationship (Ames and Rosemont, 1998). An example of this from a traditional text is 
when a nobleman asked Confucius about governance, he replied: 
 
 ‘The ruler must act like a ruler 
 The subject must act like a subject 
 The father must act like a father 
 The child must act like a child.’  
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3.3 The History of Confucianism in Korea 
 
3.3.1 The Introduction of Confucianism from China 
 
Confucianism was first introduced to Korea through China during the Goguryeo 
Dynasty era. This system is based on the 4th / 5th Century BCE teachings of the 
philosopher Confucius from the northeastern Chinese Lu state. This state lay directly 
across the shallow sea between the Korean Peninsula and Mainland China, so a 
natural flow of the philosophy spread as part of Chinese influence over Korea (Legge, 
1867). The first documented Confucian Academy on the peninsula was established in 
372 in the Goguryeo Kingdom according to the Samguk Sagi (Gardiner, 1970). 
Evidence suggests that Confucianism was integrated gradually into Korean traditional 
beliefs alongside Shamanism and Buddhism (Bowman, 2002). 
 
The transfer of the philosophy did not exclusively occur from China into Korea. 
Despite being strongly associated with Buddhism, the Southern Silla Kingdom is also 
known to have sent some of its subjects to study Confucianism in the present-day 
Chinese city of Xi’an in the 5th Century (Na, 2003). This led to the use of merit-based 
exams on Chinese Classics in the Unified Silla Kingdom to determine which scholars 
would form the elite of society. Study for these exams took place in an institution 
called Gukhak (Nahm, 1996). This resulted in a society where Confucianism and 
Buddhism co-existed in parallel even though Buddhism was still considered to be of 
much greater importance to Silla during this time.  
 
One important step in the growth of Korean Confucianism took place in 958, when 
King Gwangjong of the Goryeo Dynasty built upon the earlier Silla system and set up 
civil service examinations known as Gwageo to select suitable candidates. Study for 
the exams took place at an institution known as the Gukjagam, located in modern day 
Kaesong (Kang and Lee, 2006). The educational program in turn trickled down to 
local Hyanggyo provincial schools and spread throughout the Kingdom. One of the 
reasons why this introduction of Confucianism was readily accepted was that the 
philosophy itself evolved by incorporating elements of Buddhist and Taoist teaching. 
This modified form of the system is now known as Neo-Confucianism and it 
ultimately resulted in a more palatable version of the teachings for Korean people. 
  81 
 
However, the Royal Family of the Goryeo Dynasty still clung strongly to Buddhism 
alongside Confucianism, which stifled its penetration (DeBary, 1985).   
 
3.3.2 The birth of Neo-Confucianism 
 
The role of Confucianism in Korea changed dramatically towards the end of the 14th 
century when the Joseon Dynasty overthrew the Goryeo Dynasty. The new installed 
Joseon Dynasty rejected Buddhism and implemented a strict form of Neo-
Confucianism. The roots of this rejection began with revolutionaries within the late 
Goryeo Dynasty who believed that Buddhism contained the core of everything that 
ailed the Goryeo Dynasty, and decided that Confucianism alone was a more suitable 
ideology (Gale, 1972). When the Joseon Dynasty ascended to the throne, King Taejo 
re-iterated his commitment to Confucianism by declaring a connection between the 
people’s longing for a new regime to heaven’s mandate for how a Kingdom should be 
run based on the classic texts (Vermeersch, 2008).  
 
Confucianism was quickly accepted as the state philosophy of the new dynasty. To 
ensure that the old Goryeo supporters did not reassert their leadership claims, anyone 
clinging to Buddhism was restricted or persecuted. A school system, with schools 
known as Seowon and Hyanggyo, was established throughout the country using 
Confucianism as its core curriculum. Education is one of the key tenets of 
Confucianism and the scholars that emerged from these schools during the 15th 
century became the ruling class that shaped Korean society at that time (Osgood, 
1951). Confucianism called for a rule by virtue, and the way to attain that virtue was 
through constant studying. This meant that according to the system, those who studied 
hardest deserve to rule. Therefore, Korea implemented a yearly civil service exam so 
that the learned men in the Kingdom could display their learning and therefore their 
ability to govern. 
 
The most influential of these scholars was Jo Gwang-jo who was born in 1482. He 
encouraged a radical reform of Confucianism in Joseon as he felt it had become 
corrupted by power hungry Yangban (Korean Noblemen). Based on the teachings of 
Chinese Scholar Zhu Xi, Jo Gwang-Jo implemented a fundamentalist Confucian 
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education system that aimed to include everyone (Kalton 1988). This was made 
possible by translating the Chinese characters of the literature into the new simple 
Korean Hangul script so it no longer took years of study to read them.  However, his 
eventual downfall was due his own status, as he was perceived as a threat to the King. 
This resulted in him being sent into exile and eventually forced to drink poison to 
ensure he did not engineer a revolution. Nonetheless, he influenced the spread of the 
philosophy to all parts of Joseon society and paved the way for scholars who moved 
beyond learning the texts and started to create their own Neo-Confucian ideas.  
 
The period from the 16th century to the mid-19th century in Korea was marked by 
wars with China and Japan, followed by international seclusion. This meant that Neo-
Confucianism was retained as the dominant philosophy in Korea throughout the 
Joseon Dynasty period and became very strongly ingrained in the Korean psyche 
(Noh, 2003). When the Joseon Empire came to an end, the use of Neo-Confucianism 
ceased to be a formal part of Korean Government. However, by that time, it had 
already been the basis for the dominant philosophy for over 500 years. When the first 
Christian Missionaries in the mid-19th and early 20th century came to Korea, they 
had to try and adapt their teachings to not contradict the Neo-Confucian ideals of 
Korea in order to gain followers. Then, during Japan’s occupation of Korea, attempts 
were made to impose the Japanese Empire’s form of Imperial totalitarianism. This 
certainly had a strong influence, now more apparent in North Korea than the South, 
but it still did not manage to erode Korea’s social structure. Korea did not have to face 
a contradictory ideology in the South during the second half of the 20th century as 
modern capitalism somehow managed to merge and co-exist with traditional ideas 
(Lew et al, 2011). This is the opposite of what happened in China at the same time
3
. It 
is on this basis that South Korea is often referred to as the most Confucian-influenced 
country still in existence today (Deuchler, 1992; Robertson, 2002; Park and Cho, 
1995). 
                                                        
3 Maoist Communism diluted Confucianism in China to a certain extent. An example of this is the 
political campaign that the ruling Communist Party began in 1973 in China called the Anti-Lin Bao, 
Anti-Confucius Campaign (Hsiung, 1984).  
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3.4 Neo-Confucanism in Organisational Culture 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
 
Among the Neo-Confucian relationships, the pivotal relationship is the one between a 
parent and a child (Joe, 2000). This is the relationship that forms the foundation of 
Ren and it also heavily influences a number of other interactions.  The cascading 
effect of the relationships is very apparent in Korean workplaces and organisations. 
Neo-Confucianism is not the only influence in Korean organisational culture but it 
has resulted in a number of distinct features and the five of these listed below will be 
investigated in further detail during the next sections:  
 
 Paternalistic Leadership 
 Family-Like working environment 
 Hierarchical structure 
 Importance of Family Ties and Blood-Based Succession  
 Gender inequality 
 
3.4.2 Paternalistic leadership 
 
All of the main five Confucian relationships, namely ruler and subject, parent and 
child, elder and younger brother, husband and wife and friend and friend exist both in 
Korean organisations and within families.  In a workplace, this means that the most 
senior manager effectively occupies the role of a parent, while employees take the 
role of children and colleagues act as brothers (Tan, 2008).   
 
To make the above system function, ritual behaviour and etiquette must be adhered to. 
These rituals are present at home, in school, in the military and in universities so most 
Korean people are already well used to it even before they begin their professional 
careers.  Through both speech and gestures, subordinates should show loyalty and 
respect to their superiors, while a superior should look after the needs of his 
subordinates. As it is based on the role of a father, the expectation is that the superior 
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manages in a strict way, but also using affection.  This sometimes crosses the line to 
become bullying which is a frequent criticism of Korean organisations (Kim, 1994).   
 
Conversely, the role of the inferior involves obeying a superior’s commands and 
carrying out any work assigned by their superior without objecting. In Korean 
companies, this has evolved into a culture with distinct paternalistic leadership 
characteristics. This can be directly linked back to the records of Analect, where Tzu 
Chang asked:  
 
‘The Chief Minister Tzu Wen was appointed three times, but never showed any sign of 
pleasure. He was fired three times, but never showed any sign of disappointment. He 
would always inform the incoming minister about all the details of the prior 
government. What do you think of him?’  
 
Confucius answered, ‘He was loyal’. As shown in the dialog between Tzu Chang and 
Confucius, loyalty and paternalism are crucial in Confucianism (Farh and Cheng, 
2000). Employees or junior members of organisations are discouraged from 
complaining about their work and the expectation is set that they obey their superiors 
without any complaints.  
 
While Confucianism demands loyalty from the inferior side, it also expects a high 
standard of leadership from superiors in order to maintain good relationships. The key 
standards that need to be maintained by superiors are fairness and ensuring that the 
pride of their workers is not compromised.  In Analects, Chi K'ang Tzu asked 
Confucius: ‘How can I make the people reverent and loyal, so they will work 
positively for me?’ Confucius said, ‘Approach them with dignity, and they will be 
reverent. Be filial and compassionate and they will be loyal. Promote the able and 
teach the incompetent, and they will work positively for you’ (Cheng et al., 2004)  
 
The above extract shows that Confucianism sets clear management expectations when 
seeking loyalty. It is a system that, if maintained correctly, can create a very 
harmonious workplace. However, in modern Korea it is sometimes seen as a flawed 
model because those with the power can misuse it to facilitate corruption and power 
abuse. Any abuse is also hard to correct because upward criticism is not allowed.  
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This is why the large Korean companies have tried, with limited success in most 
cases, to implement reform. 
 
3.4.3 Family-like Working Environment 
 
A knock-on effect of paternalistic leadership is the creation of a family-like 
ecosystem in Korean organisations. As explained earlier, every person is treated as a 
family member with the boss occupying the role of the parent, while the more senior 
staff take on the roles of older brothers. Tight family-style bonds between coworkers 
are usually emphasised (Choi, 1974). To cement the family-style workplace, team 
activities are frequently organised to create fraternal bonds between employees e.g 
kimchi-making activities in early winter or hiking trips. In addition, bonuses are 
usually paid at special family occasions like Chuseok (the Annual Autumn Harvest 
Festival) and Lunar New Year (Kim and Briscoe, 1997).  Within teams, staff birthday 
celebrations are common and colleagues often attend family events together including 
weddings, parents’ birthday parties, funerals and the birth of children. As a result of 
these interactions, the connections between colleagues become closer but sometimes 
resentment also grows. When the system works, coworkers feel that they belong to 
their organisation and are valued by those that surround them. A sense of shared 
responsibility builds up and all staff try to work hard for their organisation.  
 
However, if a worker is not happy with their team or perceives that they are not being 
treated fairly, this system can cause another phenomenon. This is extreme repressed 
anger towards coworkers due to a feeling of injustice. This is so common that a 
specific word for it exists in Korean, called Han. Han is a contradictory concept as it 
includes the passive acceptance of a person’s fate, along with the intense desire to 
overcome it or gain revenge on those who have imposed it (Min, 2009). The feeling 
usually accumulates over time, partially due to the throttling effect that the family-like 
team environment in Korean organisations creates for those who are in bad situations. 
The feeling is unresolved, coiled and repressed but longs to be released. A 
supplementary word in Korean was also created called Hanpuli, which means the 
release of Han through dance, violence or alcohol consumption (Choi, 1993). 
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3.4.4 Hierarchical structure 
 
Within Neo-Confucianism, a hierarchical structure is needed to sustain group and 
social harmony. Historically in Confucian Korea, that structure was separated into 
five classes and each person’s social position was determined by their class and 
status. Every class had a distinct set of rules and customs that had to be adhered to. 
No individual could move beyond the limits of their class or challenge a superior 
(Chung, 1997). In modern South Korea, even though the old structure no longer 
exists, a modified hierarchical structure still functions. This can be seen in language 
use, family life and in workplaces.  This concept is so important that it means when 
two Korean people meet for the first time they must establish the hierarchy in order to 
communicate comfortably (Coyner and Jang, 2007). This is done by asking a series of 
simple questions which are sometimes seen as intrusive by non-Koreans. 
 
Within families, each person’s status is defined primarily by their role, gender and 
age. In a work place, the status of an employee is dependent on their job title and then 
follows age, experience and educational background rules.  In the majority of 
situations, gender is also considered to be of importance when determining an 
employee’s level in a workplace.  Socially, age is the most important piece of 
information followed by education and wealth (Hofstede and Bond, 1988).  
 
Confucius stressed that individuals who do not cause offence to their superiors are to 
be applauded. Confucius said: ‘A young man should serve his parents at home and be 
respectful to elders outside his home’. Based on Confucian texts, every Korean person 
should to respect their elder and the authorities no matter where they are. In families, 
children must obey their parents while younger family members should obey their 
elders. At workplaces, approval processes for changes move from the bottom right to 
the top in Korean companies (Lee, 2002). Even small decisions with minimal risk or 
impact are often sent all the way up to top management for approval. A rigid 
organisational structure is then established based on the patriarchal-fraternal model 
introduced earlier. 
 
Using this structure, decision-making processes become very centralised and 
authority lies on senior levels while junior members of organisations have extremely 
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limited freedom to make decisions (Robinson, 1996). This type of centralised 
command and control system was prevalent in many Korean Chaebols, and it was 
effectively used to execute grand visions and large-scale projects without resistance. 
Because of its highly centralised structure, company owners, politicians and top 
management are often involved in minute details of management (Park and Kim, 
1992). One downside of this structure is that the decision-making and approval 
process often takes too long. Therefore, as the size of organisations expand, their 
management processes become more convoluted and efficiency is restricted.  
 
Some of the larger Korean companies recognised this issue and attempted to 
implement management reform. Increased authority was delegated to the mid-
management level to improve decision-making processes. However, as the majority 
of Korean workers grow up using this system, reform is extremely hard to implement. 
In a recent study, it was determined that seventy-five percent of a senior manager’s 
time in Korean organisations revolves around providing approvals and dealing with 
minor operational problems (Shim et al., 2008). In contrast, leaders of other global 
organisations devote the majority of their working time on strategy decisions such as 
brand development, budget allocation, and skill development, as these areas are 
considered to be more important and significant for progress (Triandis, 1995). 
Furthermore, within the hierarchical structure of most Korean organisations, it is 
almost impossible for members of teams to share dissenting viewpoints with senior 
management. This creates a groupthink ecosystem that appears to have the safe 
perception of agreement, but potentially insightful input from junior members is 
withheld.  Exchange of opinions and ideas among members of team during a meeting 
is difficult if high-level senior managers are present. In Korea, no employee wants to 
be the person that made a manager lose face by making an inappropriate comment.  
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3.4.5 Importance of Family Ties and Blood-Based Succession 
 
Family involvement in Korean corporate management is yet another area that has 
traditionally had strong ties to Neo-Confucianism. High-level roles were frequently 
held by the owner’s own family, mostly by his sons. Based on Neo-Confucianist 
advice, the oldest son should take responsibility for his family’s wealth and follow in 
his father’s footsteps by steering his family. Korean company owners, and in North 
Korea’s case Governments, have often used the same type of succession, as they 
determined that control must be retained within the family (Bae, 2002). A study 
conducted at the start of the 1980s found that a quarter of the presidents of large 
Korean companies were also the founders, nineteen percent were the sons of the 
founders and twenty-one percent gained promotions from inside the company.  Just 
thirty-five percent were hired via external sources. The study concluded that family 
ties with leaders in the company guaranteed greater job progression opportunities 
(Fukuyama, 1996).  
 
Nowadays, the majority of Korean Chaebol companies are still under the control of 
the founders’ families even though in some cases that control has become indirect. 
The founder, along with his siblings and children, often hold the key roles in the 
organisation. Seeing as most Korean Chaebols were set up just a generation or two 
ago, executive responsibility has often only been passed to a child or possibly a 
grandchild by now. A good example is the chairman of the Samsung Corporation, Lee 
Kun-Hee. He was the third-oldest son of Samsung’s founder Lee Pyong-Cho who 
began the business in 1938. Lee Kun-Hee also appears to be following the family 
tradition by gradually transferring responsibility to his son (Lim, 2003). Lee Jae-
Yong, as the only son of Lee Kun-Hee, is now the chief operating officer of Samsung 
and he effectively runs Korea’s largest business empire with guidance from his father. 
Lee is also the majority shareholder in Samsung Everland, which is Korea’s biggest 
theme park (Forbes, 2013). 
 
Lee Pyong-Cho also promoted other family members into key positions at Samsung 
and other related companies. Lee Boo-Jin, his oldest daughter, is President and CEO 
of the Silla high-end hotel group, and she is also the President of Samsung Everland. 
Lee Pyong-Cho’s oldest brother's son is also chairman of the CJ Company, a large 
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organisation that operates in the food, beverage and entertainment areas (Korea 
Times, 2012). His older sister owns the Hansol Group, which is Korea’s main paper 
production company and also makes electronics and telecommunications equipment. 
His younger sister, Lee Myung-Hee, is the chairperson of the Shinsegae Group, which 
is the largest retail organisation in the country. 
 
The Hyundai Group is another example of a large company controlled by the 
founder’s family members. The group was founded in 1946 by Chung Ju-Yung (Sin, 
2000). He had many sons and he passed parts of the business down to them as shown 
in the list below: 
 
 Chung Mong-koo: Currently Chairman of the Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group. 
This is the second biggest company in Korea. 
 Chung Mong-kun: Now the Chairman of the Hyundai Department Store Chain, 
This is one of the largest retail companies in the country. 
 Chung Mong-woo: Committed suicide after years of apparently suffering from 
depression. However, his eldest son, Chung Il-Sun, is now the President of 
BNG Steel, a subsidiary of the Hyundai-Kia Group. 
 Chung Mong-Hun: Former Chairman of the Hyundai Group. He committed 
suicide in August 2003 after being implicated in a scandal where money was 
provided to North Korea in return for summit participation.  His wife Hyun 
Chung-Eun currently controls the Hyundai Group. 
 Chung Mong-Joon: Owner of Hyundai Heavy Industries, the world's biggest 
shipbuilding company. 
Other high profile Korean companies that have also used family based succession are 
the LG Group, the Hanjing Logistics Group (which is connected to Korean Air), the 
Lotte Group and the Ssangyong Group (Choi, 2001).  
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3.4.6 Gender inequality 
  
As with many ancient systems of thought, Korean women were mostly restricted to 
their homes under Neo-Confucianism. Beginning at an early age, women were 
expected to adhere to the Confucian values of subordination and endurance. This 
groomed them for future positions as wives and mothers but didn’t provide the chance 
for them to take part in community life outside their homes (Khang and Cho, 2006). 
Their goal was to produce a male offspring to sustain the family lineage and their 
principle role in society was only to serve men. A well-known Confucian saying 
explains, ‘It is a virtue if a woman has no ability’. This means that responsibility for 
earning money for the family lies with the husband while women should remain in 
their homes to take care of domestic issues and support their children’s educational 
needs (Sung, 2003). This feature from Confucian teaching still has deep roots in many 
Korean families, especially with older generations. The expectation is that women 
should prioritise the needs of their family instead of their careers, especially when 
they get married and have children.  
 
In modern Korea, a woman’s place in society is still frequently restricted by these 
expectations.  Some women have been successful in the business world but it is still 
an exception rather than the rule. Women’s jobs in companies are still often restricted 
to certain positions like secretarial or general administrative work (Sen, 2001). 
Confucius said: ‘Girls and inferior men are hard to raise. If you get familiar with 
them, they lose their humility; if you are distant, they resent it’. In a 2010 study, South 
Korea had the largest pay disparity in the OECD between men and women at 39% 
(OECD, 2010).  Furthermore, only 4.7% of senior executives at Korean organisations 
with over 1,000 employees were women, in comparison to 39.5% in Norway and 
15.7% in the US. 
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3.5 Flaws of Confucianism 
 
3.5.1 Rigid Communication Rules  
 
The influence of Confucianism is also ever-present in the rules of the Korean 
language. Traditionally, when talking or writing about someone who is superior in 
status, people utilise certain nouns or verb-endings to infer the persons' superiority 
(Sohn, 1999). As explained in section 3.4.2, someone is superior in status if they are 
older, a manager, a teacher or a customer. Conversely, a person is equal or inferior if 
they are younger, a student or an employee. In the Korean language, there are seven 
verb speech levels, and each of the levels has a distinct range of verb endings, which 
communicate the level of formality of an interaction. The top six levels are usually 
grouped and called Jondaenmal, and the lowest level is known as Banmal in Korean. 
Banmal is considered a serious insult if it is used in the wrong situation (Song, 2005).  
 
Except for close friends, it is not common for Korean adults to address others using 
only their names. For example, the Korean word for ‘you’ is not common because 
relationship descriptions are used instead. For a person named Ji-Sae: Ji-Sae yung 
(older brother), Ji-Sae nuna (older sister), Ji-Sae sunbae (elder classmate) would be 
appropriate (Sohn 2006). If there is no direct relationship between the two people, 
then a person’s social position can be used. Korean speakers use words like Doctor, 
Chairman, Professor or Lawyer. Finally, if none of the above are suitable, Korean 
speakers use general honorifics like the Korean words for ‘elder’ or ‘teacher’ (Chang, 
1996). 
 
One of the criticisms often leveled at Neo-Confucianism is that it stifles open 
communication by creating a strict framework that does not allow people to speak 
their minds freely.  The layers of required honorifics and levels in the Korean 
language combined with the need to accept a role under Neo-Confucianism means 
that the open exchange of ideas can be very difficult. In some situations even mild 
criticism is completely unacceptable. For example, questioning an older teacher in 
Korea is considered a grave insult. These language expectations also lead to situations 
where a lot of communication must be implied, as it cannot be said directly. This can 
often result in misunderstandings and messages not being understood as they were 
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meant. This problem becomes very prevalent when dealing with International 
Communication. If something is translated directly from Korean to English, it will 
sometimes become indecipherable, as the implied meaning does not get carried over.  
 
3.5.2 Over-attention to procedures  
 
As explained in Section 3.3.2, Neo-Confucianism really began to dominate Korea 
during the Joseon Dynasty. This was when Korean people started to live their 
everyday lives using Neo-Confucian mannerisms. The most important Confucian 
book in this context is Sohak, which translates as The Book of Small Learning. Most 
of what is considered traditional Korean manners (e.g. not eating until the oldest takes 
the first bite) comes from Sohak. The level of detail required by Sohak is extensive. 
Even for apparently simple tasks like what a son must do to serve his parents correctly 
in the morning, there are very thorough instructions
4
.  
 
Another criticism that is often made of Confucianism is that it over-emphasises the 
need to follow rules exactly, and does not allow enough room for flexibility.  This can 
lead to situations where bureaucratic red tape creates huge barriers and inefficient 
procedures. It can also cause massive problems when a situation occurs that is not 
covered by documented procedures and requirements.  It can cause situations where 
anything outside of the exact rules is just immediately disregarded or rejected without 
consideration.
                                                        
4 ‘When the rooster first crows, all must wash their face, brush their teeth, comb their hair, 
cover the hair with black silk, put on a hairpin, tie the hair with silk to decorate the topknot, 
straighten all stray hair, wear a hat and tie the strap, wear dark clothes, wear an overcoat, 
wear a large belt, put on the belt decoration, wear the things to be used for the day on the 
belt, wear leggings, wear the shoes and tie the shoes.’ (Ch’oe et al 2000: p67) 
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3.5.3 Over-emphasis on Rote-Memorisation  
 
As explained in Section 3.3.2, one of the main indicators of a scholar’s success in 
traditional Confucianism was how well they were able to recite the Chinese classic 
texts. These old texts are no longer a part of the Korean education system but the idea 
that information should be memorised and regurgitated is still very important in 
Korean classrooms. It can end up in a situation where education is reduced to a list of 
facts, figures and dates with no context. This has been highlighted as a major problem 
in Korean education and attempts have been made to introduce and encourage more 
critical thinking. However, despite this being acknowledged as a problem, Korea has 
still become one of the most innovative countries in the world, especially in the 
technology area.  
 
3.5.4 Sexism  
 
Lots of Korean women with advanced education and ability become frustrated when 
they try to search for suitable positions in organisations. After marriage, the situation 
often becomes even worse.  Korean Managers frequently hesitate to give them jobs. 
The perception is that women who are married often need time off and they can’t 
concentrate on their jobs because they are also mothers.  Therefore, a large proportion 
of women have to give up their careers to take care of their children and their spouse. 
Furthermore, women also often get lower pay in comparison to their male coworkers. 
This is a problem that is frequently attributed to Neo-Confucianism and is the source 
of a lot of the criticism aimed at the system.  
 
3.5.5 Importance of Standardised exams 
 
The reliance on the use of standardised exams for assessment does not reside solely in 
the domain of education. The majority of large Korean companies also use exams as 
an early candidate screening stage in recruitment especially for entry-level and 
graduate positions. An example of this is the custom designed Samsung Aptitude Test 
(SSAT) that the company used as an applicant assessment system (Samsung, 2013). 
This exam spawned a range of Hagwon Schools and books offering exam techniques 
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to help pass the test and get a chance at the interview stage.  Another way that 
standardised testing is used in employment is by way of professional licensing. In 
South Korea, Government-approved licenses are required in order to work in a 
diverse range of fields including school teaching, real estate sales, tour guide roles 
and nutritionist specialists (KRIVET, 2007). These licenses are all obtained by 
passing exams set by a central professional body overseen by the Government.   
 
 
3.6 How Neo-Confucianism influences Education 
 
3.6.1 Introduction 
 
Confucianism in Korea has been intrinsically connected to education all the way back 
through its history. It provided the foundation for the meritocracy exam system that 
determined who would make progress in Government as early as the 10
th
 Century. 
This section begins with a look at the most important exam in most Korean people’s 
lives, the College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT). It shows the pivotal role that 
education and exams take in Korea. From there, Korea’s relative ranking in education 
studies will be analysed showing how central education is in Korea and the social 
expectations associated with that. Next, this section will cover ICT education 
initiatives in Korea beginning with adult schemes created by the Government before 
moving on to plans at schools. This section finishes with a look at the ICT learning 
outcomes associated with these initiatives.  
 
3.6.2 The CSAT exam and the SKY Universities 
 
The importance of education when selecting leaders is still prevalent in South Korea 
today. As explained in Section 3.2.2, Confucianism suggests there is a proper way of 
doing things, so this lends itself to a collectively aligned aspiration system.  In Korea, 
this centres around the CSAT University entrance exam and the desire to enter one of 
the SKY Universities (Seoul National University, Korea University or Yonsei 
University). The CSAT exam is a one-day exam taken in high school that determines 
which university a student can enter (Jones, 2013). For many South Korean students, 
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this is the most important day of their lives because their entire career can hinge on 
their ability to enter a top University. 
The leading South Korean University at the moment is Seoul National University in 
most study areas. A degree from this University opens a lot of doors in Korea. For 
example, even though appointments are based on open exams, two thirds of South 
Korean judges, forty percent of high-ranking government officials and over half of 
diplomats are SNU graduates (MEST, 2010). This means that competition is fierce to 
get into Seoul National University. A huge industry has been created to try and 
provide exam techniques for achieving a higher CSAT score and getting a place at 
SNU (Kim, 2010).  
 
The region where this phenomenon has become most apparent is in the Gangnam 
district of Seoul. In 2011, 65.7% of new students at SNU came from the neighbouring 
Gangnam, Seocho and Songpa districts south of the Han River. Affluent families 
from all over Korea try to relocate their children to Gangnam in order to send them to 
the schools and evening cram-schools (known as Hagwons in Korea) in that area. 
They believe this will give their children a better chance of achieving a high score on 
the CSAT exam, and then get a place in SNU or one of the other SKY Universities 
guaranteeing them good career prospects (Bae et al, 2010). The CSAT ensured that 
corruption was minimised in the college application process, but it also created an 
extreme make-or-break exam for students and a huge business for any education 
establishment with a proven track record for good results.  
 
This situation has created intense pressure and competition in South Korean 
education.  According to the Korean Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 
74% of South Korean students now take additional after school classes at Hagwons to 
improve their test scores. Furthermore, in a survey complied by the Korean Ministry 
of Education, Science and Technology (2011), the top reason given for private 
tutoring and extra evening classes was that the name of the university one graduates 
from is important for future job prospects. The second is that special purpose high 
schools select students based primarily on their test scores. 
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3.6.3 The relative importance of education in Korea  
 
When South Korea’s economy developed suddenly in the 1960s, the country’s 
education system also developed in parallel with it.  As seen in the previous section, 
the University that a student graduates from can determine their entire career 
trajectory.  The percentage of students that go on to tertiary education is very high in 
Korea.  In a 2013 study, Korea had the second highest proportion of adults globally in 
higher education behind Canada (UN, 2013). The country also has the highest 
percentage among the OECD countries in terms of the percentage of 25-34 year-olds 
that have attained a tertiary level of education (OECD, 2013). In terms of literacy, 
Korea has a 99% literacy rate (the same as Ireland) and sits among the list of 
advanced countries near the top of the list (UNDP, 2013).   
 
South Korea’s position at the top end of international Education Tables is a relatively 
new phenomenon. Korea now sits in first place globally based on the proportion of 
teenagers who receive upper-secondary education with over 98% reaching this level 
(OECD, 2013). However, in the older 45-54 age group, South Korea is below some 
western European countries. An interesting note on education in Korea is that even at 
secondary level much of the spending on education comes from the private sector. In 
the 2013 OECD Education at a glance study (2013), South Korea’s public education 
spending on per student basis was below average within the group of OECD member 
nations.  
 
However, private sector education spending is over double the OECD average. This is 
explained by the fact that most Korean students top up their public school education 
with private after-school Hagwon schools in the evenings to try and get academic 
advantages in Korea’s hyper-competitive education system. For example, many 
Korean secondary students attend ICT Hagwons outside of regular schools hours to 
develop their computing skills. This may also be a factor in Korea’s positioning at the 
top of international ICT usage and skills rankings as will be seen in the next chapter.  
 
The Korean Government has tried to address the Hagwon problem by increasing 
spending on education. For example, the country’s total spending on education, 
including public and private schools, as a share of GDP was the third highest in the 
  97 
OECD area at 8.0% in 2012, even before taking account of outlays for private and 
after-school instruction (OECD, 2013). 
 
3.6.4 Adult ICT Education in Korea 
 
In 1998, the concept of e-Literacy was emphasised at the inauguration speech of 
incoming President Kim Dae Jung. He outlined his aim to turn Korea in a country 
where people can use computers better than anywhere else in the world.  This was the 
precursor to the launch of the Cyber Korea 21 initiative. This contained a number of 
specific goals (Yun et al, 2002).  
 
 Implementation of ICT education schemes for the entire population  
 Introduction of a certification system for verifying computer skills 
 Realisation of a one person-one PC environment  
 Development of Internet plaza services 
 Elimination of the digital divide  
 The realisation of a sound information culture 
 
Computer skills education was chosen as the core focus of the Cyber Korea 21 plan. 
The project aimed to provide education to 25 million people (11 million in the public 
sector and 14 million in the private sector) by creating institutes to deliver computer 
skills education, while installing computer education rooms in public or Government 
institutions - including schools, military units and post offices (KISDI, 2005). The 
plans included installation of Internet plazas at post offices or in remote rural areas 
where access to high-speed fixed lines was restricted or nonexistent; supplying free 
PCs to 50,000 students from low-income households; and developing devices and 
software for the physically disabled. In addition, the plan also sought to improve ICT 
education for farmers, fishermen, senior citizens and other groups that may have been 
previously alienated from information services. Another target group for ICT 
education was housewives. The Government wanted to encourage housewives back 
into the job market through free ICT training courses with two million places. All the 
national ICT education programs were carried out with budgetary funds allocated by 
the central and local Governments (Suh and Chen, 2007). 
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This education plan began in 2000 aiming to educate 10 million people by 2003 but 
the initiative was so popular that 13.8 million people took part by just June 2002. 
After assessing the effectiveness of the program, the Government determined that it 
did promote use of ICT equipment but mostly for leisure and games. They decided 
that the next campaign should focus on application software skills that could be used 
in practical work environments.  Thus, the second phase plan for ICT education began 
in July 2002 until 2004. This differentiated the learning into levels (KISDI, 2005): 
 
1. Basic PC and Internet skills education for 1.5 million people considered to 
be alienated from ICT including physically disabled people and senior 
citizens.    
2. The provision of practical computers skills education for 3.5 million 
people to enable them to use ICTs in their daily business or work.  
 
As part of this phase, 5,024,053 people took practical computer skills courses and 
4,053,034 people received basic computer skills courses. The number was twice the 
target figure and it was delivered six months ahead of schedule.  
 
Based on participation, these adult education programs were a huge success. Each 
course exceeded their attendance targets and this allowed the programs to expand and 
extend their reach. These types of adult ICT education projects have now become a 
part of Korea’s social fabric and they are one of the reasons why the technology usage 
statistics are so high in the country as we will see in the next chapter. 
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3.6.5 ICT education in Schools 
 
Technology has been a part of the Korean school system since the 1980s but the first 
move to formally include ICT in education took place in 1995.  This was when the 
Plan for the Renovation of Education was published by the Korean Ministry of 
Education with the aim of introducing ICT into classrooms.  As of 2013, this plan has 
now reached its fourth stage (Bacsich, 2013). 
 
In 2012, a new initiative was announced known as the SMART education project. 
This stands for: 
 
S =  Self-directed 
M  = Motivated 
A   = Adaptation 
R   =  Resources 
T  =  Technology 
 
The main goal of the program is to digitise the entire school curriculum by 2015.  
According to research conducted by the Korea Communications Commission, 67% of 
young Koreans between the ages of 5 and 19 use smartphones regularly and these 
figures are rising quickly.  The SMART project includes the creation of digital 
textbooks, online evaluation systems and the use of convergent touchscreen mobile 
devices to consume and create content (Chosun Ilbo, 2011).  These devices will 
communicate with Cloud-Based virtual learning environments through secure 
wireless networks that service entire school campuses. All of these systems are being 
developed by domestic Korean companies. The budget for hardware provision alone 
is US$2.4 billion (Shin, 2011).  
 
The aim is that every middle and high school student will study in a 1:1 device 
classroom (i.e each student will have a personal device).  Students from low-income 
families will be provided with free devices. In order to test the idea of digital 
textbooks, 130 schools were selected in 2007 to assess the effectiveness of the new 
system.  The Ministry of Education estimated that e-textbooks will be 50-60% 
cheaper than traditional hard-copy textbooks (Bacsich, 2013). It will also greatly 
  100 
reduce the dependence on handouts and printing. It is also hoped that the increased 
access to information though mobile devices will reduce the educational focus on 
rote-memorisation by enabling interactive learning patterns. This has been flagged as 
a problem in Korean education for many years and was discussed as a flaw of 
Confucianism in Section 3.5.3 of this Chapter.   
 
3.6.6 ICT Learning outcomes 
 
This focus on education and exam preparation has resulted in Korea having very good 
test scores in international comparison studies. In the most recent Programme for 
International Student Assessment study conducted by the OECD, Korea ranked first 
among OECD countries in mathematics and reading, and third in science. Moreover, 
Korea’s overall performance in PISA has improved since 2006, when it was 11th in 
science, fourth in mathematics and first in reading (OECD, 2011). Since 2000, Korea 
has doubled its share of students demonstrating excellence in reading literacy: 13% of 
its students were proficient at level five or above compared to an OECD average of 
8% (OECD, 2009). In an extension to the original PISA study, 15-year-old students 
were tested to see how well they could use computers and the Internet to learn. Their 
task was to evaluate information on the Internet, access its credibility and navigate 
webpages to test their digital reading performance. In this survey Korea came in first 
place out of the 16 countries. Korea was one of a small group of countries where the 
students performed significantly better in digital reading than print (OECD, 2011).   
 
Another indicator that can be used to assess learning outcomes in ICT is a new metric 
introduced by the ITU in 2013. This is the idea of a ‘Digital Native’. According to the 
ITU (2013), a Digital Native is an individual who has used the Internet for five or 
more years. In this study Korea had the highest percentage of young people (15-24 
years old) classified as Digital Natives in the world with a figure of 99.6%. This 
placed them just ahead of Japan at 99.5% followed by Finland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands.  The ITU directly attributes Korea’s high score in this area to the 
emphasis placed on technology and ICT in education. Another important fact 
highlighted by this study is that Korea has a smaller digital divide than most countries 
with more than 84% of the total population, both young and old, using the Internet. 
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This shows that both the adult and school ICT initiatives introduced in the Section 
3.6.4 can be considered to have been effective in this context.  
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Based on the literature presented in this Chapter, Neo-Confucianism leads to many 
contradictions within Korean society. It went from being central to the running of 
Korean Kingdoms to virtually disappearing from its formal role within Korean 
institutions. Most of the Neo-Confucian academies have now been closed or 
converted into tourist sites. The majority of young Korean people would not be able 
to quote many of the sayings from Analects. It is no longer a major subject in schools 
and people do not often talk or refer to Neo-Confucian advice when making 
decisions. Men only wear traditional Neo-Confucian clothing for special events. 
However, despite its decline in official use, Neo-Confucianism is still everywhere in 
Korea. It is a part of the Korean language and it is central to how people form 
relationships and communicate.  For example, it sets certain honorific language 
expectations that can cause the gravest insult between Korean people if they are not 
adhered to.   
 
Neo-Confucianism offers a number of positive and negative features when it comes to 
business. When Korean people meet, they ask each other a number of standard 
questions so that they know how to communicate and categorise each other. This 
creates a framework that often allows individuals and teams to work together more 
quickly as everybody knows their roles as soon as these formalities take place. The 
system also places a strong emphasis on harmony and social justice. This can lessen 
conflict in business interactions and encourage people to work together toward a 
common aim.   
 
However, there are also some negative aspects of Neo-Confucianism as were 
highlighted in this Chapter. It often stifles the suggestion of ideas or improvements 
within organisations because people feel unable to contradict the decisions of their 
seniors. This can sometimes block creativity and innovation in Korea. It also provides 
a serious glass ceiling for women that Korean people have not yet found a way to 
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overcome. Furthermore, the system lends itself to excessive nepotism as seen in the 
large Korean Chaebol businesses. In this context of this research, its biggest drawback 
is how to accommodate people and products that do not fit into the system.  
 
When an international organisation opens within the Korean market, they initially 
have no role in Korea’s social structure and are viewed as outsiders. This often causes 
confusion for both sides when dealing with local businesses and Government because 
the new operation is immediately perceived as not having a defined status in Korea. 
This can lead to suspicion and sometimes even resistance.  The resistance can be 
especially bad if it is considered to be operating in competition with a Korean 
business or organisation.  This sometimes results in a direct backlash at a local or 
Government level as will be presented in Chapters 6 and 8.  
 
As shown in Section 2.3.2, Korea spent many centuries in international isolation 
during the Joseon Empire time. When the Korean rulers were finally forced to open 
up, they were so far behind in technology that they became easy targets for 
colonisation. This left Korea with a suspicion of the intentions of foreign arrivals 
arriving on their shores.  When this suspicion is combined with the fact than these 
arrivals also do not fit in anywhere in the Korean Social System, it creates a strong ‘us 
and them’ mentality.  This characteristic has manifested itself in many ways but the 
important one in this research is that it provided the motivation to protect local 
business from foreign imports until they were strong enough to stand alone.  
 
Perhaps the area where the influence of Neo-Confucianism remains most prevalent in 
modern Korea is in education. Success and status in the country is determined by a 
rigid educational meritocracy that is largely dependent on a single exam in high 
school. This can be seen as a legacy of Neo-Confucianism where merit based exams 
always determined a persons place in the civil service. However, there is also a 
peripheral positive effect stemming from this because education is considered to be of 
the utmost importance in Korea. In the ICT area, this has resulted in education 
programs being extremely well attended and popular. In turn, this has helped push 
Korea to the top of technology usage charts as the fears and barriers associated with 
technology in other countries have been removed by education. This can be seen as a 
very positive effect coming from the Neo-Confucian emphasis on education. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4: Literature Review on ICT Business in South Korea & 
Research Methodology 
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Chapter 4: Overview of ICT Business in South Korea & Research 
Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
South Korea’s ICT business has been an integral part of the country’s economy for 
over 10 years now.  It is now considered to be a mature business area but it is still 
dynamic because the business environment is constantly changing. In this Chapter, 
the characteristics of Korea’s ICT business will be introduced. In the past, Korea’s 
ICT strengths lay in the areas of assembly and manufacturing especially of 
components, telecommunications equipment and semiconductors.  The key period for 
the development of ICT in Korea was in the years directly following the IMF crisis in 
1997. When other business areas were struggling and restructuring, ICT businesses 
expanded rapidly taking them to the forefront of the Nation’s economy.  
 
However, now there is a shift taking place, with a growing interest both domestically 
and internationally in ICT services and software products from Korea.  This shift will 
be explored in this Chapter. First, the Government’s role in the ICT development will 
be presented as discussed in the literature. As seen in Section 2.6.5, the Korean 
Government were historically very involved in business and they steered the direction 
of growth strongly in many industries. ICT is no exception in this regard and in this 
Chapter, Section 4.2.2 will be devoted to showing how heavily involved the 
Government was in the ICT area.  
 
Next, an overview of the current ICT business situation in Korea will be presented as 
discussed in the literature. This serves as an illustration of what this business area has 
become and where it might go. Then, a section on the global position of Korea when 
it comes to ICT will be presented. This will pinpoint the ICT strengths and 
weaknesses of Korea when compared to other high-income countries.  This provides 
an important foundation for the case studies that will be presented later.  
 
From here, this Chapter will then move on to the research methodology employed in 
this thesis. This overview of Korea’s ICT sector is presented both by descriptive 
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statistics and, through a discussion of the relevant literature, informs and determines 
the methodology needed in order to adequately analyse the growth and trajectory of 
the area. This section begins by explaining why a cross-discipline study was selected 
and more specifically why interdisplinarity is the most appropriate choice. Then, the 
need for a historical overview is presented to explain how path dependency was 
evident in Korea’s economic development decisions.  Finally, the use of case studies 
will be discussed showing how they provide a macro-meso view of the ICT area that 
provides practical examples of the macro-level theories introduced earlier in the 
thesis.   
 
 
4.2 ICT Business 
 
4.2.1 Definition of ICT Business 
 
From a business perspective, the Information Technology Association of America  
defines Information Technology (I.T) as ‘the design, development, application, 
implementation, support or management of computer-based information systems’ 
(Daintith, 2009: p23).  Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is a 
broader extension to I.T that includes telecommunications equipment and convergent 
technology products (ADB, 2009).  This means that any consumer product or service 
that has a function from the above definition as its core revenue-generating product or 
brand can be considered to be an ICT Business. ICT products are now used in most 
businesses and the majority of users in their daily lives. However, a distinction can be 
drawn between businesses that simply use ICT and those that derive revenue directly 
from business activity relating to the production, sales and distribution of ICT 
products. In this study when a reference is made to ICT business, the implication is 
that the business falls into the latter category, and their main revenue-generating 
product is from the ICT area.   
 
In this thesis, we also consider the use of ICT by Korean customers. This involves a 
broader definition that does not suggest the end user development of ICT, but instead 
means just the use and early acceptance of ICT products from business.  In order to 
increase revenue from ICT business, countries need to nurture a customer base that 
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feels the devices and systems are relevant and useful enough to merit a purchase. The 
Korean Government has assisted in this process through the use of educational 
programs and by making information and interactions possible thought ICT devices, 
as we will see in the next sections.  
 
4.2.2 Development and Government involvement in Korean ICT Business 
 
The earliest example of ICT business activity in South Korea was when several large 
companies established semiconductor assembly factories in the country in the early 
1960s. The companies that ran these operations were Signetics, Fairchild, Motorola, 
Control Data, AMI and Toshiba.  Then, Komi Electronics became the first Korean 
company in the semiconductor industry when they began assembling transistors in 
1965 (Business Korea, 2013). Samsung also entered the area by taking over the 
former state-owned operation, Korea Semiconductor in 1974.  
 
As seen in Section 2.7.2, South Korea began to move from heavier industries into 
consumer electronics in the 1980s. The fifth five-year plan (1982-86) by the 
Government was an essential part of this shift as it clearly outlined this change of 
strategy. For example in 1983 Korea, along with the U.S and Japan, were the only 
countries with the technical capabilities required to make high density 64K DRAM 
memory chips (Allan, 2001). Throughout the 1980s, Korea was seen as a country that 
excelled in reverse engineering and low cost manufacturing but in the 1990s they 
started to be seen as innovators (Kim et al., 2013). One example of this was in 1994 
when Samsung unveiled the world’s first 256K-DRAM chip ahead of both Japan and 
the U.S (Kim, 1997).  The three ICT areas that Korea was strong in during the late 
1980s and 1990s were I.T components, communication equipment and 
semiconductors (Lee et al., 2009). A gradual shift towards fully assembled products 
started to emerge as the economy progressed. This was also the time when the Korean 
Government began work on digitising public service data including citizen 
information, property registrations, vehicle ownership and economic statistics 
(Choung et al, 2012). This project began in 1987 and was completed in 1994 (MIC, 
2006).   
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It was in the mid-late 1990s when ICT really started to become pivotal to the Korean 
economy. In the seventh five-year economic plan (1992-96), ICT was flagged as one 
of the key development areas. One important decision the Korean Government took at 
this time was to establish an electronic stock market to encourage the growth of 
technical companies and startups (Hung et al., 2012). They modelled this new body 
on the American NASDAQ and called it KOSDAQ (KFIA, 2010). In 2013, the 
volume traded on KOSDAQ exceeded that of the Korean Stock Exchange, illustrating 
its success.  The Government also sought to stimulate ICT growth by creating tax 
incentives including a 50% tax deduction for R&D expenses, along with the 
exemption of income tax on royalties from on-the-job inventions (Jung et al, 2013). 
These incentives were allocated by a new Informatisation Promotion Fund set up to 
manage financial resources for Informatisation and ICT Research and Development 
(R&D). Another significant step was the creation of the Ministry of Information and 
Communication in 1994 (KISDI, 2005). This Government body was then given 
responsibility for the creation of a National ICT policy.  
 
In 1996, the telecommunications, computers, computer peripherals, and software 
services sectors of the economy accounted for 8.1% of Korea’s GDP (Shin and Park, 
2007). This was the year before the 1997 IMF crisis when many Korean companies 
had severe financial difficulties. It was directly after this crisis when ICT really rose 
in importance in South Korea’s economy. While other businesses were struggling, the 
ICT share of Korea’s GDP jumped from 7.7% in 1997 to 15.3% in 2000 (Kim, 2009).  
Furthermore, the percentage of the workforce employed in these industries grew from 
4.24% in 1995 to 6.04% in 2000. In a paper analysing the events directly after the 
1997 IMF crisis, Lee Ho-Chul and Mary McNulty (2002) of the World Bank, directly 
attributed Korea’s quick recovery to the growth of ICT Business and they concluded 
that this area was steered by both the Government and the private sector.   
 
In 2001, the Korean Government introduced two important acts; The E-Government 
act was put in place to begin using the Internet for as many functions as possible. The 
second move was establishing the act on resolving the digital divide, which tied-in 
with the Cyber 21 education project.  The growth trend continued into the next decade 
with ICT business becoming the main engine of economic growth in South Korea. 
Specifically, in one research paper (Vu, 2004), the ICT Hardware Industry was 
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pinpointed as the predominant driver of economic growth and this was attributed to 
the Korean Government’s strategic support. This was especially apparent in 2003-
2005 where it consisted of close to half of all growth. These percentages are 
illustrated in Table 4.1 below, where research conducted by Suh and Chen (2007) 
showed the emergence of the ICT area as an engine of growth. The percentages 
shown in the table were calculated by taking the overall economic growth figure and 
separating it by industry, to identify the share attributable to ICT.  
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Share of Economic growth in Korea that comes from ICT  
Year % 
2001 26.3 
2002 25.7 
2003 51.6 
2004 46.8 
2005 47.5 
 
Table 4.1. Percentage of total economic growth in Korea due to ICT business  
(Source: Suh and Chen, 2007 p20) 
 
To put the ICT growth into context, the figures can be put alongside overall economic 
growth in South Korea. In Figure 4.1 below, we can see how economic growth rose 
and fell throughout the last 10 years but ICT as a percentage of GDP continued on a 
steady upward trajectory. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Economic Growth & ICT as a percentage of GDP in South Korea (Data 
Source: ITSTAT, 2013)
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Another example of the crucial role of ICT was its role in Korea’s trade surplus.  In 
2007, the ICT trade surplus was US$60.3 billion accounting for more that 90% of 
Korea’s total surplus. By 2010, the ICT share of the trade surplus was 2.3 times 
higher than any other industry in Korea (NSTC, 2010).  
 
This growth was supported by the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation, 
which was set up in 2003. Private companies, especially the large Chaebols like 
Samsung, Hyundai and LG, dominated R&D ICT funding in Korea between 2003 and 
2013. They consistently spent 4-5 times the amount the Government spent on ICT 
R&D during this period (ITSTAT, 2013). Most of this was focused on the 
manufacturing of ICT equipment and electronic components, as it was their core 
business. Less than 10% was on ICT services. However, even though the Government 
spending on ICT R&D was a fraction of the total, the industry was still the biggest 
recipient of public funding. Each year from 2004-2013, ICT received the greatest 
share of public R&D financing with between 15 and 20% of the total allocated 
annually (MEST, 2013).   
 
In global terms, Korea ranks very highly when the total spend on ICT R&D is 
compared. In 2012, the ICT industries in Korea were allocated 53.1% of total research 
and development funds, placing the country fourth globally among high-economy 
countries  (Elles, 2013).  This has led to relatively high patent registration statistics. In 
the ICT area, Korea filed 13% of the total, above Japan but just below the USA 
(WIPO, 2012).  This also placed Korea ahead of any European countries suggesting 
that the high R&D expenditure is producing innovation at a good return. Another 
indicator was a study conducted by Bloomberg (2013) on the most innovative 
countries in the world. The USA was first and Korea came in second. However, 
Korea took first place in the number of patents registered per capita.  
 
In summary, this section shows that the Korean Government played an important role 
in the rise of ICT’s prominence in Korea’s economy. The area is dominated by a 
group of large hardware companies that worked closely with the Government to 
stimulate growth. There are now signs that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are 
starting to emerge in the mobile apps area and other new ICT niches are appearing 
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due to product convergence. Some evidence of this will be presented in the next 
section. 
 
4.2.3 Current status of South Korea’s ICT Business 
 
South Korea is an export-orientated country and the ICT business is a central part of 
that. The recent global slump in consumer demand from high-income countries 
affected ICT exports. The reductions have been offset somewhat by a rise in demand 
from China and other emerging economies as Korea has done well in those markets 
recently, but the overall picture is that ICT growth is quite flat overall. Another trend 
that is starting to affect Korea is the movement of manufacturing overseas to reduce 
staff costs. Certain large Korean companies are following the patterns of 
manufacturers in Europe and North America where they relocate to countries that 
have lower wages for the assembly of ICT products.  
 
According to official Korean Government statistics, production in the ICT industry 
decreased by almost 1.4% in 2012 compared to a year earlier.  Furthermore, exports 
of ICT equipment declined 3.9% year on year to US$131.5 billion. This was mostly 
attributed to poor sales figures in North America and Europe. 2013 appeared to be a 
slightly better year however.  ICT equipment exports were projected to grow by 1.9% 
in 2013 to US$134 billion. Exports of mobiles devices are essential to the Korean 
economy as the domestic market is at saturation point. In 2012, penetration of Mobile 
Devices reached 107% in Korea so companies are dependent on selling product 
upgrades like 4G LTE handsets to sustain sales (NIA, 2013).   
 
One area that is growing domestically in Korea is the I.T Services associated with 
cloud-based Internet Data Centers (IDCs). So far, attempts to get foreign direct 
investment in this area has had very limited success, but growth in cloud-based 
services for Korean customers resulted in an almost 8% increase in 2013. This can 
also be linked to increased consumer activity in the online games area. Revenue in 
this area increased 11.3% to US$9.735 million in 2012, and it was also above 11% in 
2013 (ITSTAT, 2013).  It is still a relatively small business area but it may become 
more significant in the future. Korea’s traditional stronghold of semiconductors is 
also going through a major adjustment at the moment. Exports of memory 
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semiconductors dropped 20.6% in 2012 but this has been offset by a growth of 25% 
in system semiconductor exports. The net result is an increase of 0.6% for exports in 
the area to US$91.3 billion. Again, this area showed signs of being positive in 2013 
with growth of almost 3% forecasted (ITSTAT, 2013).   
 
An area that has often been flagged as a weakness in Korea is the export of software 
when games are excluded.  However, this is now an area that is growing quickly. One 
example is that Korean apps are selling well on mobile devices internationally. One 
advantage that software makers in Korea have now is that Samsung is now a global 
leader in mobile devices so they can get an inside track on emerging hardware and 
then develop software for new models earlier than companies in other countries. 
Exports of software in 2012 increased by 26% over the previous year to US$1.79 
billion. Another segment in this area that is going well is the sales of tailored e-
Government solutions by IT service providers.  In 2013, it looks as if software exports 
will increase again by close to 14% (ITSTAT, 2013).  
 
4.3 Importance of Korea’s ICT industry to the world 
 
4.3.1 E-Government Development Index 
 
The index that most Governments reference when seeking to benchmark the quality 
of their services is the E-Government Development Index. The United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) publishes this report every 
second year. The final score is a composite index measuring the willingness and 
capacity of national administrations to use online and mobile technology.  It consists 
of three sub-indices; web measurement index, telecommunications infrastructure 
index and human capital index.   In 2008 Korea was ranked 6
th
 from 182 countries. 
By 2012, Korea was ranked first from 190 countries. In addition, Korea got the 
number one spot in the Web Measurement Index for E-Government (U.N, 2012). This 
shows how much the Korea Government has embraced the use of ICT for 
Government functions.  
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4.3.2 Network Readiness Index 
 
Another metric that countries use as a benchmark is the Networked Readiness Index 
(NRI).  This report is published by the World Economic Forum  (WEF) on an annual 
basis. It measures how much each country uses ICT to improve competitiveness and 
assesses how much innovation and new technology development influences 
productivity improvement and development. In 2012, the report underwent a major 
restructuring and now it contains 53 indicators across four sub-indexes; environment, 
readiness, usage and impact (WEF, 2012).  
 
A Summary of Korea’s ICT Weaknesses and Strengths  
Strengths Ranking Weaknesses Ranking 
Time to enforce a contract 3rd Judicial Independence 69th 
Percentage of households 
with internet access 
1st Efficiency of legal system in 
challenging regulations 
97th 
E-participation index 1st Venture capital availability 100th 
Government online service 
areas 
1st Effectiveness of law-making 
bodies 
123rd 
Individual Usage 2nd Affordability of tariffs for 
business 
70th 
Government Usage 1st Efficiency of legal system in 
settling disputes 
84th 
Impact of ICT on new 
products and services 
2nd Internet and telephony 
sectors competition index 
79th 
Social Impact 1st Mobile cellular tariffs 84th 
Extent of business Internet 
use 
2nd FDI and technology transfer 83rd 
 
Table 4.2 Korea’s ICT Weaknesses and Strengths according to the NRI study 
(Source: WEF, 2012)
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Table 4.2 above is a summary of a group of metrics in which Korea scored low or 
high scores. The set of metrics in which Korea scored well contains a number of 
usage and infrastructure items. This is suggestive of a country where ICT is a key part 
of people’s lives and where they have managed to bridge the digital divide 
effectively. The high ranking in the availability of Government services correlates 
with the E-Government Development Index results displayed in Section 4.3.1.   
 
However, this table also shows that Korea does have some weaknesses when it comes 
to ICT. The efficiency of the legal system is flagged twice as a problem. Also, venture 
capital appears on the list with a low ranking. This may be because Korea is so 
dominated by the huge Chaebol companies that it sometimes makes it hard for ICT 
enterprises to get going.  In the context of this study, the weak foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and tariff scores are significant. The scores show that it difficult for 
international companies to break into the Korean market and this is due to barriers 
associated with Korea’s history and social system. These metrics support these 
assertions because of Korea’s very low ranking compared to other countries. The fact 
that the low ranking is in contrast with very high rankings in other areas suggests a 
specific problem rather than the general weakness of the industry.  
 
 
4.3.3 Measuring the Information Society 
 
South Korea’s economic status is only the tip of the iceberg in terms of its importance 
to the International ICT industry.  Its real significance can be seen when focusing on 
how its technological profile compares to other nations on a global scale.  One 
indicator is the annual ‘Measuring the Information Society’ study carried out by the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU, 2013)
5
.  
 
In their 2013 report, the ITU captured and ranked the level of ICT development of 
152 economies worldwide and compared the progress they made over the previous 
                                                        
5  The ITU is the United Nations agency that conducts research on Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs). This agency regularly publishes statistics comparing ICT data from countries 
around the world.  
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year. From this data, the ITU created an ICT Development index (IDI). The IDI is a 
composite index that condenses 11 indicators into a single benchmark score to assess 
and track developments in ICT across countries (ITU, 2012). The first set of IDI 
statistics were generated in 2008, and published in 2009, as a response to international 
requests to the U.N for a standardised benchmark system. The final score is an 
aggregation of three sub-indices; ICT Access, ICT Use and ICT Skills.  
  
In both the 2011 and 2010 studies, the number one ranked country in the world was 
South Korea.  Aside from Korea, the only other Asian Entry in the top 10 for 2011 
was Japan, which lay in eighth place. The remainder of the top 10 countries all came 
from Western Europe.   Some of the world’s economic giants lay a little further down 
the list. The USA was 15th, Germany was in 16th place and China appeared in 78th. 
By comparison, Ireland popped up in 20th, close to the midpoint on the EU rankings. 
A tabularised summary of the scores can be seen in Table 4.3 below.
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Selected country rankings from the 2012 ICT Development Index  
Economy 2012 Rank 2011 IDI 
Score 
2011 Rank 2011 IDI 
Score 
Korea (Rep.) 1 8.57 1 8.51 
Sweden 2 8.45 2 8.41 
Iceland 3 8.36 4 8.12 
Denmark 4 8.35 3 8.18 
Finland 5 8.24 5 7.99 
Norway 6 8.13 6 7.97 
Netherlands 7 8.00 7 7.85 
United 
Kingdom 
8 7.98 11 7.63 
Luxembourg 9 7.93 9 7.76 
Hong Kong 10 7.92 10 7.66 
* United States 17 7.53 16 7.35 
* Germany 19 7.46 17 7.33 
* Ireland 23 7.25 22 7.10 
* China 78 4.18 79 3.86 
* = selected reference countries 
Table 4.3 2012 ICT Development Index (Source: ITU, 2013) 
 
The fact that Korea appeared in first place in both the 2012 and 2011 analysis, while 
also managing to improve its overall score shows that the country has sustained a 
pivotal position of importance in the overall global ICT scheme. It is also worth 
noting that Korea has over three times the population of any other country in the top 
seven, only serving to add further weight to its significance on the list.  However, in 
order to understand the rankings, it is essential to drill down into the three basic sub-
indices; Access, Use and Skills. 
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4.3.4 Internet Access and Infrastructure 
 
In the ITU study, the Access Category measured the scale of each country’s ICT 
infrastructure in parallel with the level of penetration of their Internet services.  Their 
measurement system revolved around considering the number of people that have 
opted to use the available Internet services in each country.    
 
The Access category measured five criteria: 
• Fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 
• Mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 
• International Internet bandwidth per Internet User 
• Proportion of households with a computer 
• Proportion of households with Internet Access at home 
 
A summary of the results can be seen in Table 4.4 below: 
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Selected Country rankings from the 2012 ICT Access Index 
Economy 2012 Rank 2012 Access 
Score 
2011 Rank 2011 Access 
Score 
Hong Kong 1 9.18 1 9.13 
Luxembourg 2 8.93 2 8.72 
Iceland 3 8.77 3 8.71 
Switzerland 4 8.73 4 8.61 
Germany 5 8.51 5 8.48 
United 
Kingdom 
6 8.46 7 8.30 
Sweden 7 8.37 6 8.36 
Singapore 8 8.31 9 8.21 
Netherlands 9 8.28 8 8.23 
Malta 10 8.28 11 8.16 
* Korea (Rep.) 11 8.28 10 8.19 
* United States 29 7.24 26 7.12 
* Ireland 23 7.59 23 7.49 
* China 80 4.36 82 4.04 
* = selected reference countries 
Table 4.4. 2012 ICT Access Index (Source: ITU, 2013) 
 
As can be seen in the Table 4.4 above, South Korea is listed in eleventh place. While 
still receiving a high score, this is Korea’s lowest ranking out of the three ITU sub-
indices. In order to fully understand these figures, it is useful to have a closer look at 
some ICT infrastructure information to place this score into context.   
 
As of 2013, Korea had the highest number of mobile-broadband subscriptions 
worldwide at 107% (ITSTAT, 2013). It may be significant that the level of 
subscriptions to high-speed mobile broadband services may reduce the need for other 
types of Internet connections.  For example tablet and phablet devices in Korea are 
mostly sold with monthly plans for Mobile Internet use.  Many of these monthly plans 
are now based on unlimited data use. Therefore, if people choose a mobile device as 
their primary computing interface, they may no longer need a fixed line subscription 
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or even a computer in their homes.  It could be argued that Korea’s slightly lower 
placing on this list could be down to the fact that Korea has already outgrown the 
measurement system for this section.  This may become more apparent when the next 
set of figures become available in 2014. 
 
It is certain that availability is not a limiting factor for broadband connections in 
Korea, as almost 97% of all households in Korea have fixed line Internet services 
available (ITU, 2013). However, the number of fixed-broadband subscriptions stands 
at 36.6% (4th in the world behind the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark). It is 
likely that this percentage will stagnate or even drop as Mobile Internet Devices 
continue to capture increased market shares.  Smartphones have completely changed 
the landscape of Korea’s Internet usage patterns. This provides another example of 
how Korean consumers can be considered early Internet adopters. In 2008, a 
relatively low figure of 7.5 million smartphones were sold in South Korea but when 
competition began between Apple’s iPhone and Samsung, it led to a 220% increase in 
smartphone sales in just over a year. As of 2012, almost half (20 million) of the entire 
population of South Korea owned a smartphone (Hanguk Research, 2012). 
   
One area where fixed-line broadband connections continue to outperform mobile 
connections is on speed. This is another area where South Korea appears close to the 
top of the list. In a 2012 study by Akamai, they sampled 35 petabytes of data from 27 
million downloads and 224 countries. The result was that South Korea had an average 
fixed-line peak Internet Connection speed of 48.8 MBps (Megabytes per second). To 
put that into perspective, this was almost four times the world’s average and was 
faster than the speeds in the UK, Turkey, Spain and Australia combined (Streams, 
2013) 
 
Again, Korea leads the way on the fastest Internet cities on the world list. Seocho 
(which is actually a large suburb of Seoul) weighed in at 33.5 Mbps in 2012. This was 
well ahead of Andover in the USA (also more like a suburb of Boston), which rated as 
North America’s fastest city with a speed of 22 Mbps.  The speeds level available to 
South Korean consumers can mostly be attributed to strong infrastructural support 
from the Government. For example, the Korean government is currently working on a 
project that promises to provide a speed of 1 GBps to every household in the country 
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(KISA, 2012).  This makes South Korea's Internet speed 65% faster on average than 
speeds in the U.S. 
 
4.3.5 Internet Use 
 
The second sub-index that the ITU used to paint a picture of Internet levels was 
Internet Use. These indicators attempted to measure ICT uptake along with the 
duration of people’s Internet usage. The three sub-indicators included in the use sub-
index were: 
• Internet users per 100 inhabitants 
• Fixed broadband Internet subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 
• Active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.  
 
A summary of the results in this area can be seen in Table 4.5 below:
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Selected Countries from the 2012 ICT Internet Use Index 
Economy 2012 Rank 2012 Use Score 2011 Rank 2011 Use Score 
Sweden 1 8.25 2 8.16 
Korea (Rep) 2 8.22 1 8.17 
Denmark 3 8.15 3 7.78 
Norway 4 8.05 4 7.67 
Finland 5 8.05 5 7.51 
Japan 6 7.51 6 7.49 
Iceland 7 7.50 10 6.96 
Australia 8 7.46 12 6.66 
Netherlands 9 7.32 9 6.99 
Luxembourg 10 7.29 8 7.07 
* United States 14 6.76 14 6.43 
* Ireland 21 6.08 20 5.81 
* China 66 2.70 69 2.24 
* = selected reference countries 
Table 4.5. 2012 ICT Use Index (Source: ITU, 2013) 
 
On this list, Korea sits in second place. This supports the data shown in the Network 
Readiness study earlier where Korea ranked very highly in the ICT use metrics. One 
of the indicators shown in this table may be already outdated however. The number of 
fixed broadband Internet subscriptions per 100 inhabitants indicator may be 
measuring something that is no longer needed in many Korean homes due to the 
strength and speed of mobile Internet connections.   
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4.3.6 Internet Skills 
 
The third criterion that the ITU used to measure Internet use globally was Skills.  This 
was judged in an indirect way in their study by assessing the following three sub-
indicators: 
• Adult literacy rate 
• Gross secondary school enrolment 
• Gross tertiary school enrolment 
 
The results of the rankings in this section are shown in Table 4.6 below. 
 
Selected Countries from the 2012 ICT Skills Index 
Economy 2012 Rank 2012 Skills 
Score 
2011 Rank 2011 Skills 
Score 
Korea (Rep.) 1 9.86 1 9.86 
Finland 2 9.80 2 9.80 
United States 3 9.65 3 9.65 
Greece 4 9.55 4 9.55 
Belarus 5 9.48 5 9.48 
Slovenia 6 9.44 6 9.44 
New Zealand 7 9.38 7 9.38 
Spain 8 9.34 8 9.34 
Australia 9 9.29 9 9.29 
Iceland 10 9.24 10 9.24 
* Japan 34 8.62 34 8.62 
* Germany 45 8.17 45 8.17 
* Ireland 20 8.89 20 8.89 
* China 93 6.77 93 6.77 
* selected reference countries 
Table 4.6. 2012 ICT Skills Index (Source: ITU, 2013) 
 
As we can see in the above list, South Korea ranks in first place on the scale that the 
ITU used for this area. The fact that this criterion was measured in an indirect way led 
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to some countries appearing in much different positions on the list than they did in the 
directly measured criteria. Some examples of this are the inclusion of Greece, Belarus 
and Slovenia in the top ten. Obviously these countries have highly inclusive education 
systems but do not have the Internet infrastructure and usage characteristics 
highlighted in earlier sections.    
 
By analysing the ITU study results and the supporting information behind the data, 
South Korea’s importance in the world of ICT immediately becomes apparent. 
Korea’s position among the countries at the forefront of ICT early adoption and use is 
unlikely to be usurped any time in the near future. This makes South Korea the ideal 
subject for study in this area.  
 
 
4.4 Research Methodology 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
In any cross-disciplinary study, the research methodology needs to be carefully 
considered and the decision to move outside of a discipline needs to be justified to 
establish why it is beneficial in the context of the study. In this thesis, a number of 
disciplines are straddled and the reasoning behind the diverse use of sources of 
evidence will be explained in the next section. Also, the use of a historical overview 
will be discussed in Section 4.4.3. The ICT area is considered to be a new and 
dynamic area and its links to the past are not always apparent. In Section 4.4.3, the 
reasoning behind using a historical approach will be introduced by explaining how 
Korea’s rapid development trajectory is strongly influenced by path dependencies 
from historical events. Finally, the use and choice of case studies will be analysed in 
Section 4.4.4. In research work, case studies are a somewhat controversial area as 
they are not always contusive to answering research questions. Section 4.4.4 will 
show why case studies have value in this research area and why certain case study 
areas were selected.   
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4.4.2 Multi-disciplinary, Cross-disciplinary or Interdisciplinary Studies 
 
Academic disciplines have been traditionally seen as distinct areas of study with their 
own theories, methods and content.  This has been reflected in institutions by 
separating activities into departments, chairs, courses, research groups and other 
similar designations (Squires, 1992, p202).  Disciplines train members of their 
departments by providing tailored scientific processes and standard acceptable 
approaches for solving problems that can be peer reviewed by others who are also 
familiar with these structures (Beyer & Lodahl, 1976; Reich & Reich, 2006) 
 
However, when following the thread of evidence needed to solve a research question, 
researchers sometimes find themselves at the boundary of their discipline. This can 
leave them with a dilemma. Will they move out of their comfort zone and try to seek 
the answers in the unfamiliar territory of another discipline or move back inside their 
own area and reappraise the direction of their investigation? The second choice is 
sometimes the path of least resistance because it does not challenge existing academic 
structures and does not challenge the assessment framework of their institution. 
Unfortunately, it can also result in promising paths of inquiry being discarded or ruled 
out because of where they are taking the researcher.  
 
If a researcher decides to take the path of moving outside their discipline into a cross-
discipline study, then another question must be answered.  Which is the correct type 
of cross-disciplinary approach for their research question; Multidisciplinary, 
Transdisciplinary or Interdisciplinary?  
 
A multidisciplinary approach is based on drawing from various disciplines to re-
evaluate problems from perspectives that lie outside of normal boundaries in order to 
reach solutions to complex problems.  It is based on the concept of the co-existence of 
multiple discrete and autonomous disciplines. Multidisciplinarity can be described 
simply as an approach in which: ‘everyone [does] his or her thing with little or no 
necessity for any one participant to be aware of any other participant’s work’ (Petrie, 
1976, p9). In many ways multidisciplinary approaches lend themselves to the use of 
teams where each member has their own distinct expertise.  The advantage of 
multidisciplinary teamwork is that there is in-depth knowledge of each facet of the 
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study when a deeper analysis is needed.  The disadvantage is that lines of inquiry can 
be lost when crossing over from one discipline to another due to variances in 
perspective, analytical methods and standards.  Important research threads can fall 
between the cracks of disciplines because the line joining the dots cannot bridge the 
divide.   
 
One of the first scientific references to the idea of Transdisciplinarity as it is used 
today was presented by Erich Jantsch (1972: p28) to the OECD in 1970. He explained 
it as ‘the targeted coordination of a group of disciplines and inter-disciplines, which 
together are involved in a complex scientific system, and which have a common 
purpose, with this coordination based on a general system of axioms that are 
considered binding on all concerned’. Despite the complexity of the definition, the 
idea caught on and evolved. The broadest concept of Transdisciplinarity is that it 
involves moving across disciplines with a set of research tools and approaches in 
order to investigate a research question (Miller & Boix, 2004).  It lends itself to 
research projects where an individual researcher is willing to cross boundaries in 
order to try and conduct research using their current skillset and practices.  This can 
eventually result in the branching off of study into a new discipline (Dunning, 1989).  
 
The idea of Interdisciplinarity is quite close to Transdisciplinarity.  This involves the 
combining of two of more academic disciplines into a single research activity. Its aim 
is to solve a problem or provide a bigger picture explanation of a topic in ways that 
would have been impossible when confined to a single discipline (Creamer & Lattuca, 
2005).  This form of research also lends itself to a single researcher working on a 
topic or question but it can involve collaboration by integrating knowledge from 
various disciplines into the project. Petrie (1976) suggested that Interdisciplinary 
relationships should be sought when the demands of the subject warrant it, and not 
before. Certain questions require the use of alternative perspectives in order to be 
solved.   
 
In the context of this study, the aim is to study the rise of Korea’s ICT industry and 
explain why it was centrally planned with heavy Government involvement. As seen in 
Section 1.1, while looking at the rapid development of Korea’s economy, researchers 
often stopped at the post-war period and pinpointed President Park Chung-Hee’s 
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leadership as the only significant factor that allowed for economic growth.  However, 
this leaves some questions unanswered. Why did President Park’s regime take a very 
different economic approach than the one favoured by the U.S.A at the time even 
though South Korea was still very much under their sphere of influence?  What are 
the social / historical factors that were behind this approach? How are these 
approaches evolving in the era of free trade agreements?   
 
These questions involve stepping outside of the boundaries of a single discipline and 
looking at history, culture, technology and economics. The historical aspect involves 
looking at the path-dependency stemming from historical events and tracing how they 
entered the decision-making processes in recent times.  Culture is important because 
Neo-Confucianism is a part of all relationships in Korea and these relationships 
strongly influence the country’s business environment. It also provided the emphasis 
on education and exam culture that partially lies behind the early adoption and use of 
ICT devices. The economic viewpoint is needed to show what economic development 
path Korea took. Knowledge of technology is essential as the topic is the how these 
factors shape the ICT area. 
 
As this research project did not involve a team or an expert in various disciplines, the 
multi-disciplinary approach was not really an option. Transdisplinarity was also 
unsuitable as this research project was more about following the trail of breadcrumbs 
to see where it leads as opposed to applying consistent approaches across a set of 
disciplines. Therefore an Interdisciplinary method was the appropriate choice for this 
research area.  It allows the crossing of boundaries without requiring in-depth 
knowledge of each area in order to provide an integrated bigger-picture view that 
includes the constituent factors.  
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4.4.3 Historical approach and Path Dependency 
  
The idea of looking back into history to find the roots of Korea’s economic 
development lies in the idea of path dependency. Path dependency means that 
decisions and actions can be attributed to the experiences and strategies taken in the 
past even if past circumstances may no longer be relevant. In economics, path 
dependency has been used extensively to explain technology adoption processes and 
industrial evolution in developing countries (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Thorbecke, 
2006; Douma and Schreuder, 2013). It is closely connected to evolutionary 
economics. This area looks at the external processes that affect and transform 
economies and has parallels with evolutionary biology and Darwinian theories.    
 
Specifically, the economic transition and innovation path that took place in certain 
East Asian countries after the Second World War was analysed in depth by John 
Cantwell (1999, 2000, 2003). In his research, Cantwell concluded that the progress 
made by this group of countries, one of which was Korea, needs to be studied using a 
techno-socio-economic paradigm in order to be understood. He also pinpointed the 
role of Government and the management of trade barriers in both Korea and Japan as 
key factors in their growth cycles.  Furthermore, in a study on path dependency in 
international networks of technological innovation (2009), Cantwell outlined the need 
to trace the roots of development to historical events to pinpoint the factors that create 
an environment in which certain industries can thrive even in countries that were 
catching up economically.  
 
There are two types of path dependency study paradigms that are used in the 
comparative-historical analysis of the development of businesses and organisations.  
The first type is the critical juncture framework where sequences of the past establish 
specific development habits and approaches that are difficult to break away from. If 
these habits are successful they become self-reinforcing sequences of increasing 
returns, where the adopted pattern delivers ever-increasing benefits with its 
continuous use (Arthur, 1994). The second type of path dependent analysis is the 
study of reactive sequences. These are connected sequences of ordered, causally-
connected events. Therefore, each event is part of a chain that builds on the previous 
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event. This type of analysis is generally seen as a path towards a single outcome 
(David, 1985).  
 
The basis for the use of path dependency in this thesis is that there appears to be a 
reactive sequence of events beginning in Korean history that has exhibited itself 
within the characteristics of Korea’s post-war economic development period. This is a 
critical constituent part of the mix of elements that have come together in order to 
drive Korea’s growth in ICT to become a world leader.  In this thesis, the notion is put 
forward that Korea has exhibited both types of path dependency in its history. 
 
The type of path dependency that is more suited to the analysis of Korea’s rapid 
development is the reactive sequence approach. As introduced in Section 2.3.4, there 
is a strong idea that Korea’s mistakes of the past led to a situation where the country 
was too weak to defend itself against the influence of larger countries who did not 
have their best interests at heart. This manifests itself as a desire to change their path 
to ensure these mistakes are not repeated.  However, Korea’s rapid development was 
based on a definite strategic approach as seen in Section 2.6.4. When a strategy is 
successful, it can set the country on path towards having a critical juncture framework 
where the development habits that worked well in the past become engrained as a part 
of the decision-making process especially if the country continues to reap dividends 
from its use. Therefore, there is a basis for saying that Korea exhibited a reactive 
sequence to certain historical events that took place pre-industrialisation, but is now 
exhibiting characteristics of critical juncture path dependency by repeating the 
techniques used during the country’s era of rapid economic growth in adapted forms 
to suit the changing international environment.  
 
Two study areas were removed from the path dependent historical overview in this 
thesis and analysed in separate chapters. These were Neo-Confucianism and Korean 
Netizens. Both these areas were pinpointed as areas that required a different level of 
examination than the other historical events from Chapter 2. Neo-Confucianism is a 
philosophical subject, but it is enshrined in history so it does have path dependent 
characteristics. However, the focus on Neo-Confucianism in this thesis is on how it 
strongly influences contemporary communication, organisational culture and 
education in Korea. This aim of the Chapter is to show how Neo-Confucianism and 
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the education meritocracy it has created in Korea has no role for foreigners or foreign 
companies so it can lead to the erection of barriers as a byproduct, rather than by 
design.  
 
Netizens as a study subject was also taken separately from Chapter 2 because it 
required a greater level of detail than anything covered earlier. Korean Netizens are 
fluid social groups that have been spawned by reactive sequences based on Korean 
historical events.  They are significant because they show how certain mixes of 
combustible elements can trigger strong reactions and Internet social movements in 
Korea. This can be tied back to historical events and formative international 
experiences.  
 
4.4.4 Use of Case studies 
 
A case study can be simply defined as ‘the intensive study of a single subject with the 
aim of generalising across a larger set of subjects’ (Dul & Hak, 2008 p40). In this 
thesis, the role of the case studies is to see if research evidence can be found of a 
causal relationship between the topics and the historical path dependencies discussed 
earlier in the research. This provides a micro / meso level view to complement the 
macro view of the ICT business of Korea shown earlier in the thesis. This research 
strategy aims to provide an empirical inquiry that investigates the proposed 
phenomenon within its real-life context.  
 
One premise of this thesis is that trade-protectionism and centralised decision making 
processes in Korea when it comes to international business, is a natural phenomenon 
considering that the history of the country is littered with examples of foreign powers 
removing Korea’s leaders along with controlling and sometimes exploiting the 
country. Therefore, the aim of the case studies here is to illustrate how protectionism 
manifests itself, using a small number of specific examples.  These case studies can 
also be considered to be part of the broader methodology used in this research. The 
case studies needed to be drawn directly from business in order to provide concrete 
practical scenarios. 
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4.4.5 Choice of case studies 
 
When tracing paths from history and causation, it is often helpful to choose subjects 
that provide an interesting, unusual or particularly revealing set of circumstances. The 
case studies chosen can be outlier cases (where the subject is extreme, deviant or 
atypical), key cases that provide representative case examples or local knowledge 
cases.  Outlier cases often provide more useful insights but local knowledge cases can 
be powerful when the researcher has specialist knowledge of the area from being 
immersed within the environment (Hamel, 1993).  
 
When choosing case study examples, it is common to provide a mix of secondary data 
along with in-depth interviews. However, in this thesis, the decision was made to rely 
entirely on carefully selected secondary data. In certain case studies, analysis of the 
information may point in a direction that is not in line with the image that parties with 
vested interests may want to portray. With that in mind, the case studies presented 
here did not involve direct interviews with Korean Government officials or 
representatives from the ICT industry in Korea, as any information gathered in that 
way was unlikely to be of benefit to the study.    
 
In this thesis, the theoretical focus is the rapid development of Korea’s economy and 
more specifically the ICT business area. So, the case studies were chosen as a means 
by which the object of the theoretical focus can be viewed and illustrated. As the ICT 
area is rapidly evolving, the case studies chosen needed to be contemporary and 
relevant to current technology trends. In this thesis three case studies were selected, 
namely the battle for Office Suite Dominance, Active-X and the SEED Security 
Standard and Korea’s telecommunication industry.  
 
The case study examples used in this thesis were selected based on business 
anthropology approaches. It is possible to identify good opportunities for research by 
becoming immersed in an environment and identifying topics suitable for further 
study based on observation from within, while asking why each individual 
characteristic of an industry exists. In order to replicate the approach taken in this 
study, a researcher would need to gain practical work experience in a region and then 
search for the key business scenarios that influence the companies working in the 
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area. With that in mind, the rationale for these three case studies used in this study are 
given below. 
 
The battle for Office Suite Dominance: This case study is a local knowledge example 
that uses a combination of the experiences and observations of the research along with 
academic and media articles. It is a narrative that has not yet reached a conclusion but 
it has a number of critical events that make it a good study topic. The first key point is 
that the case study contains direct competition between Hancom, a domestic small-
medium enterprise (SME), and Microsoft, a large Multinational Corporation (MNC). 
The second important detail is that the MNC is American and of course the USA is 
often perceived to be one of the countries that has threatened Korea’s sovereignty in 
the recent past.  The third important detail is that Hancom has a connection to Korea’s 
history because their flagship product uses and associates itself with the Hangul 
Writing System, which is of huge cultural significance to Korean people, and is itself 
a symbol of independence. Therefore, it ticks all the boxes as a practical local-
knowledge case study that serves as a contemporary illustration of what can happen 
when a MNC threatens the business of a home-grown company where protectionism 
is part of the social fabric. It links back to the research question because it shows how 
trade can be affected by social and historical factors in the ICT area.  
 
Active-X and the Seed Security Standard: This case study is another local knowledge 
example that comes directly from practical business experience. In this example, the 
Korean Government features heavily, as it was a chain of decisions made by 
Government bodies that resulted in a unique I.T security ecosystem in Korea that 
diverged from the rest of the world. It was selected because of the pivotal role of the 
Government in the development and evolution of this ICT area. This case study links 
directly back to the research question as the security standard was challenged legally 
as an example of a technical trade barrier  
 
Korea’s Telecommunication Industry: This case study contains a much wider scope 
than any of the preceding examples. It was selected because this is an area of ICT 
where Korea has a world leading company. Therefore, it can be use to track the 
development path that the company and the industry took in order to produce a set of 
products that managed to be hugely successful internationally. This case study 
  132 
involves both Government and Private Sector organisations working together. It is 
connected to the research question because it again involves domestic Korean 
companies competing directly with large international corporations for business 
dominance both inside and outside the country.  
 
4.4.6 Expectations from each Case Study 
 
The battle for Office Suite Dominance: 
 
In this case study, the expectation is that evidence will show how the Korean public, 
business and Government reacted to a large international company that directly 
threatened the continued existence of a homegrown company. The most likely 
conclusion based on experience from Korean history is that it would trigger a strong 
social movement against the international company that would then in turn set in 
motion a chain of events resulting in the Government erecting trade barriers or other 
measures to protect the domestic company. Depending on the domestic company’s 
ability to take advantage of their protected status, the expectation is this would either 
provide them with a platform to expand their business outside Korea or else 
consolidate their domestic user base.  In section 6.9, the evidence presented by this 
case study is discussed to establish if the Hancom business trajectory can be explained 
by the role of the Korean Government and the company’s connection to Korean 
heritage through their product’s name.   
 
Active-X and the Seed Security Standard: 
 
In the second case study, the expectation is that a linkage to history will be shown by 
Korea’s willingness to go it alone and create their own standards and approach to 
solving problems. The research will most likely show that this approach created a 
walled garden and a trade barrier that no international company could get past in the 
online transaction security area. The expectation is that it will also show how the 
standard became a trade issue when it was legally challenged by a group of Korean 
academics claiming it stifled competition and protected certain businesses. At a first 
glance, it may seem that the protected company is actually a large MNC but with a 
deeper investigation, it is likely that they will not be the only protected organisation. 
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This study will aim to show the intertwined relationship between business and 
Government in Korea and how that can create certain business conditions that in turn 
affect trade. Section 7.6 provides a summary of the findings of this case study, which 
shows how certain antivirus companies used the barrier created by the use of Active-
X to establish a niche business area that could not be threatened by non-Korean 
companies. 
 
Korea’s telecommunication industry: 
 
The expectation in the third case study is that it will show how a set of decisions by 
the Korean Government created a telecommunications environment that allowed 
Samsung and LG to rise first to the top of their domestic market and then gave them a 
platform to become a global success in their industry. This appears to be the 
equivalent of a key case study because it follows the development path of domestic 
Korean companies that were nurtured and protected by the Government. In this case, 
the expectation is that the study will show that the actions of the Government 
provided a platform for the Korean companies that allowed them to compete 
effectively internationally.  This will link directly back to the research questions from 
Chapter 1. This connection is summarised in section 8.9, showing how Samsung used 
their protected domestic base to expand internationally in the consumer electronics 
area to become a market leader for certain products.   
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Chapter 5:  The Growing Influence of Korea’s Netizens 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter will analyse the role and importance of South Korea’s Netizen groups in 
the context of understanding the characteristics of the country’s ICT business area.  
Korea’s Netizens are the millions of people who use and contribute digital content on 
the Internet in various ways.  Opinions are mixed about whether they are a negative or 
positive influence on society. Depending on who is asked, they may be described as 
useful sources of information or any angry mob of vicious cyber bullies. Netizen 
Groups are in many ways a window into the attitudes and interests of younger Korean 
people. Young males are often over represented proportionally in Netizen activities 
but as seen in Section 3.4.6, South Korea is still a very male dominated society so that 
may explain the gender disparity. 
 
This study begins with a definition of the word Netizen in order to provide a context 
for the research that follows. This logically leads to an investigation into the origins of 
the Netizens and how they evolved from their early beginnings. The roots of Netizens 
lie in the bulletin board communication systems pioneered first within the U.S 
Department of Defense, and later within North American Universities in a more open 
community-based form. As Internet use became more widespread, the idea of a 
Netizen declined in most of the English Speaking world seeing as the majority of 
people were online regularly and they could all be considered Netizens.  
 
The term Netizens re-appeared in South Korea at the turn of the century with a 
different interpretation. The groups referred to as Netizens in Korea came from 
activist and sports support groups, as opposed to the bulletin board communities of 
the past in North American Universities. One of the main reasons activist groups took 
to the Internet in this fashion is because the mainstream South Korean media is 
perceived to be controlled by the Government. A short summary of this connection is 
included to understand where the calls for a platform for dissent came from.  As will 
be seen later in Section 5.6.1, when the Korean Netizens finally started to form groups 
and become active, they quickly became a very powerful group in Korea. The 
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research follows the rise of the Netizens, beginning with small political support 
groups, and eventually growing through sports and protest campaigns to become a 
key part of Presidential Elections and national policy-making.   
 
One highly important communication channel for the Korean Netizens was the 
Citizen Journalist website Ohmynews. It gave a voice to those who wanted to provide 
an alternative to the traditional media so this will also be included and analysed in 
Section 5.4. The relationship between the huge candlelight protests in Seoul and the 
Netizens activists will be explored, showing how the online communities fuelled the 
campaigns.  When a key number of ingredients are present at the same time in Korea, 
it creates a perfect storm effect among these online groups. The ingredients will be 
identified in this study. This Chapter also includes a look at how the Korean 
Government has tried to control and restrict Netizens. Some of these initiatives caused 
a lot of resentment and anger and illustrate how the Government sees the Netizens as 
a threat.   
 
In the context of this research thesis, the Netizens can be seen as a litmus test for how 
Korean attitudes are evolving. The aim of this Chapter is to display how central 
Netizens have become in Korea and show how the Government intervened when they 
became very powerful. It is another example of how proactive the Korean 
Government is in trying to control the ICT industry and the Internet. This could be 
seen as either a positive and negative characteristic depending on the perspective 
used.   
 
 
5.2 What is a Netizen? 
 
The term Netizen comes from a combination of the English words Network and 
Citizen. It can be defined as a person who actively contributes content or comments to 
Internet Networks.  The terms Netizens and Cybercitizens are often considered to 
have the same meaning. Netizens are the creators of Cyberculture.  This is a 
collection of cultures and cultural content that appears on and is enabled by the 
Internet, in tandem with the feedback given about these items. Cyberculture was 
spawned when computer networks started to be used for communication, 
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entertainment and business (Bell et al., 2004). It sits within the cognitive space shared 
between people and computing devices.  
 
Netizens use of the Internet is characterised by the convergence and overlap of the 
following areas (Hauben et al., 1997): 
 
 Email / Instant Messaging / Online chats: Direct communication by means of 
the Internet. 
 Internet forums: Websites that hold discussions of topics. 
 Online games: Multiplayer games played using the Internet. 
 Blogs / Social Media: Communities of networked users, where each individual 
can share thoughts / media / creations with others.  
 Feedback & comment systems: A mechanism used to collected and display 
responses to media from Internet users. 
 User Generated Content: A process whereby Internet users create, modify 
information / media on the Internet alone or with collaborators.   
 File sharing: A technology that makes it possible for Internet users to share 
files from their computers with other Internet users. This enables the fast 
distribution of digital media. 
 
 
5.3 Origins of the Netizens 
 
5.3.1 ARPA 
 
The roots that led to the emergence of Netizens as we know them today were 
established at the U.S Government’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 
the 1960s. Under the umbrella of the U.S Department of Defense, ARPA began work 
on the development and testing of computer communications networks (Salus, 1995). 
In 1969, they launched an experimental connection of computers known as the ARPA 
Computer Network (Arpanet) (Abbate, 2000). The first host connected to the Arpanet 
was a terminal at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA) on Sept 2nd, 
1969. Arpanet quickly became a success and it paved the way for many advances in 
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communications research.  Electronic mail (e-mail) became the main channel for 
communication early on and this resulted in major productivity increases. By 1977, 
Arpanet had expanded to over 50 sites in North American and Europe. Most of the 
original users of this network were technical and scientific specialists, but some of the 
group began to use the Net for more than just technical discussions (Gillies and 
Cailliau, 2000). 
 
Arpanet lasted until the mid-1980s before being superseded by various internal 
networks. For example, university communities started to use NSFnet, which started 
out as a communication medium for university researchers and the five U.S National 
Supercomputer Centres. NSFnet built upon research done on Arpanet and it went on 
to become the U.S. backbone for the larger global network now known as the Internet. 
The Arpanet managed to successfully connect various spatially remote computers, 
and created a new communication channel for the people who used those computers 
(NSF, 2007). However, it was also an exclusive club limited to professors at 
universities and employees of a small group of Defense Industry organisations. 
 
5.3.2 Usenet 
 
As explained above, there were many individuals who could not get access to the 
Arpanet but sought similar ways to communicate. These groups felt they needed to 
design equivalent networking systems using operating systems that allowed open 
collaboration and communication to maximize their user base. Usenet was born in 
1979 when two graduate students from Duke University collaborated to create a 
computer network (Lueg and Fisher, 2003). Soon, three computer locations, ‘Duke’ at 
Duke University, ‘UNC’ at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and ‘Phs’ 
at the Physiology Department of Duke Medical School, linked up and a basic system 
was put in place to connect them (Lehnert and Kopec, 2007).  
 
Usenet was developed in order to create a Unix user network. The development team 
expected that Usenet would help people to share experiences and solve problems with 
Unix. They made various newsgroups organized by topic areas on many different 
subjects. Users could post content on any of the newsgroup pages, reply to another 
user’s posting or email messages to respond to the writer of a piece  (Rittner, 1997). 
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Usenet sites expanded slowly at first. This changed early in 1981, when Arpanet and 
Usenet were connected. The University of California at Berkeley had access to both 
Arpanet and Usenet and Usenet pioneer, Mark Horton, decided to begin importing 
mailing list discussions from Arpanet and posting them on Usenet newsgroups 
(LaQuey, 1990). 
 
5.3.3 The Convergence of Arpanet and Usenet 
 
The incorporation of Arpanet mailing lists onto Usenet brought a lot of new users on 
board. Gradually, Arpanet became interconnected with other networks and began to 
function like a backbone to other networks instead of as a self-contained network 
(Horton, 1990). By 1982, Usenet had stretched all over North America. A system of 
community networks began to develop, where organisations used Netnews software 
to make Usenet available to communities for free or for a nominal charge (Flickenger, 
2003). This new form of media posed a challenge to conventional mass media. Usenet 
was controlled by its audience, so the majority of the content posted on it was created 
by users who also actively read Usenet. This gave its users a sense of participation 
and provided motivation for them to contribute.  Usenet exploded from two articles 
per day posted on three sites in 1979 to 1800 articles per day on 11,000 sites in 1988 
(DeJean, 2008).  
 
Usenet provided the Internet platform needed for digital citizens to emerge. It created 
a real networked community that users felt a part of.  These users also created and 
popularised a lot of terminology and ideas that are now taken for granted on the 
modern Internet. For example, the system administrators of Usenet coined the term 
Netiquette to encourage good behavior during networked discussions (Pregowsk, 
2000). They also spread the notions of FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions) and 
Spam.  To pay homage and illustrate its importance, Tim Berners-Lee launched the 
World Wide Web and Linus Torvalds announced the Linux project as posts on Usenet 
(Torvalds and Diamond, 2001). 
  140 
5.4 Birth of the Netizens Concept 
 
By the early 1990s, networked computers had become a widespread tool for 
discussion and information exchange.  The most common tools used at the time were 
Usenet, mailing lists and free-nets. Usenet featured a number of network-wide 
newsgroups with a ‘Net.’ naming convention, including ‘Net.General’ for general 
discussion, ‘Net.Auto’ for postings about cars and ‘Net.Bugs’ to share and solve Unix 
technical problems. Individuals that provided content to Usenet started to prefix terms 
relating to online terms by adding the word NET. For example, users would mention 
‘Net.Gods’, ‘Net.Cops’ or ‘Net.Citizens’ (Turkle, 1997). When analyzing the impact 
of Usenet and how it had created a community in 1995, Michael Hauben used the 
word Netizen as a shortened version of Net.Citizen to describe Usenet contributors 
(Orlowski, 2001). When his paper became widely circulated, the concept began to 
spread and the terminology became increasingly common.  
 
5.5 Netizens in Korea 
 
5.5.1 Civic activism and student protests 
 
Citizens of South Korea have a long history of civil disobedience and protest 
gatherings to rally for political and social issues.  The epicenter for these protests has 
traditionally been City Hall in Seoul (Chandra, 1988).  Examples of large protests 
held there include the Independence Club campaigns from the late 1890s, the 1919 
Samil movement, the 1960 Student Uprising and rallies demanding democracy in 
1980 and 1987.  The Internet then evolved to become the most common way to 
organize large civil movements globally nowadays and this evolution took place in 
Korea too.  An important point is that Neo-Confucianism stresses the need to carry 
out tasks in a correct and just manner. This means that a sense of unjust or unfair 
treatment can trigger very strong reactions from Korean people. When these feelings 
and the ability to organize large groups via the Internet converge with Korea’s 
suspicion of external influences, desire for conformity, strong ethnic identity and 
nationalism, it can become an extremely powerful force (Hart, 2001). The organisers 
and participants of these large online movements, which sometimes also become 
  141 
street protests, have now become known as Korean Netizens.  The term Netizen has 
become a byword for online activism in Korea, so it taken on a slightly different 
meaning that it has in most other places where it is more associated with bulletin 
board contributions and online collaborative content creation (Cho and Ahn, 2011).   
 
5.5.2 Government involvement in the media 
 
Traditionally, conservative political groups have controlled the media in South Korea 
either directly or directly.  For example, President’s Park and Chun directly controlled 
the media through censorship and manipulation, and then indirectly by other means. 
Publications, including highly acclaimed opinion journals, were banned or merged in 
1961, 1972 and 1980 (Ko, 2006). About seven hundred journalists were dismissed 
and one hundred seventy two publications were banned by Chun’s press purification 
campaign in 1980 (Kim, 2004). A total of nine hundred thirty three journalists were 
forced to quit by 1980 (Park, 2004). After the democratic elections in 1988, the level 
of control was reduced. Under the Young-Sam Kim Government (1993-1997), the 
media were nominally free (Lee, 2003). However, the regime still indirectly 
controlled the media by using tax investigations (Woo & Joo, 2002).  
 
5.5.3 Ohmynews and the Nosama Group 
 
Because of their long-standing association with the Conservative Elements of the 
Korean political sphere, most of the main Korean newspapers and TV news shows 
consistently supported them (Youm, 1996).  Conversely, during periods in which 
Korean Presidents came from more liberal parties, they strongly criticised their 
policies. It was from this environment that a new form of media appeared in South 
Korea (Kim, 2004).  On the 22
nd
 February 2000, former investigative reporter Oh 
Yeon-ho launched a news website called Ohmynews. The stated aim of this new site 
was to encourage citizen and Netizen journalism (Cho, 2003). Anyone was allowed 
register and contribute to OhmyNews, but only after agreeing to their code of ethics 
by promising to always use facts and to not defame anyone. From the 150 to 200 
articles received per week, around 80% were usually published. The reporters whose 
work was accepted received a small fee (around US$17). Initially, the website started 
off with 10 full time editors and 700 amateur reporters. This figure snowballed very 
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quickly however and soon there were thousands of reporters and even more 
commenters (MacIntyre, 2005). It was this website that gave a voice to young 
emerging Korean Netizens.  
 
In the same year, future president Roh Moo-Hyun ran unsuccessfully in a National 
Assembly election in Busan. Roh ran mainly to make a symbolic gesture, aiming to 
try and reduce regionalism in Korea (Cho, 2005). He didn’t win a seat but a group of 
young Koreans inspired by Roh’s idealism created an online support club. They 
named it Nosamo, an acronym for the phrase ‘those who love Roh’. Nosamo started 
out with forty members in April 2000 (Cellen-Jones, 2006). One hundred supporters 
turned up for the official launch at a Korean Internet Café one month later.  This event 
was streamed live on OhmyNews. This began the long, but informal, relationship 
between the Nosamo group and the citizen journalism site. 
 
5.5.4 Netizens and Sports 
 
The first time the Korean Netizens started to show their growing power was in 
February 2002 during the Winter Olympics. In past competitions, Korean athletes 
often won medals in the short track skating events. During the 2002 Salt Lake City 
Olympics, the leading competitors in the 1,500 metres final were Kim Dong-Sung 
representing South Korea and Apolo Ohno, a Japanese-American athlete representing 
the USA. Kim Dong-Sung finished the race in first place ahead of Ohno but was 
controversially disqualified by Australian referee James Hewish who ruled that Kim 
illegally blocked Ohno during the final lap (Lewis, 2012). 
 
The Korean Olympic officials asked the International Olympic Committee president 
for an appeal and announced they were considering boycotting the closing ceremony 
of the Salt Lake City Games (CNN, 2002). This came at a time when Anti-American 
feeling was strong in the country due to a series of crimes committed by the U.S 
Military stationed in South Korea and the growth of a popular movement among 
young people alleging that the U.S was standing in the way of warming relations 
between North and South Korea (Becker, 2001). This mixture of factors prompted a 
large-scale response from Korean Netizens. 16,000 protest emails were sent to the US 
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Olympic Council, crashing their server and it took them nine hours to restore service. 
In addition, the Netizens distributed a list of American companies in Seoul on the 
Internet and sought to begin a campaign to boycott all American products and 
services. On the popular Daum Web Portal, more than 40 groups that objected to 
buying U.S. products were created and over 32,000 members joined up. Another 
portal site, Freechal.com, had more than 30 similar communities with more than 
3,000 members. Registration information showed that the majority of participants 
varied from middle school students to those in their late 20s (Lee, 2002).    
 
Four months later, another big sports event caught the attention of the Netizens again. 
This time it was the football World Cup in June – July 2002 and it was held jointly by 
South Korea and Japan (Young and Park, 2002). Large screens were set up in 226 
public spaces all over South Korea to allow fans to watch the matches together 
(including a screen at the traditional epicentre of Korea activism in front of City Hall). 
The police estimated that 1.4 million Koreans, mostly in their teens and twenties 
gathered together to watch their second group match against the U.S (Lee and Seung, 
2002). The match finished 1-1 and the South Korean scorer celebrated by mimicking 
a speed skater to show that his goal was in revenge for the incident at the Olympics. 
Support for the National team skyrocketed after positive results in the first two games 
and the outdoor crowds jumped to 2.8 million for the final group game against 
Portugal. A police official said the crowds were the biggest ever witnessed in South 
Korea, exceeding the peace rally of June 1987 that saw 1.4 million people gathering 
in 33 cities. Some 6,000 police were on hand to ensure that the gathering stayed 
peaceful (Choi et al., 2002).  
 
These events were the first time the Internet had been used a medium for organising 
large groups of people in Korea. The scale of the gatherings illustrated the power of 
online forums and social media for creating and promoting group activities. At first, 
the activities were connected to sports events but they did have political undertones 
due to the nations involved in the key matches. As the online movements evolved, the 
political aspects of the groups started to become more influential as covered in 
Section 5.6.1 below.  
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5.6 How the Korean Netizens became a major force 
 
5.6.1 The Middle School Girls Incident and the 2002 Presidential Elections 
 
During the 2002 World Cup, another significant non-sports related incident took place 
that initially did not garner much media attention due to the overwhelming focus on 
the football matches. On June 13th, two middle school girls, Sim Mi-seon and Sin 
Hyo-sun, died when an American bridge-laying military vehicle hit them north of 
Seoul while walking to a birthday party.  Initially, this story was virtually overlooked 
by the mainstream media as it took place the same day as both two world cup matches 
and the Seoul mayoral election.  In the days after the event, it emerged that the 
soldiers involved were on duty and were therefore covered by the Status Of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) between the USA and Korea, and could therefore only be tried 
under U.S. criminal jurisdiction (Dong-A Ilbo, 2002). 
 
Some groups in Korea decided to use this incident as the crux of a new campaign 
against the U.S Military presence on the peninsula. On June 27th, 2002 a small group 
of around 200 people set up a stall to generate a petition and gather protest signatures 
outside the Camp Red Cloud U.S Military base in the city of Uijongbu (Yoo, 2002). 
While the attention was on the stall, two smaller groups cut holes in the bases fence, 
chained themselves together and marched through the base with placards.  They 
demanded that the U.S military hand over both the soldiers so that they could be tried 
in a Korean court without their protected SOFA status (Ser, 2002). The Korean police 
and U.S Military then removed the protestors, but a number of people were injured on 
each side and recordings were made of the clashes.  This took place at the tail end of 
the World Cup just after Korea’s exit at the semi-final stage so again it did not receive 
a huge amount of mainstream media attention. During July, the protest groups started 
to circulate the protest footage on the Internet and engage in discussions on Internet 
bulletin boards (French and Kirk, 2002).  It was at this stage that the protests captured 
the emotion of a lot of the young university students that were still riding the wave of 
national unity generated by Korea’s World Cup success.   
 
Pressure on the U.S Military to hand over the soldiers to the Korean legal system 
grew based on accusations by protest groups that the army would take care of their 
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own soldiers using SOFA to avoid a prosecution.  In an attempt to placate the groups, 
the U.S Forces in Korea (USFK) Commander ordered a negligent homicide court 
martial for the two drivers with Korean media representatives present (Tow, 2003).  
They invited over thirty observers including members of the South Korean Justice 
Ministry, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and from other 
South Korean non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) to attend each trial. However, 
the public nature of the proceedings gave the impending trial more attention and it 
then became an election issue because the date for trial was set for two weeks before 
the 2002 Korean General Election. This election pitted Conservative Grand National 
Party (GNP) Leader Lee Hoi-Chang against the political outsider and human rights 
activist Roh Moo-Hyun (Kim, 2003). The mainstream Korean media supported Lee 
Hoi-Chang so those supporting Roh Moo-Hyun posted their articles on Ohmynews.                                     
 
Roh’s Netizen support group Nosama stepped up its activity as the Presidential 
campaign gained steam. They launched a drive for micro-donations, by distributing 
piggy banks asking supporters to gather loose change and donate it to Roh’s 
campaign. The piggy bank drive eventually added up to 10.8% of Roh’s US$7.9 
million campaign fund. Roh’s digital campaign was not dependent on the Nosamo 
group. Online donations contributed 59.4% of his total fund, mobile phone pledges 
were 4.8% and an automated telephone service drummed up 3.9% (Gomez, 2004). 
With the backdrop of the election, the impending trial of the U.S soldiers loomed. A 
left wing group called the Pan National Committee started to dominate the continuing 
protests, some of them involving violence by both sides. The court martial ran from 
November 20
th
-22
nd 
2002.  Rooms with CCTV feeds were made available to service 
the high level of interest (Son, 2002). Large groups of people also gathered outside 
the camp awaiting the final verdict.   
 
Sergeants Nino and Walker were judged to be not guilty of negligent homicide in two 
verdicts determined separately by the two court martial panels on Wednesday, 
November 20th and Friday, November 22th, 2002. This triggered a reaction from the 
Korean protestors who had been demanding a guilty verdict (Lee, 2002). The South 
Korean Justice Ministry announced that they were not satisfied with the decision, but 
that they accepted the legal process that was used. Netizen journalists and 
commentators then took to Ohmynews in large numbers. On the 27
th
 November, this 
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led to one citizen reporter called Ang.Ma posting the following call for action on 
Ohmynews and a number of other websites (Han, 2011).  
 
‘It is said that dead men’s souls become fireflies. Let’s fill downtown with our souls, 
with the souls of (victims) Mi-seon and Hyo-soon.  Let’s become thousands of fireflies 
this coming Saturday and Sunday. Let’s sacrifice our private comfortable lives. 
Please light your candle at your home. Let’s walk in Gwanghwamun holding a lighted 
candle….  Let’s fill Gwanghwamum with our candlelight. Let’s put out the 
American’s violence with our peace.’ 
 
One of the main points of contention was that the US had not expressed regret for the 
incident so President George W. Bush sent an apology message for the girl’s deaths to 
President Roh.  This was in addition to previous visits made to the families of the two 
victims by U.S military representatives, and financial compensation that was sent to 
the girl’s family, as is the Korean custom.  However, these gestures did not appease 
the groups. Some reporters on OhmyNews continued to write inflammatory reports 
claiming that the soldiers murdered the girls deliberately.  Early on the following 
Saturday, the Pan National Committee held a rally attended by 1,000 students and 
other individuals in downtown Seoul.  Speakers demanded that the U.S. military 
reconsider the acquittals and change the Status of Forces Agreement (BBC, 2002). 
Later that night, ten thousand people gathered for the first vigil. This was followed by 
more vigils in seventeen Korean cities around the country.   
 
The media attention continued to grow and the number of online visitors per day 
accelerated rapidly to all sites covering the protests, reaching into the high millions 
when major news stories were published. Ohmynews was the first port of call for 
many Netizens and they registered close to 20 million hits a day at the height of the 
situation.  Also, 23,000 messages were posted on the Pan National Committee 
electronic bulletin boards in protest of the not-guilty verdict and 140,000 protest 
messages were posted on the bulletin board of Daum, a major search engine in Korea 
(Yeo, 2010). Internet activists also attempted to flood the White House, U.S. 
President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney’s e-mail systems but they 
did not manage to crash the mail servers. 
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The next weekend the protests grew further, and on December 9
th
, 20,000 people 
gathered near the Gwanghwamun intersection of downtown Seoul. Several thousand 
more people in thirty cities across the nation also held rallies.  Some journalists in the 
Korean media noted that the rally was similar to the gathering to support the Korean 
football team during the World Cup in many ways (Steinberg, 2005). Even the ‘Dae-
han-min-guk’ football cheer was modified into a call demanding changes to the SOFA 
agreement.  While all of this was going on, public opinion also swang towards Roh 
Moo-Hyun in the presidential election campaign based on his loose association with 
left leaning groups and the Netizens. Around the same time, the Korean National 
Police announced that they concurred with U.S military investigators that the deaths 
of both girls was an accident. 
 
However, the protests continued.  A group known as ‘The People`s Counterplan 
Committee for the Death of Middle School Girls by the US Army Armored Car’ held a 
photo exhibition about American soldiers crimes in front of the White House in 
Washington. They also brought a letter for President Bush allegedly containing the 
signatures of 1.3 million people with the following demands (Shin, 2002): 
 
 ‘Make the deceptive not-guilty decision against the American soldiers invalid 
 Transfer the criminal trial right to the Korean Government to punish the two 
American soldiers in a Korean court 
 Amend the unfair nature of the SOFA agreement’.  
 
The protests peaked on the weekend before the Presidential Election with almost 
100,000 people gathering in Seoul and 300,000 in total around the country. A 
Globescan poll of media habits at the time found that 34% of Koreans named the 
Internet as their most important source of news, with 38% saying they trusted blogs - 
higher than in any of the other countries surveyed (Im, 2002). Ohmynews was 
running their site at this time with just 41 full-time staff, but 23,000 citizen reporters 
were active close to the election time.  
 
Despite the ongoing civil unrest, the election took place as scheduled on 19
th
 
December 2002. As the opinion polls suggested, the momentum had swung to Roh 
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Moo-Hyun. He got 48.91% of the vote compared to Lee Hoi-Chang’s 46.59%. The 
election had a high turnout with 70.8% of eligible voters (24,784,963) taking to the 
polls (Reporters without borders, 2003). In order to acknowledge the role of the 
citizen journalists in his campaign, Roh gave his first post-election interview as an 
exclusive to Ohmynews only.  This inspired Oh Yeon Ho, the founder of Ohmynews, 
to declare that in the battle between the conservative media and the Netizens of 
Korea, the Netizens won (Kim, 2004). 
  
After the election, the candlelight protests quickly lost their momentum. The police 
announced a ban on the protests from January 3
rd
 2003 onward as the National Police 
Agency announced that the vigil had changed from purely a memorial event into 
violent anti-U.S demonstrations (Lee, 2003). A Gallup poll taken at the time 
discovered that 75% of South Koreans in their 20s indicated that they disliked 
America while Sixty-seven percent in their 30s and half of those in their 40s indicated 
that they either ‘did not like’ or ‘hated’ the U.S (Pew Research, 2002). 
 
Even though the protests fizzled out in the centre of Seoul, smaller fractured groups 
continued their campaigns outside U.S military bases and in other locations around 
South Korea (Kang, 2004).  As many of Roh Moo-Hyun’s supporters were connected 
to student unions and Netizen communities, the groups felt empowered after the 
election and some previously outlawed groups reappeared and took to the streets in 
front of the bases. At the forefront of these smaller but more militant groups were 
Hanchongryun (Hankuk Daehak Chonghaksaenghoi Ryunhap) which means South 
Korean Federation of University Students Councils (Choi, 2005). The group was 
criminalised in 1999 for Pro-North Korean activities based on their support for a 
North Korean-led unification of Korea and their plan to encourage Korean college 
students to overthrow the Government (Gluck, 2003). They had close ties to the North 
Korean National Alliance of Youth and Students for the Country's Reunification 
(known as Pomchonghakryon). 
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5.6.2 Protests against military involvement in Iraq 
 
The next incident that inflamed the Netizens occurred on June 22
nd
 2004 when Kim 
Sun-Il, a translator and Christian Missionary was kidnapped and beheaded in Iraq by 
an Islamist group. The execution was videotaped and distributed on the Internet. 
While the decapitation was taking place on the video, a statement was read 
explaining: ‘Korean citizens, you were warned, your hands were the ones who killed 
him. Enough lies, enough cheating. Your soldiers are here not for the sake of Iraqis, 
but for cursed America.’ (Freedom House, 2004). At the time Korea had a few 
hundred soldiers stationed in Iraq but it had just announced its plans to send 3,000 
more.   
 
The statement and its inclusion of America provided ammunition to the Netizen anti-
American activists so they took to the street again for more candlelight protests.  This 
time however the numbers were smaller peaking at 3,000 people but they, along with 
their online supporters, forced the South Korean government to postpone sending the 
troops until a parliamentary vote could be taken (Im, 2005). Despite the delay, on 
the13
th
 February 2004, Korea’s parliament eventually voted 155-50 in favour of 
sending the troops and 1,400 Combat Marines, Special Forces commandos and 1,600 
military engineers and medics were sent to the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk (BBC, 
2004). 
 
5.6.3 Other targets of Netizen activism 
 
Not all of the Netizen activism focused on the Korea – U.S relationship. Another long 
running example of online activism was the dispute between Korea and Japan on a 
small group of islets located between the two countries.  Korea calls the rocks Dokdo 
and maintains military control of the area, but Japan calls them Takeshima and claims 
they are a part of Japan.  This problem has flared up regularly online starting from 
2005 when Japan's Shimane prefecture set up a dedicated ‘Takeshima Day’.  This 
happened in the same year as the publishing of a set of school textbooks that sought to 
downplay Japanese activities and war crimes in World War II (Al-Jazeera, 2008). 
Even though the books were not widely adopted by Japanese schools, it evoked a 
strong reaction in China, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan. The Netizens started 
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to be seen as a very powerful lobby group within Korea at this time. In 2005, of the 
90 government decisions taken against the majority Netizen opinion, 43 ended up 
being revoked (Yu, 2005).   
 
Another long running issue that evoked a response from Netizens was the KORUS 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations that started in 2006 between South Korea 
and the U.S. On Wednesday 12
th
 of July 2006, 25,000 protestors took to the streets 
against the FTA (Third World Network, 2006). Many of the Korean Netizens felt that 
entering FTA negotiations with the U.S and sending the soldiers to Iraq were 
betrayals by President Roh. They voted for him as part of an anti-American 
movement but after getting into power, he did not manage to force a revision of the 
SOFA agreement or arrange the reduction / removal of U.S troops that they had hoped 
for during his time in office.  In addition, Roh received criticism for domestic policies 
because of his inability to stimulate the Korean economy, and by the end of 2006 his 
approval rating had dropped to just 11% (Choe, 2008). 
 
Another move that Netizens felt was a betrayal by President Roh was the 
implementation of the Korean Internet ‘Real Name Registration System’. This 
measure was implemented in July 2007 requiring users of websites that have over 
100,000 members to enter their resident registration or credit card number before 
commenting. This meant that comments had to be made using real names and the aim 
was to force Internet users to be more responsible when posting messages. 146 
websites fell into this category at the time (Lee, 2011). The list contained the 
YouTube video sharing webpage, but the website's U.S.-based owner, Google, 
decided not to ask their Korean customers for their ID numbers. Instead, they simply 
blocked users from uploading videos to YouTube Korea. Users could then bypass the 
rule if they changed their location setting to ‘worldwide’. Eventually even the Korean 
president’s office maintained its YouTube channel using this workaround.
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5.6.4 The Netizens Versus 2MB 
 
In 2007, it was again time for Presidential Elections in South Korea. The 17th South 
Korean presidential election was held on the 19th December 2007, and this time the 
winner was Lee Myung-Bak from the Grand National Party, meaning that 
conservatives returned to the Blue House for the first time in a decade. Lee won by 
the largest voting margin since direct elections were brought back to Korea in 1987. 
This came as a huge blow to the Netizens as it re-installed the power of the old order 
and the traditional media (Sa, 2009).  The Netizens felt disenfranchised and they 
quickly prepared to rise up against the new president.  They dubbed Lee Myung-Bak, 
2MB.  His family name Lee has a similar pronunciation to the number two in Korean. 
Therefore, 2MB had a double meaning because it also sounded like  ‘two megabytes,’ 
which was meant to be an indication of the president's limited intellectual capacities 
(Hankyoreh, 2008).  
 
A new set of protests began in May 2008. The trigger this time around was the lifting 
of the Korean ban on the importation of U.S beef. It built upon some of the earlier 
unrest from the ongoing FTA negotiations between Korea and the USA. Earlier in 
December 2003, South Korea along with Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan 
blocked imports of US beef when tests on a 6.5-year old cow proved positive for BSE 
(also known as Mad Cow Disease). On 18th April 2008, U.S. and South Korean 
representatives agreed new sanitary standards for U.S. beef imports (Applebaum, 
2011). Protest groups accused President Lee of removing the block on U.S. beef 
imports too quickly, despite the alleged health risks, so that Korea could quickly make 
an FTA with the United States.  
 
On 27
th
 April 2008, the MBC TV Channel aired a broadcast entitled ‘Is American 
Beef Really Safe from Mad Cow Disease?’. This inspired a Netizen called Baek 
Seong-geun to set up a website called MichinCow.net (Michin means mad or crazy in 
the Korean language) on May 3rd calling for street protests (CCDM, 2009). Then, one 
high school student started a petition on the Agora online discussion forum 
demanding an impeachment for President Lee. The petition received 1.3 million 
signatures in just a week (Sa, 2009).  This protest saw another innovation from the 
Korean Netizens.  This time some websites offered live streams of the protests with 
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broadcast jockeys (BJs) providing live commentary and they started to refer to the 
gatherings as Web 2.0 protests. One clip of the police assaulting a female protester 
was widely circulated on the Internet and the angry backlash encouraged more people 
to take part in the rallies. It became the country's biggest anti-government protest in 
two decades (Solis, 2008). Attendance peaked on the 10th June 2008 with 80,000 
protestors in attendance before declining and finishing in mid-July. This time around 
the Government took a hard line against protestors and many were arrested and 
imprisoned for short periods.  
 
The end result of the protests was that talks on the beef deal were postponed, Lee 
Myung-Bak’s approval ratings dropped to less than 20% and his entire cabinet offered 
to resign. On 22nd May and 18th June 2008, President Lee apologised during 
televised interviews for ignoring public health concerns (Cho, 2008).  The backlash 
against the mainstream media that brought the issue to the surface began when a 
complaint against the broadcasted ‘facts’ was lodged by the Korean Department of 
Agriculture. The Seoul Central Prosecutors' Office investigated the program's content 
and a lawsuit was filed against MBC. On the 12th August 2008, the Korea 
Communications Commission demanded that MBC issue an apology for factual 
errors included in the program (Korea Times, 2009).  MBC apologised, saying that 
six translation errors were committed and that a certain cow had been falsely 
described as having BSE in the report.  
 
Another law came into effect in July 2009 that was seen as a further attempt to control 
Netizen activism. This law designated Cyber Defamation as a criminal activity 
punishable by up to two years in prison.  In most countries defamation is classed as a 
civil offense based on the damages caused by the information disclosed. Critics 
attacked the law saying those in power would use it to curb freedom of speech and 
control political dissent (Kang, 2009). A unique feature of the new law in South 
Korea is that the truth is not counted as a valid defence. If the distributed information 
damages the reputation of an individual or business it can still be classed as a crime 
even if the information is true.  However, if the defendant can prove that circulating 
the information is in the public’s interest, the truth can be used as a valid defence.
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5.7 Cyberbullying and the Real-Name registration systems 
 
Other common targets of Netizen comments are Korean celebrities and those who 
appear in viral videos.  These interactions usually take place entirely online but they 
can become quite aggressive and have been described as a form of mob cyber 
bullying (Korea Times, 2009).  An example of this was the suicide of the famous 
actress Choi Jin-Sil and her ex-husband Jo Sung Min in 2008 after they had been 
subjected to a stream of online accusations about her alleged involvement in the 
suicide of actor Ahn Jae-Hwan. This was followed by nine additional celebrity 
suicides within a year where online criticism and pressure was identified as a 
contributing factor (Cho, 2008).  
 
One problem associated with the requirements to enter personal data to interact with 
Korean websites is that it provides a tempting target for hackers. In 2011, this 
problem hit the limelight when data on 35 million users was compromised from two 
well-known websites (Chosun Ilbo, 2011). This led to action against the Korea 
Communications Commission and in December 2011, the Government was forced to 
end online registration systems that demanded resident registration numbers.  Then, in 
August 2012, the law forcing South Korean users to enter their real names on 
websites to comment was also overturned by a panel of judges who said it restricted 
freedom of speech and undermined democracy (BBC, 2012). Data collected during 
the real-name restrictions suggests that it was ineffective in reducing online abuse. In 
a study carried out by the KCC, they discovered that malicious comments comprised 
13.9% of all comments posted on Internet threads in 2007 but the real name 
regulation system only led to a 0.9% reduction in 2008, a year after the regulation 
went into force (BBC, 2012).  
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5.8 Conclusion 
 
Based on the evidence presented in this Chapter, Korean Netizens are now a 
significant social influence in the country. They are involved in shaping public policy, 
business decisions, elections and the entertainment industry. The Korean Government 
is now acutely aware of the consequences of crossing swords with large Netizen 
Groups.  As seen in the reaction to the U.S Beef protests, the Netizens were the 
engine room of the movement that forced the large majority of the Government 
Ministers to step down.  Their support was also the catalyst that swept Roh Moo-
Hyun into the Presidency in 2002.  
 
Netizen campaigns on the Internet are always starting and disappearing in a constant 
flux. Occasionally, when the right circumstances come together, a campaign can grow 
into a large-scale event that can become nationally significant. It is not a coincidence 
that the biggest movements nearly always include a perceived threat to Korea from 
other countries. Specially, the trigger for the biggest reaction has usually been U.S 
involvement in an incident.  Many young people in Korea do not trust the intentions 
of the U.S Government in Korea, and some also fear that the growing influence of 
American Products in their country is a form of cultural invasion and occupation.   
 
A detail that comes as a surprise to many external observers is that North Korea tends 
to not be a country that riles up the Netizens. For example during 2013, North Korea 
threatened nuclear attacks against South Korea, Japan and the U.S, cancelled the 1953 
Armistice, closed the Kaesong Industrial Park joint venture and severed all 
communications between their southern neighbours but the Netizens were relatively 
quiet.  There are two main reasons for this. The first is because South Korean people 
have heard so many threats from the North over the years so they do not worry much 
about it anymore. The second is because of the Minjok philosophy. This is the idea 
that Korean people have the same blood and therefore would not attack each other 
unless pushed by foreign powers as happened in the Korean War.  
 
The Korean Government has attempted to take measures to try and control Netizen 
activities.  One of the measures was the real name commenting system. The second 
was the enactment of the Cyber Defamation Law. Both of these laws were resisted 
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strongly in Korea with the first one eventually overturned.  The enactment of these 
laws show that the Government saw the Netizens as a real threat that they felt they 
needed to control.  
 
In summary, Netizens are now a central and fundamental part of South Korean 
society.  When a product or service succeeds or fails today is now often down to how 
the Netizens view it. They also influence public policy making. From the examples 
shown above, it is apparent that the Netizens are territorial and very nationalistic. 
Logically, this Nationalism often manifests itself as a push to protect Korea’s land, 
culture and products against perceived outside threats.  They were strongly against the 
FTA agreement with the U.S for this reason. As the Netizens grow older, they will 
most likely move into positions of power in the country. This may be happening 
already, as the Netizen Groups of 2002 are now over a decade older. It is likely that 
these individuals would still be somewhat suspicious of external influences and pro-
protectionism.  
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Chapter 6: The Battle for Office Suite Dominance in South Korea 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
An interesting case study that provides a good illustration of the Korean ICT Business 
environment is the struggle for market domination in the Word Processing and Office 
Suite area. This is significant because it shows some of the barriers that international 
companies face when entering South Korea. The Word Processing battle illustrates 
this perfectly, because it involves a small domestic Korean software company going 
head-to-head against one of the largest MNCs in the world. It also shows the 
influence of national pride, politics and public perception in Korean business and how 
important it is to be aware of sentiment before making key decisions. 
 
This Chapter begins with a look at the birth of the Hancom company, which was 
based on Hangul, the Korean writing system, and therefore has a connection to an 
important symbol of Korean culture. This company got a head start in the area before 
the global word processing giant Microsoft arrived in Korea with their dominant 
Word program. This Chapter will show how initially Microsoft lost out to Hangul 
Word but then they saw an opportunity when its parent company got into financial 
difficulties.  Microsoft then attempted a takeover of Hancom, but this triggered a 
national outcry because of the symbolic significance of Hangul.  The ensuing 
campaign managed to rebuff Microsoft’s moves and keep the company going amid a 
media storm. Then, the battle for control of the market continued with a series of price 
and public relations wars.  
 
Next, this study will show how Hancom overstretched themselves with various 
ventures and got into financial trouble again. This time they were forced to sell a 
proportion of their shares to investors in Hong Kong and Singapore but this time it did 
not trigger a backlash. This Chapter will also show how the Korean Government 
opted to mandate that Hangul Office files would be the only system used for official 
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documents that need to be filled in. This move protected Hancom and ensured that 
their core business was protected.  
 
Not long after this move, the Korea Fair Trade Commission decided to pursue 
Microsoft on charges of attempting to bundle packages with Windows and stifle trade. 
In the context of the earlier decision to mandate the use of Hangul Office for 
Government documents it was seen as a double standard by some. The study then 
moves on to have a look at one of the effects of the FTA between Korea and the U.S. 
The agreement on intellectual property allowed companies like Microsoft to start 
chasing organisations using their software illegally through the courts. Some 
examples of the cases and their resolutions are presented as illustrations of the 
proceedings.  
 
 
6.2 Representing Hangul Digitally 
 
The Korean script, Hangul, is distinct from other East Asian languages as it uses 
independently created characters, whereas Japanese and the various Chinese writing 
systems are mostly based on ancient Chinese characters (Fouser, 1998). The writing 
system allowed the Chosun Monarchy to break the elitist grip the powerful Yangban 
families had at the time on education and information due to the difficulties associated 
with learning more complex Chinese characters. It also was a symbol of Korea’s 
cultural independence from China during the many Chinese and Mongol invasions 
and occupations of the Korean peninsula. Later the Hangul script was threatened 
during the Japanese Annexation of Korea when Japan attempted to impose their 
writing and family name system on Korea in the late 1930s.  This made Hangul a 
symbol of Korean national pride, independence, and patriotism. When Korea regained 
its independence at the end of World War II, a new annual National Holiday called 
Hangul Day was announced (Fouser, 2012). This is held on October 9th each year to 
celebrate King Sejong’s unveiling of the new characters. 
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The Korean language was excluded from many of the earliest attempts to display 
languages on computers as it was considered to be a niche market for one country 
only. The breakthrough in displaying Hangul on computers came from within Korea.  
The person behind this achievement was Lee Chan-Jin, a former Seoul National 
University Mechanical Engineering student, in the late 1980s (Choi, 2007). Lee 
quickly realized he had a good potential business with his creation, and on Oct. 9th, 
1990, he established a Korean language Word Processing program as part of a 
company called Hangul and Computer.  The owners later decided to change their 
company name first to Haansoft, and then later to Hancom in 2010 (Hancom, 2012). 
The company called the Korean language Word Processing Program, Hangul, or 
sometimes Ah-Rae-Ah Hangul, in English.  Coincidentally, this was the same year 
that Microsoft first began to offer Korean language support through MS DOS and 
later Windows 3.0 (Microsoft, 2004). 
 
Based on its ability to effectively display and edit Korean text, along with its 
symbolic significance, the new program moved into a strong market position. After 
it’s release in 1990, Hangul reached sales of one billion won in 1991, before 
progressing to 10 billion won in 1993 by adding over 100,000 registered users (Sims, 
1999). One major advantage the new company had during this period was that 
Microsoft did not even have a branch in Korea at the beginning of the 90s. 
Microsoft’s first office in Seoul opened in 1992, but by this time the American 
Company was already well behind in the Desktop Office software area in Korea. 
 
6.3 The arrival of Microsoft Word to South Korea 
 
To compete with the success of Haansoft, Microsoft tried to create ties with the 
Korean business and academic communities. In 1994, the then CEO of Microsoft 
signed a source code licensing agreement with the Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science and Technology (KAIST), one of Korea’s top technical universities (The 
Korea Herald, 2003). Then, in June 1997 he went to Korea again to deliver a 
  160 
presentation to the Chief Information Officer (CIO) Forum, organised by the 
Federation of Korean Information Industries (Leganza, 1999). 
 
Meanwhile, the surge in Hangul Word Processing program usage continued and by 
1997 Haansoft had attained a 60% market share for domestic users. The success of the 
company was a source of pride in Korea leading to the software winning the media-
voted Hit Product of the Year award for 1995, 1996, and 1998, the 13th Venture 
Society Grand Prize of 1995 and the New Software Product Grand Award from the 
Association of Korean I.T Industries (Kirk, 1998). All this attention meant that Lee 
Chan-Jin became a very high profile figure in Korea. His status allowed him to branch 
out into the world of politics and he even managed to win an election to become a 
member of the Korean National assembly. 
 
At the same time, Microsoft were the clear global leader in the industry with their 
flagship MS Word program, but they only had a 30% market share in Korea for word 
processor usage. One technical difference between the products, that Haansoft used as 
part of their marketing campaigns, was that their program was able to display over 
11,000 combinations of the Korean language's phonetic characters, compared to 
Microsoft Word's 2,500 (The Register, 1998). The default filetype of Hangul is HWP 
format, with the filename extension *.hwp.  Early HWP files up to and including 
Hangul 97 could be opened with the OpenOffice Suite but they had to be converted 
for Microsoft Word use (Hancom, 2013). These conversions often resulted in 
formatting errors that made the files almost unusable and effectively forced users to 
purchase a copy of Hangul to work with HWP files.   
 
On the surface, the market dominance looked like a huge success for Haansoft but the 
figures masked a serious problem. As with a lot of the software of that era, the 
licensing and security systems were basic, and it was easy to pirate and copy the 
program.  Furthermore, enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws for software use in 
Korea was also a relatively new area, so the legal route was often not a practical 
option. One of the Haansoft executives disclosed in a 1998 press conference that an 
estimated 80% of the software in use throughout Korea at the time was pirated. 
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Another issue was that Haansoft had unsuccessfully expanded into new business areas 
without first stabilising the company’s financial situation, which further stretched 
their finances. On May 13th 1998, the company dishonoured promissory notes worth 
KRW250 million. On May 21th, another arm of their business, Haansoft Service, also 
dishonoured its notes and could not pay employees' salaries for three months in a row 
(Bae, 2002). 
 
 
6.4 Microsoft’s attempted takeover of Haansoft 
 
6.4.1 Discussions behind the scenes 
 
The financial problems at Haansoft became public in 1998 at the height of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, when the company disclosed that they had built up over US$10 
million of debt and were on the verge of collapse (Lee, 2000). A takeover by 
Microsoft at this tome would have allowed them to attain a virtual monopoly of the 
Korean word processing market, so negotiations started off between the heads of 
Microsoft Korea and Haansoft on June 8th, 1998. According to the former Microsoft 
Korea General Manager, Lee Chan-Jin of Haansoft initially suggested selling the 
intellectual property right to his word processor software, as he needed operational 
funds (Chosun Ilbo, 1998). Instead, Microsoft Korea’s representatives suggested to 
Haansoft’s owner that Microsoft would like to invest in his organisation and change 
the business strategy of the company. Haansoft showed an interest in this suggestion 
so the next step involved forming a team led by the law firm Kim & Chang to arrange 
the details of the deal.
6
 (Kirk, 2001).     
 
At a meeting held on June 15th 1998, in front of a large media audience, Haansoft and 
Microsoft Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that confirmed the 
Korean company’s plan to discontinue its Korean word processor software in return 
for Microsoft's investment. At around the same time, Microsoft’s CEO was on a visit 
to Korea. He told the then Korean President about his investment plans in Korea 
                                                        
6 Perhaps sensing that this would be an unpopular decision, Lee Chan-jin resigned as a member of the 
National Assembly while the negotiations were going on 
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explaining that Microsoft actions would help the country out of their financial crisis. 
During the subsequent press conferences, the Korean Information and 
Communication Minister made it clear that the Government would never be involved 
in business activities. This was seen as a gesture to clear the way for Microsoft’s 
investment. In order to try and ensure a positive profile for the company, Microsoft’s 
vice-president also announced a US$77 million software donation to Korean schools 
and institutions as part of a promotional tour  (Weekly Chosun 2000). 
 
Microsoft’s offer was that they would make a US$20 million investment in Haansoft 
on the basis that the Hangul Word Processing Program would be entirely withdrawn 
from the Korean market. The US$20 million would then entitle them to 19% of the 
company and they would steer the business in new directions with Haansoft becoming 
a reseller for MS Products.,A PR executive with Haansoft said that with the help of 
Microsoft's investment the company planned to move away from packaged software 
into the Internet infrastructure business area (Nakarmi, 2000). 
 
6.4.2 The Campaign to Save Hangul 
 
The idea of a foreign company taking control of the word processing business in 
Korea’s own language when the country was at a low ebb due to the financial crisis 
stuck a nerve with the local media and Government, and it inspired an immediate and 
intense backlash. 1998 was the year that the Korean economy saw a 6% contraction in 
GDP. Conversely, Microsoft was at the peak of the software industry with a US$260 
billion market valuation that was not very far behind the value of the entire Korean 
economy (US$317 billion in 1998). This also took place just before the global dotcom 
crash affected technology companies all over the world. Microsoft would have been 
paying the equivalent of what it earned in two days in exchange for virtually complete 
control of the Korean Word Processing market (Kim 2007). It was in this 
environment that a group called ‘The Committee to Save Hangul Software’ was 
established on June 22nd by local entrepreneur Lee Min-Hwa explaining that he 
planned to fight to save Haansoft from foreign involvement.   
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Lee Min-Hwa was the founder of the Korea Venture Business Assn. (KOVA) in 1995 
and the CEO of a successful medical devices company called Medison (Cho, 2011). 
His new group was supported by over 15 civic organisations including the Hangul 
Society.  One of their announcements at the time read ‘If Haansoft gives up Hangul 
software, it will be a tremendous loss for the country. The entire business will be 
taken over by Microsoft, and people will have to learn MS Word.’ The indirect 
suggestion of the statement was that Haansoft were exhibiting a lack of patriotism by 
selling one of Korea’s cultural treasures, their unique Hangul writing system, to a 
foreign company. The group set out to explore alternatives to the Microsoft proposal. 
One example of the suggestions made was to open the Hangul program source code 
and develop an all-Korean word processor product that could serve as its replacement. 
The leaders of the ‘Save Haansoft's Korean Software’ movement also met Microsoft 
Korea’s president directly to request that they back out of the deal (Sims, 1999). 
 
6.4.3 The Hangul Venture Company Committee 
 
The next step in the Korean group’s campaign against Microsoft was to set up the 
Hangul Venture Company Committee. The aim of this group was to raise enough 
funds to keep Haansoft afloat and avoid the need for Microsoft’s investment. Lee 
Min-Hwa announced that ‘Lee Chan-Jin and his staff must fight until the end’ in a 
newspaper interview. He also presented a report suggesting that the cost to retrain all 
Korean users on Microsoft software could surpass the US$14 million debt of 
Haansoft. Meanwhile, Korean newspaper editorials were published branding 
Microsoft’s CEO a colonialist and a survey of Korean college students, asking which 
celebrities they admired most, placed Haansoft’s founder Lee Chan-Jin in second 
place while the chairman of Hyundai came in first. In a media interview, the Haansoft 
founder said that the Hangul Venture Company’s aim was ‘flattering but unrealistic' 
and asked for more time to negotiate a deal with Microsoft and avoid bankruptcy 
(Chosun Ilbo, 1998).  
The Korean Venture Business Association fundraising campaign reached out to both 
Korean businesses and individuals and managed to raise US$7.3 million, 
approximately two thirds of which came from association members with one third 
from Korean individuals. At the same time, Haansoft and Microsoft Korea continued 
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the takeover negotiations until July 16th, in spite of widespread public opposition. 
They agreed to sign the final draft on July 20th and Microsoft Korea closed their 
offices for two days holidays starting from July 17th for Constitution Day. 
 
6.4.4 The restructuring of Haansoft 
 
However, within Haansoft there was a growing internal conflict. Haansoft Service’s 
president was against the Microsoft plan and he persuaded director Chung Nae-Gwon 
to join him. Between them, they succeeded in forcing Lee Chan-Jin to bow to public 
pressure and back out of the turnover plan at almost the last minute. They did not 
immediately inform Microsoft of their change of plan and Microsoft’s CEO was 
already en route to Korea to announce the deal at a prearranged press conference as 
part of a two-day promotional tour that included meetings with the Korean President. 
The press conference was still held on July 20th but Haansoft’s founder surprised the 
assembled reporters and Microsoft visitors by announcing his final decision not to 
accept their investment offer (CBR, 1998).  Instead they outlined their intention to go 
with the offer from the Save Haansoft's Korean Software movement and try to turn 
the company’s finances around. 
 
As part of the powershift within Haansoft that led to the strategy change, the Haansoft  
founder, Lee Chan-Jin, was forced to transfer to the position of CTO (Chief 
Technological Officer) from CEO and on July 27th, 1998, Jeon Ha-Jin was chosen as 
his replacement. The first action of the new CEO was to try and capitalise on the 
national pride movement that had been created by rebranding their word processing 
software and re-releasing it with the name ‘Hangul 815’. The ‘815’ referred to August 
15th, the day that Korea was liberated from Japan’s colonial rule (Tan et al., 2010). 
Then, on October 19th 1998, the Save Haansoft's Korean Software movement 
officially dissolved as they announced that their campaign was finished. 
 
The company quickly ran into more problems because some of the money pledged by 
individuals towards the Save Haansoft's Korean Software campaign did not 
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materialise. This meant that Lee Min-Hwa, the chairman of Medison, was forced to 
increase his investment to cover the shortfall making him the largest shareholder of 
Haansoft. The new company power base decided to restructure the company aiming 
to refinance the company's debt and reduce its costs. Haansoft’s workforce was 
reduced by 10% and their unprofitable businesses, including publications, educational 
programs and hardware distribution were shut down. Research and development 
efforts were also significantly downsized (Ko, 1999). However, these changes did not 
sit well with founder Lee Chan-Jin and he left the company in 1999 along with a core 
group of engineers and developers. 
 
 
6.5 Office Price Wars 
 
In 1998, Haansoft participated in a national campaign to reduce software piracy in 
Korea. The campaign encouraged businesses, organisations and individuals to destroy 
pirated copies of their software and buy legitimate ones. To facilitate the purchases of 
legitimate copies, Haansoft cut their prices and began selling their software in places 
as diverse as banks and supermarkets. The campaign was a success and the company 
managed to sell a record 700,000 copies. The company then established a Haansoft 
Internet service for Hangul Word users in mid-1998. A countrywide publicity drive to 
advertise Haansoft and their new online E-Commerce website managed to attract 
more than 500,000 subscribers (Bae, 1999). 
 
In August 1998, just one month after their failure to purchase Hangul, Microsoft 
released a Korean version of Windows 98. However, they only managed to sell 
27,000 copies in the first four days which was more or less the same amount as the 
Windows 95 launch sale three years earlier and was seen as a disappointing return 
(Meier, 2005). 
 
Another new strategy of Haansoft at the time was to expand into the Internet business 
area. In 1999, the company opened a new portal website called Netien and 
successfully conducted a W10 billion takeover bid for the Hanulsarang chatting 
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website immediately gaining access to their 350 million accounts. They further 
expanded their offerings by establishing an Internet service sister company called 
Yecar. As Korea’s economy recovered quickly from the 1998 crisis, Haansoft’s share 
price increased to KRW40,000 in 2000 from its earlier junk valuation (Lee, 2000). 
Medison's investment of KRW5 billion jumped up to KRW120 billion and their 
intervention was initially seen as a big success. 
 
Microsoft determined that the best way to compete with Hangul Word was to develop 
Microsoft Word's ability to display Korean characters, so they released a new version 
of Word 2000 in January 1999 that addressed this. Microsoft explained it was now 
able to display 11,172 Korean syllables, 1.6 million old Korean characters and 27,000 
Chinese characters, which now placed it technically ahead of Haansoft’s Hangul 
Word. In October 2000, Haansoft launched their rival Hangul upgrade called Wordian 
(Korea Times, 2000). User reviews of the new program were largely negative, and 
many Korean customers decided to purchase Microsoft Word this time around. This 
came as a major blow to Haansoft. 
 
One of the reasons why Microsoft gained market share with Windows 2000 was 
because they gave large discounts for MS Office use in Korean Universities and 
Schools. Student licenses for MS Office at the time were often priced at around 
US$20 per head. This was taking place at the same time as new Internet licensing 
techniques were emerging that made it more difficult to distribute illegal software.  
One high profile example of the changing business environment was when a Seoul 
Court fined the majority-Government owned Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO) KRW10 million in 2000 for using pirated versions of Microsoft programs 
(Korea Times, 2000).   
 
However, the reduced academic prices also had a slightly negative outcome for 
Microsoft as individual software buyers still had to pay the full price. The result was 
that Microsoft’s own software resellers held public protests in Seoul against the 
company. Also, Haansoft accused Microsoft of using dumping tactics by selling 
software at 10% of the market price to certain user groups. This became a big PR 
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problem. The consumer sentiment problem was illustrated in mid-May 1999 when the 
Korea Times ran a story with the results of a study showing that 87.2% of Korean 
users indicated that the Windows operating system was ‘unsatisfactory' but they felt 
they had no choice other than to keep using it (Korea Times, 1999). 
 
Microsoft responded to dumping accusations by claiming that they created the site 
license system to sell their software packages at reduced prices to Korean education 
customers to encourage the installation of genuine software with students. Microsoft 
then suggested that Haansoft were guilty of their own accusations because they 
reduced their prices to under US$10 for a one-year license of their program. The 
Korean Government reacted by saying they planned to open an investigation into 
business practices in the area (BBC, 2005). With mounting pressure, Microsoft had no 
choice but to relent and to withdraw its campus license package before the legal 
decision by the Korean Government was published (Kim, 2005). This was another 
setback for Microsoft Korea in their attempts to dominate the Korean Office Suite 
market but it was not a complete disaster because they did manage to increase their 
market share.  
 
 
6.6 Government Intervention 
 
The Korean government was caught between pressure from consumers, organisations 
and the software industry, along with the need to show the world that Korea was open 
to foreign business in the wake of the financial crisis. At the same time, the Korean 
Government openly promoted Haansoft’s Word Processor by adopting it for a number 
of state-run agencies and schools but individual and corporate customers often opted 
for Microsoft products. 
 
However, behind the scenes, Haansoft was again having financial problems.  The 
Dot-com bubble was bursting globally and their main investors from the Medison 
Company had run into financial issues with their own businesses. In 2000, the Korean 
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Credit Rating Company downgraded Medison's rating to the junk bond category and 
this prompted the firm to attempt to sell its shares in Haansoft to raise funds. Initially, 
the shareholders approached Korean Companies including LG Telecom, SK Telecom 
and Daum Communication but they could not make a deal. As a result, the value of 
Lee Min-Hwa's Hancom stock dropped from KRW100 billion to KRW25 billion. 
Then, Lee Min-Hwa began a search outside Korea in order to make a sale. In 
November 24th 2000, Medison opted to sell half of their Haansoft shares to Bicus 
Ballas, a subsidiary of Singapore Telecom for KRW22 billion (Lee 2010). After the 
sale, Medison was no longer the largest shareholder of Haansoft shares. They were 
now in fourth place behind Hong Kong's West Avenue (7.28%), Korea’s Moohan 
Technology Investment (5.84%) and Singapore’s Bicus Ballas (5.53%). 
 
Despite the shareholder wrangling and financial problems, Haansoft continued to try 
and expand. The firm now had 23 subsidiaries including Internet Service Provider 
Netian, Haneul Sarang, Hansoftnet, Yeka Tour and HanCom Linux. The company 
also tried to expand their core business outside of Korea by signing a contract with 
BIT Japan Inc. in 2001, to export KRW50 billion worth of their Hangul 2000 Word 
processing software for sale in Japan. Furthermore, localized versions of Hangul in 
English, Chinese, Spanish and Arabic went on sale in September 2001. In press 
releases, Haansoft said that they believed China and the Middle East were now keen 
to embrace new non-American word processor software (The Korea Herald, 2003). 
 
Most of these expansions met with limited success. In 2002 Haansoft’s operating 
profit dipped 37% to KRW2.7 billion won in comparison to the figures published in 
2001. However, the company persevered with its attempts to move into new business 
areas. During 2002, Haansoft set up a US branch in Orange County, California under 
the name Hancom. The company also launched a new version of Hancom Office for 
the U.S, built with code ported from Linux.   
 
This was also the time when Hangul dispensed with Open Office compatibility. Files 
made with Hangul Wordian, Hangul 2002, Hangul 2005 and later versions could be 
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opened with Open Office (Kim, 2007).  Also, users could save files in MS office and 
PDF formats using the ‘Save As’ function in Hangul. However, .hwp files could not 
be opened directly by any other program without conversions and major formatting 
problems. Then, local and regional Governments in Korea began to support Hangul 
Word by making mandatory online forms available exclusively as .hwp downloads. 
This meant for example that all businesses and organisations, who needed to file tax 
returns, fill in reports for local councils or apply for Government support, had to get a 
copy of Hangul Word. This practice is still in place today as of 2014. 
 
 
6.7 Haansoft explores UNIX and Launches Cloud Based services  
 
From their new regional base in the U.S, Haansoft acquired Thinkfree in December 
2003. Thinkfree was a small Korean-American Company, founded in 2000, that was 
working on the development of Portable and Online Java-based Office Productivity 
products (Wong, 2000). This was five years before Google acquired 2Web and 
Writely in 2005/06 and went on to produce the cloud-based Office Suite, Google 
Docs / Drive (I.T Reviews, 2006).  This turned out to be one of Haansoft’s more 
successful branches as it had a direct link to their core products. As of 2012, Cloud or 
Server based versions of ThinkOffice are still available as packages to run alongside 
Hangul Office.   
 
Another one of the avenues that Haansoft ventured into during this time was UNIX. 
The company’s aim was to create a Korean Operating System and compete with 
Microsoft’s Windows System. To do this Haansoft established an affiliate 
organisation called Hanscom Linux. In January 2002, the new affiliate announced that 
the Korean Government had procured 120,000 copies of Hanscom Linux Deluxe 2.0, 
which came bundled with Hancom Office. This office suite included the updated 
version of Hangul Word along with Spreadsheet and Presentation Programs. The 
Korean government also outlined plans to migrate 23% of their computers to a non-
Windows platform in subsequent years but this plan was never fully implemented. 
One of the problems with Haansoft’s move into the Linux area was that they were not 
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just competing with Microsoft anymore. The company sold their Operating System 
for about W150,000 but a free Korean language version of Ubuntu was also available 
which appealed to the same user base.  Hanscom went bankrupt in 2004 (Bodnar 
2004). After that time, the Hanscom Linux development team was merged back into 
Haansoft. 
 
While Haansoft was trying to find new business areas, Microsoft continued to try and 
expand their Office Suite market share in Korea without huge success. They 
encountered more problems in 2005 when the Korean Fair Trade Commission 
(KFTC) followed in the footsteps of the E.U and launched an inquiry into whether the 
bundling of a media player and instant messenger services in Windows, along with 
the availability of Windows Media Services as an optional extra within the Windows 
Server operating system, was in breach of Korea’s Fair Trade regulations. The result 
was that Microsoft were ordered to produce separate packages of Windows after 
reaching a US$32 million settlement with the South Korean Government (Chosun 
Ilbo 2005). 
 
In 2007, Haansoft opted to return to the world of operating systems. This time, 
Haansoft joined a venture called the Asianux project, aiming to create a customised 
version of Red Hat Linux for certain scenarios (e.g. databases, clusters or backups) 
and sold as a complete package to the East Asian region. The Asianux iniative was 
originally started by Red Flag Co., Ltd. of China and the Miracle Linux Corporation 
of Japan in December 2003 (Asianux, 2013).  This project was more durable than 
Haansoft’s earlier attempts and the most recent version, Asianux 4.0, was released in 
2011. 
 
Towards the end of 2010, the digital playing field started to change dramatically when 
Cloud Computing and Mobile devices emerged. Hancom attempted to react to the 
new landscape by forming new partnerships. The most significant of these was a deal 
struck in 2010 with Samsung to provide Thinkfree Mobile services as a pre-installed 
Android App on the Galaxy S Smartphone and later the Galaxy Tab in many regions 
(Collin, 2012).  As of 2012, ThinkFree Mobile came pre-installed with over 55 
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million of Samsung’s Android-based mobile devices.  Hancom also created 
partnerships with other mobile device companies, including LG, Pantech, Qualcomm, 
ARM and Toshiba. As of 2012, Hancom employed over 320 people and they were 
profitable for nine consecutive years. Hancom stocks jumped 130% in 2012 compared 
to 2011 (Kim, 2012). 
 
6.8 Chasing pirates 
 
During recent years in South Korea, Microsoft has continued its policy of attempting 
to aggressively pursue software pirates. In 2010, Microsoft’s CEO announced a 
US$60 million deal after a meeting South Korea's president at the time. This deal 
promised training for software developers, support for venture companies, and the 
establishment of a technology research centre near Seoul (Woo, 2010).  
 
At the same time, Microsoft became embroiled in a large legal battle with Korea’s 
Defense Ministry. The Korean Department of Defence entered discussions with 
Microsoft Korea over a demand for KRW200 billion that the company said they were 
owed for connection to their servers and illegal use of software applications. 
Microsoft made requests to the military asking for data on the total number of PCs 
used by the Korean armed forces, along with an accurate report on which software 
applications were in use on them. Microsoft provided evidence that 210,000 
computers from the South Korean military were operating using partially unlicensed 
software. Based on April 2012 server data, Microsoft estimated their losses at 
KRW201.1 billion (Chosun Ilbo, 2012). One change that allowed Microsoft and other 
companies to press their claims in this area was the implementation of stronger 
intellectual copyright laws as part of the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement. 
 
In 2012, according to the Korea Software Property-Rights Council, software piracy 
dropped more than 29% from a year earlier. The latest survey named Microsoft Corp. 
as the biggest victim. Its Windows platform (mostly XP) was illicitly installed in 
23,473 cases in 2011.  The Hangul Office Suite came in second with 16,990 cases, 
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trailed by U.S.-based Autodesk Inc.’s AutoCAD design tool with 11,005. By 
company, Microsoft remained on top with 35,020 cases. Adobe Systems Inc., 
Hancom and Autodesk followed with 18,550, 16,990 and 14,605, respectively.  One 
third of all software piracy was from products developed by Microsoft. However, in 
monetary terms, Autodesk suffered the biggest losses of KRW81.3 billion. In 2012, 
according to the Software Property-Rights Council, the ratio of pirated software stood 
at 41% in South Korea, while that of most other OECD countries was at less than 
30% (Shin, 2012). 
 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
This case study is an example of the rising and falling fortunes of Hancom and their 
competition with Microsoft. Initially, their Hangul Word program was unopposed in 
the domestic Korean Market and it took a strong market position. They got to the 
forefront of the industry without any significant assistance or protection from the 
Government. However, the company was determined to use their core product as a 
stepping-stone towards reaching into other areas.  These ventures were not very 
successful financially and it left them in a very precarious financial situation.  
 
Microsoft tried to step in and take over the ailing company and its significant market 
share in the office area. Microsoft obviously had not considered the cultural 
significance of the Hangul writing system in Korea and how that was connected to the 
Hangul Word program. Another important point worth noting is that Microsoft is an 
American company and as seen earlier in the Netizens Chapter, perceived American 
cultural imperialism is something that often sparks a strong reaction in Korea.  
 
One mistake made by Microsoft in this takeover attempt is that they were very public 
with it. Microsoft representatives visited Korea is high profile business trips while the 
takeover was being finalised before the deal went through.  However, their plan 
backfired as this allowed those opposed to the deal to portray them as arriving to 
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conduct a takeover of Hangul Word at a time when Korea was already bruised and 
wounded due to the IMF crisis. There had already been a lot of talk in the media 
about how the IMF was going to demand that Korea open up to foreign investment 
and possible takeovers especially in Government controlled sectors that had 
previously been monopolies.  
 
The scene was set for a real PR problem for Microsoft. Civic groups rose up and 
joined with investors to try and stave off Microsoft’s approach. They also went public 
with their campaign to ensure the nationalistic angle could be promoted to the general 
public.  With the huge media attention surrounding the situation, Hancom were left 
with little choice but to take the offer from the venture group and try to keep the 
company going.  It was a real snub for Microsoft. The lesson to be learned from this 
situation is not to underestimate the importance of cultural icons and their historical 
significance even in today’s business world. When certain decisions are made, the 
result can be a huge patriotic backlash that can tarnish a company’s image in a 
country permanently. Some Korean people saw it as their civic duty to try and protect 
the Hangul program against what they thought were the overtures of the ‘American 
Imperialists’ seeking to ‘grab control of their cultural heritage’.  
 
The ironic aspect of the situation was that only a couple of years later Hancom got 
into financial difficulties again from unsuccessful over-expansion and they ended up 
being majority owned by Hong-Kong and Singaporean investment groups. However, 
because these investments took place less publicly and did not involve American 
Companies, it only garnered minimal media attention and no public outcry. Also, 
because the Korean investment company who previously held the majority of 
Hancom shares retained some of their involvement in the company, it was not seen as 
a complete transfer of control.     
 
It was around this time that the Korean Government made the decision to only use 
Hangul Office for official documents. As these files could not be edited using any 
other program, it forced organisations to buy a copy of the program, providing an 
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influx of sales for the Hancom and ensured that their core business was protected.   
This is a prime example of a technical trade barrier erected against Microsoft to 
ensure that Hancom was protected. This protection potentially offered Hancom an 
opportunity to expand their business outside of Korea from their domestic base. To 
date, Hancom have not fully been able to take advantage of their protected status to 
expand into the International Market. However, they are trying to use partnerships 
with Samsung in order to piggyback on their international success and get a foothold 
outside Korea. This will be discussed further in Section 8.7. 
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Chapter 7: SEED, Active-X and Online Transactions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter centres on the story behind South Korea’s unique online transaction 
ecosystem. It charts the evolution of an ecosystem involving the Korean Government, 
Microsoft and Korean I.T Security companies.  The study begins by introducing the 
SEED security algorithm. Korean researchers created this standard because the U.S 
delayed the release of their newly 128-bit encryption systems for international use. 
The Korean Government opted to create their own system in the hope that they could 
provide an alternative to the American standard that could possibly be sold outside 
Korea later.  
 
The literature presented will show how the SEED security standard was designed for 
use as an Internet Brower plugin and a law was created so that only companies 
approved by the Korean Government could create the encryption software. When 
SEED was created, only two Internet Browsers were in widespread use in Korea, so 
the plugin inevitably became linked to the fortunes of each of them. In addition, three 
domestic certification companies started up to provide the software needed for online 
transactions using this framework.  The resulting ecosystem involved a symbiotic 
relationship between these companies, Microsoft’s Active-X and Internet Explorer.   
 
When one of the browsers went out of business and new browsers entered the market, 
the plugin system could not be adapted for use for the newer programs. This created a 
protected and restricted business environment for the lone remaining browser from 
Microsoft and the three security software companies that provided the encryption 
plugin.  This Chapter will examine how a group of citizens and academics formed a 
group to try and protest against this walled garden using the Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement from Korea Law. However, the court ruled against them and they 
were forced to concede defeat on the legal front. 
 
The next event covered here was that Microsoft turned against their own Active-X 
technology when a number of security holes were identified. This left Korea’s 
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transaction security system in a difficult situation, as can be seen in Section 7.4 
below. Some information is discussed to show how the security problems with the 
technology also caused a number of problems in Korea. When smartphones and 
mobile devices started to become widespread, it caused another issue because the 
consumers wanted to use them for transactions but the technology and legislation 
could not easily accommodate that.  
 
Another relevant point included here is how the Active-X system moved beyond 
transactions and became a web design standard for the majority of Korean webpages 
that required data collection.  In addition, this Chapter looks at how the founder of 
one of the Internet Security companies that benefitted from the system moved into 
South Korean politics and managed to rise high enough to become a Presidential 
candidate.  
 
The relationship between Active-X and the security standards locked out other 
operating systems and browsers causing criticism from those that wanted to use those 
tools. An outline of one group’s legal moves against the restrictions will be presented 
in Section 7.3 along with an analysis of the outcome. In summary, this study will 
show how the worlds of Korean Government, private business, trade restrictions and 
an International company combined in a situation that provides an important insight 
into the country’s ICT business environment.    
 
 
7.2 Early Online Encryption and the creation of SEED 
 
The South Korean Government and banks first started working together on Internet 
Security standards in 1998 (Lee et al., 2005). At that time, the most common form of 
cryptographic security system used to protect data around the world was called 
Security Socket Layer (SSL). However, during 1998, the 128-bit SSL protocol was 
still a work in progress. It was not finished and approved until January 1999 when the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) signed it off for use (Hiltgen et al., 2006). 
The IETF is an International Standards Body that specializes in TCP / IP security. 
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This left the South Korean banks in a bit of a difficult situation because Korean 
National Legislation at the time would not allow the use of 40-bit encryption for 
online transactions. The scenario was further complicated because the U.S blocked 
the export of 128-bit encryption technologies until December 1999 due to National 
Security concerns (Chang, 2003). In order to circumnavigate the delays, the Korean 
Government instead funded a project by the Korean Information Security Agency 
(KISA) to create their own encryption standard using a block cipher approach. They 
named their resulting security algorithm SEED (KISA, 2012). Most other countries 
opted to wait for a global standard but Korea took a different approach. 
 
In order to run SEED, users had to download a browser plugin. These plugins were 
bundled with a certificate issued by a Korean Government Certificate Authority. 
According to the Electronic Signature Law of Korea, only accredited Certificate 
Authorities were allowed to provide user software for certificate handling (Ministry of 
Government Legislation, 2012). The user software needed to meet several regulations 
and technical conditions to achieve accreditation. The logic behind this system was 
that the Korean Government wanted to ensure their approved user certificates were 
only handled by approved web browser certificate management and form-signing 
modules. The certificate issuing authority branched off into their own Government-
controlled arm known as the Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearings 
Institute (KFTC). This meant that only certain Internet browsers would be able to 
process electronic transactions (KFTC, 2012). The rules were designed in the hope 
that the SEED encryption technique could eventually be something that South Korean 
firms could export and sell internationally as an alternative to the systems controlled 
and distributed by the U.S.  
 
When SEED was launched, the main Internet browsers used in Korea for online 
transactions were Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and Netscape (Hankyoreh, 2010). 
Internet Explorer plugins used Active-X technology whereas Netscape required an 
NSplugin. Therefore, most of the accredited Certificate Authorities in Korea decided 
to provide the user software for these two browsers only. In the early 2000s, Netscape 
use gradually dwindled and then disappeared, both in Korea and internationally, so 
that left Active-X for Internet Explorer as the sole standard for domestic Korean 
companies. Another development that happened during this time was that the security 
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techniques used by the financial websites started to spread throughout the Korean 
website world. It also created a business opportunity for companies in Korea as they 
could exclusively provide the programs needed to support the system. Three Korean 
companies emerged in this niche area; AhnLab, Soft Forum and Initech (Kim, 
2010). One big bonus for these companies is that they could bundle their anti-virus or 
even third party programs with the security installations to drive revenue growth. It 
quickly became a lucrative market. 
 
Initially, this monopoly on Korean Internet browsing was a good business situation 
for Microsoft and they supported the system. In November 2003, Microsoft signed an 
MOU with KISA and on November 22nd 2004, both organisations marked a year of 
cooperation with a promise to persevere with their attempts to improve the computer 
security and data protection ecosystem in Korea (Microsoft, 2003). One serious ICT 
downside to being entirely reliant on one system is when that security wall is 
breached. This became apparent on 25th January 2003, when almost the entire Korean 
Internet environment, including banking and stock market systems, became 
completely paralysed for 9 hours in the wake of a worldwide virus that exploited 
certain Windows security loopholes (Kim, 2011). Other countries were also affected, 
but as the market share of Microsoft Windows for client PC’s in Korea was 99.4% at 
the time, it temporarily brought the Internet in the country to a virtual technical 
standstill.  
 
 
7.3 Opposition by the Open Web Group 
 
The security problem prompted the new South Korean President at the time to pledge 
to diversify the computer ecosystem in the country by encouraging the use of Linux 
as an alternative operating system. Seven months after President Roh took office, he 
announced that by 2007, 20% of client PC's and 30% of servers in Korea would be 
Linux-based (Openweb, 2006). However, this project met with limited success and 
the status quo continued.  The Korean government also introduced statutes to 
encourage the use of neutral ICT infrastructure. The modified Electronic Signature 
Act required official certificate authorities to offer certification solutions for Linux 
and Mac users in addition to Windows users. It also imposed a legal obligation on the 
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Government to ensure that e-commerce systems were inter-operable. This statute 
stipulated that the Korean Government must establish and implement platform-neutral 
Technology Standards for e-commerce. However despite these statutes, the Korean 
Government continued to grant licenses to Certification Authorities who did not 
service Linux or Mac users. Therefore, the vast majority of Korean websites, 
including 100% of Governmental websites, continued to rely on Active-X controls as 
of 2012 (Cho, 2012). 
 
Some banks in Korea did try to branch out beyond Windows. In 2005, Shinhan Bank 
provided the EzPlus 2.0 for Mac system, to enable Internet banking services for Mac 
OS users. Also, Nonghyup bank began to provide Internet banking services for Linux 
users in 2006. This was possible by installing Active-X emulation middleware onto 
Linux PCs in order to access their banking site (Kim, 2010). However, these 
initiatives were only used by a tiny minority of users and did not influence the 
majority of consumers. 
 
A group of 83 Korean Internet users & academics, known as the Citizens Action 
Network at Open Web Korea, began a campaign to highlight website accessibility 
problems when using browsers other than Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. Most of the 
group’s members were open source programmers using Mozilla’s Firefox or the 
Opera Internet browser. In late 2006, they decided to take legal action as Microsoft 
was embroiled in an antitrust case with the Korean Government based on their 
bundling of Windows Media Player with the Windows OS (Yoo, 2007). The group 
was led by Professor Kim Ki-Chang of Korea University, who was a well-known 
critic of the widespread use of Active-X in Korea. They sued the Korea Financial 
Telecommunications and Clearings Institute (KFTC) for KRW415,000,000 
(approximately US$460,000). Professor Kim’s accusation was that the Korean 
Government legislation on the usage of Active-X plugins for online banking and other 
public Internet services should be removed, as it was in opposition to fair trade and 
‘overly favoured technology from a single company (i.e, Microsoft)’. Translated 
details of the accusation are shown below (Openweb, 2006): 
 
1.  ‘That it is unlawful for a public body to operate browser-specific or OS-
specific websites; 
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2. That the Government’s decision to endorse MS optimized websites and web 
security applications is in violation of its treaty obligation under GATT/WTO 
as they create trade barriers to web browsers originating in other member 
countries of WTO, such as Norway; and 
3. That, in view of the market condition and the prevalent web page designing 
practice in Korea, the government has a duty under Art. 3(1) of the Antitrust 
and Fair Trade Law and under Art. 4.1 of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) to adopt and implement appropriate measures to 
encourage private entities to comply with international standards in Internet 
engineering’. 
 
The outcome of the case was that the Korean Government was found not guilty. The 
logic of the judgment was that as most Korean Internet users were already using 
Internet Explorer anyway, the fact that other browsers were not supported was not 
considered to have strongly affected Korean users' online experience (Baekdal, 2007). 
The Openweb group protested the judgment and continued to campaign but they 
didn’t try legal approaches again.  
 
 
7.4 Microsoft turns against Active-X 
 
Around this time, aside from its browser compatibility problems, Active-X controls 
also started to be flagged as a global Internet security problem. The controls became a 
widespread channel for viruses and malware because Microsoft initially designed 
Active-X to run by default as opposed to requiring user permission (Ellison and 
Schneier, 2000). Malicious programs from websites therefore had the ability to 
automatically install their malware on PCs when a user simply visited a website using 
Internet Explorer version 6 or 7. When these security problems became widespread, 
critics of Korea’s system stressed that public-key certificates were also not very 
secure. One risk with this system was that keys were often stored on unprotected 
memory devices like hard disks or USBs, and that they could be transferred simply by 
using a copy and paste command from the NPKI folder to any other storage device. 
Another problem was that the security given by the Active-X plug-in was only 
temporarily available during that online session and it was effectively useless if the 
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user's computer was compromised earlier (Burkholder, 2002). Usability was yet 
another complication. In a study by Huh Jun-ho of Oxford University, an Internet user 
logging on to the webpages of three Korean banks would have to install a minimum 
of nine Active-X plug-ins to proceed (Kim et al., 2011). Furthermore, to use more 
than one computer, a user would need to copy the private key each time and re-install 
all the plug-ins again and again. 
 
Microsoft decided to address some of their browser security problems when they 
released their upgraded Operating System, Vista, in 2007. They re-designed Active-X 
controls to increase safety by requesting a user action before a control can run. This 
meant that the launch of Windows Vista in 2007 resulted in major disruption for 
Korea because the Active-X programs required by banks and online retail sites no 
longer functioned correctly after the upgrade. This prompted three South Korean 
Governmental ministries; the Ministry of Information and Communication, 
the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, and the Financial 
Supervisory Service to warn domestic users that a Vista upgrade would make it 
impossible for them to make any secure transactions online (Farrell, 2007). They also 
lobbied Microsoft to delay the launch of the Vista OS but their request was rejected. 
Microsoft announced ‘We’ve been testing Vista with banks and other service 
providers since September, but we encountered more delays than we expected. We 
plan to release the product as scheduled’. The result was that many Korean 
companies and users opted not to upgrade and plenty of them still use Windows XP 
even today. 
 
Other large companies wishing to attract Korean users have been forced to try and 
accommodate the national reliance on Active-X controls. On November 26th, 2008, 
Google Korea announced that their Chrome Web browser would support Active-X 
only for the Korean market in order to allow for the use of digital certificate systems 
(Kang, 2007). This came at a time when Google held a 2% search engine share and a 
negligible slice of the browser market, so they were trying to find a way to make 
themselves attractive to Korean consumers. 
 
The fact that almost every Korean website used the same security method meant that 
hackers had a unified point of attack. According to a study carried out at Cambridge 
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University, close to 90% of Korean data breaches from 2008 to 2009 took place using 
only one attack method (Kang et al., 2010). One example of this occurred in summer 
2009, when a large Internet attack disabled over 80,000 Korean computers. This 
attack was blamed on Active-X providing a single channel for cyber criminals to 
spread malware to carry out Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Korea had 
issued almost 22 million public-key certificates by the end of 2009 (KISA, 
2009). From January to August 2009, Korea reported 14 Internet banking security 
breaches leading the loss of KRW0.23 billion, while the US reported losses of 
approximately KRW135.2 billion in the 3rd quarter of 2009 alone. The UK had the 
losses of approximately KRW66.4 billion in the first half of 2009. However, some 
specialists asserted this could be down to the buffer provided by the Korean language 
as opposed to the protection offered by the nation's online security standards (Korea 
Times, 2010).  
 
It was around this time that mobile devices became widespread in South Korea. Users 
expected to be able to access Korean websites and carry out transactions using these 
devices. However, the predominant browsers on these devices did not support Active-
X. In February 2010, The Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) introduced 
new standards for card transactions on smart devices (Kim, 2010). The standards 
stipulated that inputted card data must be protected using antivirus, anti-malware 
programs and encryption. Furthermore, the use of accredited certificates when making 
payments of KRW300,000 (approximately US$260) became mandatory. This caused 
many problems for online retailers that were targeting smartphone users. For example, 
the changes meant that the ‘Alladin’ and ‘Yes24’ Internet media stores had to stop 
using their new card payment system that confirmed user details via SMS messages 
for iPhone customers. Also, Samsung Electronics had an e-book reader for sale that 
allowed users to download e-book content using a wireless Internet connection but the 
new regulations meant that the service could not be used. As their e-book reader did 
not have a fully functional web browser, it was not possible for them to get an 
accredited certificate for their device. 
 
When these guidelines affected the business of high profile Korean companies, a 
strong lobby movement began. This resulted in a major change in legislation when in 
mid-2010, the Government opted to officially end mandatory usage of Active-X by 
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introducing a procedure for e-commerce organisations to apply for exceptions. The 
Korea Communication Commission (KCC) announced they would permit alternative 
verification methods other than public-key certificates to protect encrypted 
transactions. As of 2014, Korea’s regulators have given approval to few exceptions so 
the Active-X system is still used by the vast majority of the nation’s banks and 
retailers. 
 
 
7.5 Looking beyond Microsoft Windows 
 
In 2010, Wooribank began to expand its online banking service beyond Internet 
Explorer on computers when they began to support the Firefox, Chrome, Safari and 
Opera browsers. However, Wooribank’s Mac OS customers still needed to install 
public-key certificates and keyboard encryption programs on their devices to access 
their accounts online (KISA, 2011). 
 
In 2011, many new computers by Samsung and LG in Korea were still on sale with 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 6 and Windows XP as the default option. In 2011, the 
Korea Communications Commission and the nation’s big Internet portals, Naver and 
Daum, began to encourage South Korean Web developers to stop using Active-X 
encryption and diversify the browsers they develop their sites for.  In Oct 2011, the 
market share of Internet Explorer fell below 90% in the Korea as the campaign took 
hold (Kim, 2011). Meanwhile, Google Chrome tripled its share within a year to 
7.27% of the market, partially attributable to its association with the successful 
Android Mobile Device Operating System. The figures in Korea are way out of sync 
with the global picture where Internet Explorer dropped to a 39.35% share as of 2013, 
nearly halving from 68.91% in August 2008. 
 
A report by the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) in 2012 gave an updated 
view of Active-X use in Korea. 168 sites of the Korea’s 200 major Internet sites, 100 
of them private and the other public, used Active X for payment settlements and 
security at that time. Within the 100 public Internet sites investigated, 82 of them 
were using an average of 3.7 Active-X applications, while 89 out of 100 private sites 
used an average of 3.9. On Governmental sites, the Financial Supervisory Service was 
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using seven, followed by Korea Financial Telecommunications & Clearings Institute 
and Government Employees Pension Service with six each (Yoon, 2012).  
 
In late 2012, the Active-X situation in Korea even managed to become part of a 
Presidential Election Campaign. Ahn Cheol-Soo, the founder and major shareholder 
of AhnLab, the largest of the three big online security companies that offered Active-
X solutions in Korea, announced his intention to run as an independent candidate for 
the National Presidential Elections. He stepped down from his post as Dean of the 
Graduate School of Convergence Science and Technology at Seoul National 
University in order to run his campaign. He announced that if he was elected, he 
would change the Governmental regulations that had been the cause of the country’s 
dependence on Active-X and encourage the use of International Standards (Ramstad, 
2012). This was seen by many as a sign that the attitude towards local web design 
approaches had finally changed in Korea, and that Ahn was trying to get votes by 
showing he was on board with the new direction. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This case study illustrates a number of important characteristics that are prevalent in 
Korean business. Initially, it showed the Korean willingness to go it alone because 
they tried to establish a new online transaction security standard instead of waiting for 
the U.S to make one available. This showed considerable self-belief, as the country’s 
aim was to create a rival standard, and then try to export it for use globally as an 
alternative. As is common in Korean business, the Government was the driving force 
behind this move and they put new laws in place to support the initiative.  
 
Then, legislation was created to ensure the Government had to approve any company 
who sought to create the software needed to support this new encryption system. This 
had a twofold effect. The first was that it ensured the Korean Government had a 
certain amount of quality control over the services offered. The second was that it 
created a barrier to any other company intending to elbow their way into the business 
area. Three companies then managed to gain approval and build successful and 
profitable business in this new niche.  
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When Netscape left the browser business leaving Internet Explorer as the only 
available browser that could support the plugins needed, it created a monopoly for 
Microsoft. At a quick glance, it may have seemed to observers that the Korean 
Government had created a technical trade barrier that benefitted a large MNC. 
However, behind the scenes, the Korean companies providing the security software 
needed for Internet Explorer were also benefitting, and were thus protected from 
competition.  
 
This barrier was contested in court by a group of Korean academics and Netizens 
using the argument that it was in breach of laws restricting the use of technical trade 
barriers. They based their opposition on the fact that the Mozilla Firefox browser was 
unusable with many Korean websites because it could not support the Active-X 
plugin needed. The court ruled against them explaining that as Firefox and other 
minority browsers had such a small market share, the barrier did not affect Korean 
users much. This showed that the Korean Government were not interested in 
removing or resolving this trade restriction at the time.  
 
Then, another complication emerged when Active-X controls were identified as a 
security problem. They provided a channel to bypass user confirmation and install 
things without consent by malware developers. This led to Microsoft seeking ways to 
reduce their own reliance on Active-X and trying to boost the security of their 
operating systems. This was problematic for the Korean encryption standards, as the 
added security included with Microsoft’s upgraded operating system rendered it 
unusable until it could be adapted.  
 
One big international company even tried to accommodate a major rival’s technology 
in order to get around the barrier. Google took the very unusual step of modifying 
their Chrome Browser to use Active-X for the Korean market only.  This shows how 
much of a hurdle the system was because this is not a strategy that Google would 
have willingly taken if they did not have to.  The situation got even more complicated 
when devices started to converge. Smartphones, tablets and e-book readers all had 
new types of browsers and none of them were compatible with the Korean transaction 
security standards.  The Korean Government moved to try and create new legislation 
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to support transactions on these devices but it was a difficult process. However, as the 
use of these convergent devices grew exponentially, concessions had to be made to 
allow for their use.    
 
As can be seen in Section 7.5 of this Chapter, the online transaction security 
ecosystem is now changing but the use of Active-X and Internet Explorer is still 
extremely prevalent.  The founder of one of the main companies that benefitted from 
the situation even moved into politics and worked his way up until he became a 
Presidential candidate. As many of his supporters were young University Students 
and 20-something professionals, he had to take on the topic of Active-X usage and his 
company’s involvement directly. The younger generation was those who were most 
likely to use the convergent devices that the security system had problems with, so he 
promised publicly to try and address the system and open up the market for all 
browsers and systems.  
  
In conclusion, this case study illustrates a lot of the characteristics of the Korean ICT 
ecosystem. It displays heavy regulation and the relationship between Korean 
Government and business. The restrictions created a market where the Korean 
companies and Microsoft were the only ones who could take advantage of the 
situation, and thus they had a profitable and protected niche market. The core services 
of these protected Korean companies could only have been confined to their own 
nation initially, but the insulated environment allowed the companies to diversify and 
now some of their offshoot areas have managed to expand beyond Korea. 
 
This example also shows some of the negative aspects of Korea’s social system. It 
shows how the Korean Government’s attempts to micromanage the online security 
system resulted in a situation where consumers were effectively locked into a 
monopoly that restricted them from being able to keep up to date with technology 
changes. The spread of Active-X based web design also clearly displays the Neo-
Confucian characteristic of seeking conformity and following a standard accepted 
approach. The irony here is that Korea ended up isolated from international standards 
by using an approach that entirely depended upon a single foreign Internet browser. 
This is example of a situation where a technical barrier to trade was raised through 
Governmental regulation. This allowed the Korean transaction security companies to 
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safely develop their businesses while only competing for customers against each 
other. In addition, the owner of one of the main companies moved into politics 
creating strong lobbying potential for the agenda of the group.  
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Chapter 8: Telecoms and Mobile Devices in Korea 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Telecoms and mobile devices are now one of the key ICT business areas in South 
Korea. As with other industries in the country, it is dominated by the giant family-run 
Chaebol companies. The major players in this arena are Samsung, SK, LG and KT.   
This Chapter begins by showing how Korea was drastically behind the leading 
countries when it came to telecom infrastructure, but a restructure of Government 
departments in the 1980s, followed by strong support and financing for improvement 
led to Korea catching up very quickly.  
 
Next, the study moves on to the early days of commercial mobile telephony and 
shows how South Korea opted to use the CDMA system instead of the GSM even 
though GSM was showing signs of becoming a global standard.  This created a 
connection between the American company Qualcomm and the Korean handset 
makers but also shut out the vast majority of international handset companies. Again, 
the heavy involvement of the Korean Government was apparent as they helped to 
create the system and legislated for its mandatory use.  
 
In order to show how the telecommunications business in Korea evolved, a section is 
included following the entry and exit of various companies in the mobile phone 
market. All of the service providers were domestic companies with strong 
Government connections, thus creating a tight-knit business area. Moves were made 
to deregulate the market but it was still kept under tight supervision from the 
Government. It was in this environment that Samsung and LG started to emerge as 
dominant players.  
 
This Chapter also outlines how the WIPI system was created. WIPI was another 
mobile telephone standard that was used within Korea only, and again its use was 
compulsory for any company planning to sell handsets in the country.  This Chapter 
will show how this standard along with a Governmental restriction on the use of 
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mapping technology formed another significant technical barrier to trade for 
international handset manufacturers.   
 
This Chapter also looks at the effect the arrival of Smartphones had for Korean 
handset makers. In most countries, these phones dramatically entered the market and 
immediately grabbed a substantial market share, but they were affectively locked out 
of South Korea because of the WIPI and mapping restrictions. However, this did force 
Samsung and LG to make some big decisions about which operating systems they 
opted to use on their phones. 
 
Next, this Chapter shows how pressure groups and criticism managed to force the 
Korean Government to remove their WIPI requirement and create exceptions to a 
location-based services law. This finally allowed international Smartphone makers 
into the Korean market and their success will be analysed as part of this study. Other 
legislation on gaming by the Government that affected the mobile device business 
area will also be looked at as a possible example of impractical lawmaking that they 
were forced to back down on.  
 
The Chapter ends by looking at recent developments both globally and in Korea in the 
Smartphone area. This shows how Samsung reacted to the threat of Smartphones and 
managed to regain and even develop their footing in the mobile device area. This is 
another example of a story that is not yet finished because the competition is 
constantly swinging back and forth as new products are released.  
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8.2 Infrastructural Development under a Government monopoly 
 
In post-war South Korea, responsibility for telecommunications was given to the 
Government’s Ministry of Communications (Antonelli, 1991).  However, in 1981 a 
series of decisions were made to restructure the industry and drive progress.  This 
began with the creation of a new law on the establishment of the Korea 
Telecommunications Authority (KTA) paving the way for a 100% Government-
owned monopoly carrier to open for business. The KTA was launched on the first of 
January 1982 with support from a Governmental ‘Information Welfare Society’ 
project that aimed to provide universal telecommunications services to both rural and 
urban areas. This started out with the construction of Korea’s first digitally-switched 
network using a fiber optic backbone, When it was completed in June 1987, it was 
possible to dial direct nationally without operator assistance for the first time. Other 
important moves made by the Korean Government to support the new market 
structure were The Framework Act on Telecommunications and the 
Telecommunications Act in 1983. These laws decreed that all telecommunication 
services could only be provided by carriers approved by the Ministry of 
Communications (Amsden, 1989). 
 
As communications were all Government-owned in South Korea, the creation of 
Mobile Phone Services was managed in the same way. In 1984, a new organisation 
called Korea Mobile Telecom (KMT) was formed as an offshoot of the KTA.  The 
aim of the KMT was to provide a 1G (first generation) analogue cellular service using 
Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) technology in Seoul and parts of the 
Gyeonggi-do urban area surrounding the city (Choi, 1990). During these early days of 
mobile telephony in Korea, most of the network equipment was brought over from 
AT&T and Motorola from the U.S. In 1987, the Government took its first step away 
from a monopoly by announcing a plan to privatise the KTA and invite private 
companies to offer database and data processing solutions (Kim, 1993).  This was 
followed by a loosening of regulations for public networks and leased lines. This 
allowed the construction of Korea’s first private networks in 1987 and 1988. 
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8.3 The decision to use CDMA 
 
By 1988, the KTA had achieved their first goal of providing services to the area in 
and around Seoul so they moved on to working on a nationwide mobile 
communication network. They achieved full coverage in 1991 and one driver during 
this period was that the Korean Government earmarked mobile telecommunication as 
one of the country’s pivotal strategic industries to drive exports (Kim, 1992).  One big 
decision taken at this time was on which technology emerging mobile providers 
should use. A very influential body in the decision-making process was the 
Government-owned telecommunications research institute known as the Electronics 
and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI). The Korean Government initially 
set up the ETRI in 1976 and they created a digital switching system called TDX, 
which was licensed to all the major domestic telecommunications equipment 
manufacturers (Lee, 1991). In 1989, the ERTI started to work on mobile networks 
using TDX along with a technology known as Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA) that was first used with phones in the USSR during the 1950s (Skylar, 
2001). In order to commercialise CDMA, the ERTI worked with an American 
Company called Qualcomm who had recently made a number of technology 
breakthroughs using CDMA. Qualcomm owned the core technologies but they were 
searching for partners to test and implement their new systems (Lee and Gomez, 
1992).  
 
The first phase of the CDMA project in Korea was launched in 1989, supervised by 
the ETRI with project management provided by the KTA. They worked with 63 
researchers and a budget of 4.5 billion Won. From 1990 to 1995, four more 
companies joined the initiative as Designated Manufacturers (DMs); Samsung 
Electronics, LG IC (who later became LG Electronics), Hyundai Electronics and 
Maxon (Chang, 2003). The first three were from South Korea and the last was from 
Australia. 
 
With Korea’s major companies and the Government behind the CDMA project, the 
South Korean Government decided to approve CDMA as the only permitted mobile 
network standard in the Korean domestic market during 1993 (Song, 1999). However, 
the decision to exclusively use CDMA placed Korea at odds with the majority of 
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Global Phone networks.  Internationally, the emerging dominant technology standard 
was the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM). These were standards 
developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to 
establish protocols for the Second Generation (2G) digital cellular networks utilised 
by mobile devices (Mouly and Pautet, 2002).  
 
In contrast to Korea, thirteen European countries worked together and agreed to adopt 
GSM as their mandatory standard in 1987 (Funk, 2001).  Mobile phones could not 
roam between CDMA and GSM networks so that meant that phones from outside 
Korea could not be used in Korea and Korean-made phones could not be used in 
Europe. One effect that this had is that it kept Nokia and Eriksson, who went on to 
become the globally dominant handset leaders in subsequent years, out of the Korean 
market and protected domestic handset manufacturers (Haug, 2002). In contrast, the 
USA took a different approach and allowed the use of both GSM and CDMA at the 
same time by different carriers, creating competing network technologies that still 
exist today (Funk, 2002). For example as of 2013, five of the biggest seven mobile 
networks in the United States use CDMA: Verizon Wireless, Sprint, MetroPCS, 
Cricket, and U.S. Cellular, accounting for almost 60% of the market. Conversely, 
only AT&T and T-Mobile use GSM representing approximately 40% of the user base 
(GSM Association, 2013).  With its dominance in Europe and a significant presence 
in the USA, GSM became the closest thing to a global standard for mobile 
communications at the time, reaching over 80% of the market share at its peak (Funk 
& Methe, 2001).  
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8.4 The emergence of private companies 
 
In 1991, the Korean Government continued taking steps towards reducing the 
monopoly in their domestic market and the KMT (Korea Mobile Telecom) began a 
privatisation process. By this time, the KMT had rebranded their company as the 
Hankuk Idong Tongshin Corporation.  It was at this stage that one of Korea’s giant 
Chaebol companies started to show an interest in Telecoms. The Sunkyong Group 
(now known as SK) decided to branch off from their core business of petrochemical 
and energy processing into communications, and invest in the privatisation of the 
Hankuk Idong Tongshin Corporation (KMT). By June 1994, the Sunkyong Group had 
become the largest shareholder in the former KMT (Kim et al., 2010).  
 
The Sunkyong group also began to be strongly involved in the CDMA development 
process. They organised a special taskforce to carry out various field tests that 
provided essential feedback to the commercialisation process. This was the beginning 
of a close relationship between Samsung Electronics and Sunkyong that eventually 
resulted in Samsung offering handset models exclusively to Sunkyong (SK).  
Samsung took their first plunge into the international handset market in 1996, when 
they sold their PCS cellphones through Sprint, a U.S-based CDMA network. Sprint 
agreed a US$600 million deal with Samsung, whereby Samsung would offer their 
PCS handsets to Sprint for three years under the co-branded name Sprint-Samsung 
(Lee & Lee, 2002). In the following years, Samsung expanded into Hong Kong in 
1997, and then Brazil in 1998. However, the Korean Government wanted to introduce 
competition as well as privatisation into the market. Therefore, in 1994, they 
attempted to break the monopoly by allowing a second mobile service provider into 
the market. Shinsegi were awarded the license to operate and they began to prepare to 
enter the market. Then, in January 1996 the Sunkyong Group launched the world’s 
first 2G digital CDMA service, quickly followed by Shinsegi Telecom using the same 
technology in April 1996. Just over six months later, they had signed up 100,000 
subscribers and within a year the figures exceeded 500,000 (Yun et. al., 2002). 
 
In June 1996, the Korean Government moved to further deregulate the market by 
selecting three more approved PCS (Personal Communication Service) providers. 
Korea Telecom Freetel (a subsidiary of KT), LG Telecom and Hansol PCS were 
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chosen, and they began operating in October 1997 (Kushida and Oh, 2006). However, 
this was just over one month before South Korea required IMF intervention to save its 
ailing economy. One of the IMF’s demands was that major public service 
organisations must be privatised, so a movement began to restructure KT. Despite the 
demands from the IMF, the Korean Government continued to be heavily involved in 
the mobile telephone business. The Government established a research fund for 
CDMA technologies using a license fee gathered from the five main mobile network 
operators calculated by their market share (Lyytinen & King, 2002). The Institute of 
Information Technology Assessment (IITA) controlled this fund. The Government 
ensured that there was collaboration between SKT, ETRI, KT and the handset 
manufacturers. The official aim of this was so any delays between technology 
development and commercialisation could be minimised but of course it also allowed 
the Government to steer the direction of technology development.  
 
It was also around this time that the rise of Samsung and LG began to be apparent in 
the Korean mobile handset market. In the final days of 1G analogue phones in 1995, 
the U.S-based Motorola company was the market leader with a 52% share in the 
Korean handset business. As explained in Section 8.4, the Sunkyong Group had a 
close relationship with Samsung and LG telecom decided to promote their own LG 
handsets in the 2G rollout. This meant that by 1999, domestic Korean manufacturers 
had taken over in excess of 90% of the market share (Steinbock, 2003). Moreover in 
1999, Samsung also moved into first place in the global CDMA market where they 
accounted for more than 50% of the market share. However, the global CDMA 
market was much smaller than the GSM one, which added up to 70% of the total 
global mobile communication market (Rapporteur, 2002). 
 
Another important change at this time was the creation of the 1997 revised 
Telecommunications Business Act that allowed companies to offer services without 
installing line facilities, and also lowered regulation barriers for Internet access 
service providers (MIC, 1999). Previously, a company had to undergo a long approval 
process to get a license but the new revisions simplified the procedure with a more 
efficient registration system to offer ‘specific communications business’ services. This 
resulted in an explosion in the market with 82 new Internet service providers (ISPs) 
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and 19 million additional Internet customers before the end of 2000 (Forge and 
Bohlin, 2008). Cable TV networks quickly leveraged their existing customer bases 
and launched high-speed ADSL services with flat-rate price plans.  
 
In parallel with the above changes, the Korean mobile operators began to introduce 
data service functions in late 1998 using 14.4kbps connections and then upgrading to 
64kbps in 1999. This was when short messaging services (SMS) became the most in-
demand service, and the three main players agreed to make the system interoperable 
across their networks (MIC, 2001). For 2G, Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) 
and iMode were the only two available standards. With these new services, there was 
a race to provide the best possible network. In 2000, this led to the launch of Korea’s 
first broadband mobile service (2.5G) by SK Telecom using CDMA 2000 technology 
(Han, 2007). There was an agreement between the Korean network operators that 
when a company launched a new service, they would have exclusive rights to it for 
six months and then others could use it. This also applied to this new broadband 
service and KTF LG Telecom launched their 2.5G services right on cue during May 
2001.  Shinsegi was then acquired by SK Telecom in January 2001 and Hansol PCS 
was merged into KTF in May 2001 (Park & Lee, 2002). 
 
 
8.5 Falling behind on 3G and the implementation of the WIPI Standard 
 
As high volume data transmission traffic increased, the bandwidth of 2G mobile 
phone networks began to struggle with multimedia broadband Internet services so 3G 
started to emerge an a solution. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
sought to establish a global standard for 3G wireless communications known as 
International Mobile Telecommunication-2000 (IMT-2000). Both wCDMA and 
CDMA2000 were officially included in the IMT-2000 standards (Chandler, 2003).  
 
The Korean Government adopted a multi-standard approach for their next-generation 
3G regulations. There were two types of standard for 3G services available at the 
time. CDMA2000 was an upgrade to QualComm’s 2G CDMA technology. wCDMA 
(wideband CDMA) was a European standard that was not dependent on GPS satellites 
owned by the United States Government (Chen, 2007). The Korean Government gave 
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wCDMA licenses to SKT and KT FreeTel (KTF) in July 2000, and then in August 
2001, a CDMA2000 license was also approved for LG Telecomm (LGT). As 
wCDMA is not compatible with either GSM or CDMA2000, handset manufacturers 
predicted that a large new market would quickly emerge for both network and 
terminal equipment. In October 2001, the Japanese company DoCoMo launched the 
world’s first 3G service using FOMA technology, which is a variant of wCDMA 
(Kushida, 2008)  
 
Korea was not far behind, and in May 2002 KTF launched the world’s first CDMA 
2000 service. Again, using the six-month rule mentioned earlier, SK Telecom 
followed using the same system in November 2002. Both companies were awarded 
licenses for wCDMA but they postponed deployment due to what they deemed to be 
an uncertain business environment. For 3G, the Korean Government decided on a 
multiple-standard policy, allowing both wCDMA and CDMA2000 1x (Kim, 2003). 
The Government awarded licenses for wCDMA to SKT and KTF, and for CDMA 
2000 to LG Telecom. By June 2003, SKT had 800,000 new subscribers, while KTF 
had about 470,000. Moreover, at that time around 40% of the new phones sold 
included cameras. Because of this and other new features, SKT received 9% of their 
revenue from multimedia data services during the first quarter of 2003. Other 
examples of successful multimedia applications included Multimedia Messaging 
Services (MMS), ringtone downloads, character animations, media downloads and 
location-dependent services (Kim, 2003). 
 
Two significant organisations whose influence was reduced at this time were 
Qualcomm and the ETRI. Qualcomm continued to be an important company in the 
CDMA2000 area, but some of their competitors started manufacturing comparable 
chipsets, including Samsung and Nokia, which affected their business. In addition, 
Qualcomm’s strategic development path diverged from some of their Korea partners 
when it came to CDMA2000 (Mock, 2005). In parallel, the ETRI, who earlier were a 
leading group in the development and commercialisation of 2G CDMA, decreased 
their profile significantly at this time. They acted in a supporting position only in the 
development of 3G. Meanwhile, KT invested KRW10.5 billion in a number of 3G 
development initiatives (Jho, 2007). Then, KT was awarded a 3G business license 
from the Government, and they started up a service called KT ICOM. However, KT 
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also failed to establish a central role during this time. The non-Korean manufacturers 
(Ericsson, Motorola and Nokia), elected to not take part in the development of 2G 
CDMA services in Korea, and instead focused on IMT2000 projects.   
 
As interactive multimedia content grew in Korea, a problem began to emerge. When 
service and content providers started to sell increasingly sophisticated data services, 
the three main operators in the Korean market each developed their own platforms to 
run Internet applications on mobile devices. The technology used to make these 
applications diverged. SK Telecom used their own VM (virtual machine), KTF chose 
Qualcomm's Brew and LG Telecom went for Java. Therefore, a content provider 
would have had to develop and test applications for all three platforms to serve all 
mobile customers in the market (WIPI Association, 2005). To address the problem, 
the Korea Wireless Internet Standardization Forum (KWISF) created a Mobile 
Platform Special Subcommittee (Falch, 2007). The three main operators, the 
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA) and the ETRI worked together 
to make a new standard for mobile Internet applications. It was called the Wireless 
Internet Platform for Interoperability (WIPI).  
 
WIPI was a middleware platform developed in Korea that officially aimed to allow 
mobile devices, irrespective of manufacturer or carrier, to run applications. Most of 
the code behind WIPI was built on Java, but it also had the capability to download 
and execute compiled binary applications. Therefore, WIPI was able to run both Java 
(MIDP) and Brew based applications. The South Korean Government then created a 
mandatory rule that all mobile devices sold through the nation had to use the WIPI 
platform. As WIPI was developed in Korea only, this new rule essentially blocked 
certain phones from being sold in the Korean market (Ramstad and Woo, 2009). 
 
As a result of the introduction of WIPI and other mandatory regulations, the 
telecommunication area became a bone of contention for trade between the U.S and 
Korea (Suh and Chen, 2007). For example, a dispute began in 2004 over the Korean 
Ministry of Information and Communication’s (MoIC) plan to set a mandatory 
standard, in the 2.3 gigahertz (GHz) bandwidth spectrum, for wireless Internet, i.e 
Wi-Fi. U.S. companies and officials made accusations that the Korean Government 
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was making decisions under the influence of the ETRI, and the standards were being 
developed to deliberately block foreign importers in order to help Samsung and LG 
(Mahlich and Werner, 2007). These moves led the U.S Trade Representative (USTR) 
organisation to label South Korea as a ‘key country of concern’ in its 2004 report, 
which assessed U.S. trading partners’ compliance with international trade agreements 
(Jho, 2007). For almost two years, the USTR argued with the South Korean 
Government about the MoIC’s requirement to stipulate that all mobile devices must 
use WIPI only to transfer data over the Internet (Lee and Lee, 2004).  
 
 
8.6 The Smartphone Revolution 
 
In 2002, a revolution was on the horizon for mobile phones and their operating 
systems. This was the emergence of smartphones. A smartphone is a convergent 
mobile device with more advanced computing capability, features and connectivity 
than previous phones (Eli, 2009). The earliest smartphones merged the functionality 
of personal digital assistants (PDAs) and mobile phones. Then, more advanced 
smartphones added features from portable media players, digital cameras and GPS 
navigation devices to create multi-use phones (Moon, 2009).  
 
One of the first commercially successful smartphones was the Blackberry from a 
Canadian company called Research in Motion (RIM). When released in 2003, the 
Blackberry phone signaled a technology convergence by supporting push email 
notifications, mobile calls, text messages, Internet browsing, fax and Wi-Fi 
information services. BlackBerry initially got a strong foothold in the market by 
focusing on email functions and targeting business customers (Cowhey and Aronson, 
2009). The first BlackBerry phone used a monochrome screen with a built-in 
QWERTY keyboard that was designed for ‘thumbing’, i.e needing just the thumbs to 
type. 
 
This convergence also opened up a massive opportunity for Apple, the U.S 
technology company. They decided to leverage their hugely successful Personal 
Media Player (PMP), the iPod, and their experience in User Interface Design from 
their personal computer products in order to make a smartphone. Development on the 
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iPhone began in 2004 and the iPhone was officially unveiled on January 9th, 2007 at 
the Macworld 2007 convention in San Francisco (Apple, 2013). The two initial 
iPhone models went on sale in the U.S. in June 2007, in the UK, France, and 
Germany in November 2007, and in Ireland and Austria during the spring of 2008. 
Samsung provided flash memory and components for both the iPod and iPhone so 
they also stood to benefit somewhat from their new competitors (Frommer, 2008).  
 
The iPhone had a profound effect on how people perceived smartphones because 
Apple marketed the idea of using these devices for leisure, general communication 
and business through a touchscreen input. The iPhone was a huge hit and just over a 
year later, it had already caught up on the Blackberry sales figures internationally. 
However, in Korea neither the Blackberry nor the iPhone were released at the time 
because they did not develop products that complied with Korea’s WIPI compatibility 
legislation. 
 
Even though they were protected domestically due to legislation barriers, the 
emergence of smartphones posed a very big challenge to both LG and Samsung 
internationally. By 2007, Samsung had become the world’s leading CDMA phone 
manufacturer and sat in second place in the overall global phone market behind 
Nokia. LG Electronics had also expanded their business quickly. Together, Korean 
companies held more than 60% of the worldwide CDMA phone market in 2007. 
Between 2000-2007 Samsung's market share almost doubled (from 10%) in the 
second quarter of 2002, while LG had a larger share than Motorola (5%) and Sony 
Ericsson (5%) combined. In 2007 / 08 Nokia were the global handset leader with over 
40% market share, but Samsung were second at over 15% and LG were not far behind 
at around 10% (Virki, 2011).  Samsung’s business strategy was to sell their phones 
based on their hardware features such as the megapixel ability of their cameras, along 
with handset size and weight. However, they now faced smartphones marketed on 
functionality, with an emphasis on user interactivity design and applications. Many 
Samsung phones at the time included operating systems that were not even branded. 
This shift was further illustrated when Apple unveiled their App Store to sell native 
and third party Apps on their devices in July 2008 (Apple, 2013).  
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8.7 The decision to use Android and the decommissioning of WIPI  
 
One reaction to the emergence of the iPhone and Blackberry phone was the creation 
of the Open Handset Alliance in November 2007 (Kim, 2008). This group of 
technology businesses included Google, HTC, Sony, Samsung, Sprint Nextel, T-
Mobile, Qualcomm and Texas Instruments. They announced that they planned to 
work together to develop open standards for mobile devices. As part of this initiative, 
Google’s unveiled the Android Mobile Operating System. Android was initially a 
separate company partly financed by Google, but Google then bought the company 
outright in 2005 (Google, 2013). This new mobile OS was built on open source code, 
meaning that the software could be adapted and used by any device manufacturer, 
wireless carrier or even hobby programmers. 
 
Within Korea, Samsung and LG continued to enjoy domestic handset dominance with 
an over 80% market share throughout 2008 (Bicheno, 2013). One side effect of the 
exclusion of international competitors was that the Korean handset makers charged a 
premium price for their products within their home country. However, criticism from 
consumers grew, as many people wanted to get access to the kind of user experience 
offered by the Blackberry and iPhone systems.   This led to a large debate among the 
commissioners of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC). Essentially, there 
were two barriers to foreign smartphones in Korea. The first was the mandatory WIPI 
platform as discussed earlier in Section 8.5.   The second was that the integrated 
mapping functionality of certain smartphones violated a South Korean regulation 
stipulating the usage of domestic Korean software for location-based services on 
mobile devices.   
 
Amid the consumer pressure, the KCC opted to retire the WIPI specification. They 
made the decision in late 2008 and set the expiration date for the rule as April 1
st
 2009 
(Oliver and Jung, 2009).  They also created an exemption to the map regulation for 
the iPhone that allowed Apple to include Google Maps as a standard App as they did 
on all iPhones at that time. The first mobile provider to announce that they would sell 
the iPhone in Korea was KT.  They had recently merged the KTF and KT brands to 
try and catch up on SK telecom who then controlled more than 50% of Korea’s 
wireless customers (Lee, 2010).  SK decided to sell HTC, RIM’s Blackberry phones 
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and Nokia instead of the iPhone (McInnes, 2011).  This left the number 3 carrier. LG 
Telecom, in trouble, because they were still using the CDMA EV-DO standard to 
provide mobile data services, so they could not accommodate foreign handsets 
(Churchill, 2011).  
 
Meanwhile by late 2008, Apple had eaten into the global business of both Nokia and 
Samsung, jumping ahead of the Korean company in global market share for 
smartphone handsets. The market positions of Nokia, Samsung, Motorola and LG 
were also being severely threatened and they needed to make major changes to adapt 
to emerging customer expectations. These companies needed to quickly find a way to 
compete with Apple’s user interface and their industrial design approach. With their 
new smartphone model, Samsung decided to focus their engineering work on the 
physical design of handsets and use Google’s Android operating system as the user 
interface. They called this phone the Samsung Galaxy (also known as the i7500). It 
was announced in April 2009 and first went on sale in June 2009 (Rowinski, 2012).  
 
Some other mobile companies, including Motorola, HTC, Sony Ericsson and LG, also 
opted to use start using Android with some of their models. In contrast, Nokia decided 
to stick with the Symbian operating system and their sales began to plummet. By the 
second quarter of 2009, Android held a 2.8% share of the global smartphone market 
and was accelerating quickly (Canalys, 2009). However, Apple still forged ahead 
globally in 2009, controlling over 14% of this emerging market compared with 3.3% 
for Samsung and an even smaller share for LG. One significant mistake during this 
period was LG’s decision to only use Android in their low-medium end phones. Their 
sales figures went into a sharp decline and the LG electronics CEO resigned suddenly 
in Oct 2010 explaining that he had to take responsibility for the company's recent 
poor management and performance in the mobile area. He was replaced by Koo bon-
joon, a member of LG’s founding family (Miller, 2010).  
 
In 2010, more convergent products started to appear. These products were called 
tablets and they combined features of mobile phones and laptop computers in flat 
touchscreen devices.  Again, Apple used its experience with laptops, phones and the 
App ecosystem to enter the market in this new area with the release of the iPad in 
April 2010. The iPad was available as both a Wi-Fi only device and a mobile device 
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using existing networks (Apple, 2013). This product was another success for Apple 
and it signaled a global shift towards larger-screen mobile devices. Samsung also 
opted for a larger screen size in the mobile phone area when they released a 4-inch 
Galaxy S Phone in June 2010. This decision helped the Galaxy S to become the 
flagship model for Android. By the fourth quarter of 2010 Android Smartphones had 
taken 33% of the market, becoming the most widely used smartphone operating 
system with the Galaxy S and later the SII at the forefront. One huge breakthrough 
was that all three of the major carriers in China decided to sell the Samsung Galaxy S 
in 2010 opening up the largest consumer market in the world (Hyers, 2013).  
 
2010 was also the year that saw mobile phone penetration rates reach 100% in South 
Korea for the first time, exceeding the total human population of the country. A 
survey taken at this time estimated that about one million, or 14.3% of the nation’s 
teenage population had symptoms of Internet addiction. This led to the Korean 
Government revising the Juvenile Protection Act in 2010 (Kim, 2010). The new 
regulations sought to prevent young gamers from playing online games anywhere 
from midnight until 6 a.m. They hoped to enforce this using the gaming age 
classification approval step that every new game needed to get before legally being 
sold in the country.    
 
This new requirement quickly ran into trouble. Its wording made it inconsistent. For 
example, Sony’s Playstation Network was not affected by the regulation, but 
Microsoft’s XBox was, because for the Xbox, subscriptions need to be purchased for 
multiplayer games. Some of the most popular online games in Korea including 
Starcraft, Diablo 2 and Warcraft 3 received exemptions from the ruling after 
Nattle.net claimed the entire Internet would need to be blocked every night 
throughout Korea to adhere to the new law.  Korea’s lawmakers also mandated that 
mobile game developers send in their games for a review of their age suitability, 
which prompted Apple and Google to entirely cut access to their gaming category for 
Korean customers. This led to an amendment in the law to give mobile games a two-
year grace period from the legal categorisation (Green, 2010).  
  
Although the switch over to Google’s Android system allowed Samsung phones to 
compete and eventually surpass Apple’s phones in sales, the move was seen as an 
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example of the weakness of Korea’s user interface design ability when competing 
internationally. To address this problem and decrease their reliance on Google, 
Samsung began to develop their own operating system called Bada (literally meaning 
sea in Korean) in 2010.  Samsung launched a range of Samsung Wave phones using 
the new mobile OS but the phones were not a success (Byford, 2013).  Recently they 
cancelled the development of Bada and merged it into the new Tizen operating system 
development project that Samsung and Intel are working together on. The group 
working on the Tizen OS are hoping it will become the system of choice for Smart 
TVs, a new convergence of TVs, PC and mobile technologies (Kim and Cheng, 
2013).  
 
 
8.8 Recent Developments in the Mobile Area 
  
2011 can be seen as the year when Samsung really started to dominate the global 
smartphone scene. Nokia had been the market leader for 15 years and many analysts 
expected that Apple’s iPhone would be the product that would topple Nokia from its 
position.  However, sales of the Galaxy Series with its Android OS accelerated very 
quickly to jump into the lead. This led Apple to begin a massive patent lawsuit 
campaign against Motorola Mobility and Samsung (and some other Android device 
manufacturers) to try and block sales of the devices. Samsung reacted by countersuing 
Apple also on patents. By July 2012, both companies were embroiled in over 50 legal 
battles all over the world, with billions of dollars in compensation sought by each side 
(Zeman, 2013). In one of the lawsuits in Seoul, the Korean judges decided that both 
sides infringed each other patents and decided to block sales of both company’s mid-
range products.   
 
South Korea’s penetration rate of smartphones ranked number one in the world for the 
first time in 2012. According to the U.S. market research Strategy Analytics group, 
South Korea’s smartphone penetration rate stood at 68% in 2012.  In a report 
analysing 88 countries, Korean smartphone users changed their handsets more 
frequently than in any other nation. For example in 2012, around 67.8% of Korean 
smartphone users changed their phones (Hyer, 2013). About half of Korean 
elementary students and about 84% of secondary students owned smartphones as of 
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July 2013 (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2013). The 4G Long Term Evolution 
(4G LTE) rollout started on July 1st, 2011 for Korean customers, with SK Telecom 
and LG U+ competing against each other for domestic network deployment. Then, in 
January 2012, KT launched its LTE service (Korea Times, 2012). By the third quarter 
of 2012, Android held a 75% share of the global smartphone market based on a report 
by the IDC research company. By the second quarter of 2013, Android accounted for 
67% of worldwide tablet shipments and 80% for smartphones placing them in a 
dominant position globally (Hyer, 2013). 
 
 
8.9 Conclusion  
 
This case study is perhaps the clearest example of how the Korean Government has 
influenced an industry using legislation mandating the use of certain technology, 
effectively excluding international businesses from competing against Korean 
companies. The Chapter began by looking at how the Government made a series of 
decisions in the early 1980s that allowed the Telecommunications area in Korea to 
develop, albeit under a monopoly.  
 
A significant decision took place in 1989 when the Korean Government opted to work 
with the U.S Company Qualcomm to develop a CDMA standard for their domestic 
market. It is another example of the Korean Government’s willingness to tread their 
own path instead of waiting to see what becomes a dominant standard.  This decision 
can be considered as being analogous to the SEED encryption decision seen in the 
Chapter 7. Legislation soon followed that mandated the use of CDMA only for the 
Korean Domestic market. This protected Korean Handset makers from the threat of 
GSM phones made in Europe being sold inside the country, and also restricted 
roaming possibilities between the two regions.  
 
As the CDMA standard progressed, a development relationship between the Korean 
Government, the handset makers and the network providers was put in place. 
Therefore, they all had a vested interest in making the system work and 
commercialising it successfully.  This relationship was kept in place even when the 
Government started to deregulate the industry and allow additional carriers to operate.  
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As seen earlier in Section 8.3, they asked the five operators to pay a license fee and 
contribute to CDMA development.  
 
To illustrate the effect that the creation of this ecosystem had, the example of 
Motorola was included in Section 8.4. In 1995, they had a significant 52% market 
share in Korea’s domestic handset business, but just four years later, Korea’s own 
handset manufacturers held a 90% market share. It was a dramatic shift in a very short 
time that clearly illustrated how the barriers raised by the collaboration agreement 
made by the Government affected Motorola. The strength of the agreement between 
handset makers was also shown by the six-month rule used by the Korean companies 
each time a new technology or service became available.  
 
The creation of the WIPI mobile connectivity standard again provided a significant 
barrier to international handset manufacturers. The official reason for creating the 
standard was to allow the Korean carriers to all run the same applications. There is no 
reason to doubt that this is true, but as a byproduct it created yet another barrier to 
international handset manufacturers. It was considered a problem by the U.S 
Government, as they flagged South Korea as a key country of concern when it came 
to telecommunications trade as seen above in Section 8.5. The implementation of 
WIPI coincided with the decline of U.S Company Qualcomm’s involvement in the 
domestic Korean market. It also happened at a time when Samsung’s chips were 
ready for use with handsets. The other example of a trade barrier that the U.S 
protested about around then was a Wi-Fi spectrum requirement for laptops, as 
discussed in Section 8.5.   
 
When Smartphones, specifically the iPhone and the Blackberry, went on sale around 
the world, it caught a lot of the feature phone handset makers off-guard because both 
of the new players came from outside the established phone companies group. Their 
success affected both LG and Samsung internationally, but it had no initial effect 
inside South Korea as the new products were blocked by WIPI and the domestic 
mapping requirement. Samsung reacted quickly (within just over a year) by making 
the decision to ditch their own phone operating system in favour of Google’s Android 
and try to change their design philosophy to directly compete with Apple. In contrast 
to Samsung, LG were much slower to react, and it negatively affected their business 
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very strongly for the next few years. They eventually decided to emulate Samsung’s 
approach to try and catch up.     
 
Samsung’s decision saw them come back into the market strongly with high-end 
large-screen smartphones that went on sale at a lower price than their competitors. 
The biggest losers in the industry, as was seen in Section 8.6, were Nokia and 
Motorola who did not react effectively at all to the smartphone revolution. One 
downside of Samsung’s change in strategy was that it set them on a direct collision 
course with Apple and that resulted in a huge set of Intellectual Property legal battles.  
 
In summary, this Chapter shows how the Korean Government protected and nurtured 
both Samsung and LG by helping them in the country’s domestic market. This took 
place via technical trade barriers and also exclusive relationships. The relationships 
between the companies and Government were very strong because of the spiderweb 
of family and business connections in Korea shown earlier in the Neo-Confucianism 
analysis in Chapter 4. In this case study, it can be said that the Government’s strategy 
paid dividends as Samsung managed to use the opportunities they were given to rise 
to the very top of the international mobile handset industry. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Research Findings and Conclusions 
 
Chapter 9: Research Findings and Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has explored, analysed and illustrated the trajectory of the ICT business 
area in South Korea. This Chapter will discuss how the key questions were addressed 
and what conclusions can be drawn from the answers. Then, to outline the importance 
of this study, a section on contributions to the field will be discussed. This will be 
followed by a look at the limitations of the study to provide some self-criticism. 
Finally, this Chapter includes the new avenues that have been opened up by this 
research. This will help other academics that want to expand or drill-in to the ideas 
put forward in this project.   
 
The cross-disciplinary nature of this work means that there are a lot of interconnected 
threads to be joined up in this Chapter. Chapter 2 on Korean history provided the 
foundation for everything else that followed. It showed how Korea’s formative 
International experiences left a long and lasting impression on the country. These 
experiences resulted in definable national characteristics exhibited by repeated actions 
and attempts to avoid certain mistakes of the past. Chapter 2 also had a look at the 
economic transformation of South Korea with a particular emphasis on the role of 
Government when it came to managing innovation. This showed how the historical 
experiences introduced in Chapter 2 strongly influenced the choices made by the 
Korean Government in business development and international relations. It also 
displayed the role of leadership in the evolution of South Korea’s industries.  
 
In Chapter 3, the focus was Neo-Confucianism and how this philosophy has 
permeated South Korea deeply, despite losing its official prominence. It helps to 
explain how all the large Korean businesses interrelate and where international 
companies fit and do not fit into the spiderweb. This section runs in parallel to 
Chapter 2 and shows what lies beneath many of the decisions and policies that were 
pinpointed as being significant. A key area where Neo-Confucianism has a strong 
influence is in education.  The introduction to Confucianism allows for the 
exploration of how education and qualifications have become so important in Korea 
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and how that has been a constituent part of the country’s meteoric rise in the ICT 
field.  
 
Chapter 4 began with an overview of ICT business in Korea. This showed how the 
Government nurtured and encouraged the evolution and use of ICT successfully. In 
combination with the value placed upon education due to Neo-Confucianism, this has 
propelled Korea right to the top of international rankings in many ICT areas. The ICT 
evidence presented led on to an explanation of the research methodology employed in 
this study.  The approach taken here involved a study of the roots of certain decision-
making mechanisms using path dependent analysis techniques. The use of path 
dependency in academic research was introduced and building upon that, the use and 
selection of case studies was discussed. This was introduced by expanding on the 
theories of John Cantwell, who suggested that a cross-disciplinary analysis of the 
historical paths taken in East Asian countries is needed to explain the rapid 
development trajectory taken in the region. This provided the motivation for including 
a set of three case studies as practical examples, showing some of the decision-
making mechanisms used to stimulate growth domestically and internationally.  
 
One of the areas that was heavily influenced by Neo-Confucianism is South Korea’s 
Internet culture.  In Chapter 5, the Netizens of South Korea were analysed to see what 
drives these online activists. It was shown that Internet movements became significant 
when a number of factors came together in order to turn all the fractured groups into 
large powerful social forces. The factors that were pinpointed were a sense of 
violation of the social justice that is central to Neo-Confucianism, as shown in 
Chapter 3, along with perceived cultural imperialism from powerful countries, 
especially the U.S, Japan and China.  This linked back again to Korea’s historical 
international experiences from Chapter 2. Chapter 5 also showed the first glimpses of 
how the South Korean Government sought to control online activity via legislation to 
limit certain activities..  
 
Chapter 6 was the first of the Case Studies included in this thesis. It followed the 
business battle between the Hangul Office Suite and Microsoft Office. This is a 
practical example of how Korean History, the tight Neo-Confucian Government to 
Business relationships and Netizen activism within Korea all converged to provide a 
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major obstacle to Microsoft, when they directly threatened the business area of a 
homegrown domestic Korean company.  Also, as part of the campaign to support the 
local company, the Korean Government put a rule in place that basically forced all 
companies needing to file documentation to buy the Korean program in order to 
operate, effectively protecting the business and shutting out competitors.  
 
Some of the same characteristics can be seen again in Chapter 7. This Chapter traced 
the use of the SEED online transaction encryption standard and showed how it created 
a unique Internet ecosystem in Korea. This Chapter again illustrated how the Korean 
Government was heavily involved in business regulation and how they created a 
barrier to certain companies while protecting domestic operations. It also showed how 
at first it created a desirable market situation for Microsoft, but later this turned into a 
problem for them in the Korean market because of security and obsolescence 
problems.  
 
Chapter 8 provided an analysis of the Korean Telecommunications Industry with an 
emphasis on how Samsung took advantage of their domestically protected state and 
managed to use that as a platform to become the world’s leading handset maker as of 
2013. It is a recent example of a successful business that grew out of Korea’s home 
environment and took on the world.    
 
 
9.2 Key Questions Addressed  
 
9.2.1 Can South Korea’s rise as an ICT-based economy be attributed to a free-market 
policy or to a government-controlled, protectionist policy and to what extent can 
these policies be attributed to events in Korean History? 
 
This thesis provided major ingredients in answering the question in the affirmative by 
confirming that the Korean economic development path was strongly influenced by 
Government-controlled protectionist policies. These policies were also directly linked 
to historical experiences. As seen in Chapter 3, South Korea’s economic rise involved 
a number of factors but the main three were: 
 
  213 
 The transfer of industrial knowledge and skills from Japan to Korea during the 
Colonial Period.   
 The successful economic policies and leadership of President Park Chung-Hee 
 A desire to be economically and technologically strong enough to avoid being 
dominated again by other nations.  
The second of these factors is most significant in the context of this study because it 
involved both business and Governmental steering. This process was enabled by 
obtaining capital, including soft loans from Japan, as part of the normalisation of 
relations between the countries. Then, President Park tightly controlled the credit to 
the fledgling Korean Chaebol companies and he used that leverage to send the 
companies into the business areas he believed would be most beneficial to his 
Government’s overall strategy. Some examples given in this study of companies that 
were managed in this way included Hyundai, POSCO and Samsung. These companies 
were all pushed into certain industries by the Korean Government as part of their five-
year economic plans using credit control and state support as both a carrot and a stick. 
As part of the system, significant trade tariffs and other disincentives were put in 
place to protect these new businesses from international competitors.  
 
This economic approach was repeated, modified and sustained over the next two 
decades. It was a hugely successful strategy for South Korea that saw POSCO 
become one of the largest steel companies in the world while Hyundai became a 
major shipbuilding, construction and vehicle manufacturing company.  Later, 
Samsung went on to become a large business in the construction, consumer 
electronics and electronic components areas. In the mid-1980s and 90s, the strategy 
began to be liberalised somewhat to encourage foreign direct investment, but it 
certainly was not dismantled.   
 
International companies often struggled to get a foothold in Korea, even if they were 
successful in most places around the globe. Examples of companies that had trouble 
in Korea include Walmart and Carrefour’s retail stores, Motorola and Nokia’s mobile 
phones, Nissan and Toyota’s cars and Nestle’s Milk and Coffee products. These 
companies have not succeeded in South Korea for various reasons, but they all had 
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significant problems and the common denominator is that they all ran aground in 
Korea, when pitted against equivalent local products and services.  
 
Attributing the success of South Korea’s economy to a Government-controlled 
protectionist approach confirms the conclusions drawn by earlier academics in this 
area. In the context of this thesis, it does however provide a building block to move 
on to finding out why this strategy was chosen and how it has evolved in the era of 
free trade agreements into a more sophisticated business mechanism. To provide 
practical examples, this mechanism was studied in one industry in Korea as part of 
this project. The ICT industry provides a good example because it is an area that 
Korea excels in generally.   
 
When reviewing Korean History, one recurring theme becomes apparent. The country 
had a number of negative international experiences. China at times protected and 
passed knowledge and culture to the old Korean kingdoms, but they also had almost 
constant territorial battles. As China started to unify, the power balance shifted, 
because China became more powerful and completely overran the Korean peninsula 
on occasions. Next, Japan started to emerge and the Japanese rulers saw Korean 
territory as a stepping-stone to getting a foothold on mainland Asia. As shown in 
Chapter 2 these experiences forced Korea to look inwards and become defensive and 
suspicious of international exchanges. Between the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, only a 
handful of foreign travellers even set foot on Korean soil.  
 
Then, at the end of the 19
th
 century, Korea was forced to open up as seen in section 
2.3.3. After opening up, control of Korea’s strategically important territory made the 
country a target for Russia, China and Japan and the Korean people and leaders had 
no way to repel their comparatively advanced neighbours. When Japan won the power 
struggle, the Joseon Empire was eventually annexed into the Japanese Empire, only 
serving to deepen the Korean distrust of the motives of foreign influence in their 
country.  This distrust was then exacerbated when Japan attempted to suppress the 
Korean language, beliefs and undermine the country’s cultural independence.  
 
Then, Korea was divided between Soviet-controlled North Korea and a reluctant U.S 
protectorate in the southern half of the country after the Japanese Empire fell. The 
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fallout was a devastated, flattened country carved in a North-South split. This 
experience did not redeem the international community in the eyes of most Korean 
people. In North Korea, a regime emerged that was fiercely militaristic and defensive. 
They created the Juche (self-reliance) and Songun (military-first) ideologies. These 
were pseudo-Soviet philosophies that strongly emphasised the need for independence 
in the face of perceived foreign aggression.  The North Korean leaders also tried to 
industrialise their country for domestic development, which initially was quite 
successful, but eventually ran into trouble, due to the decline and eventual 
disappearance of Soviet Union support.  
 
South Korea took a different approach that gradually took shape in the 1960s. Once 
the military under President Park Chung-Hee got control of the country, he created an 
export-led, centrally-controlled, industrialised country that successfully fostered a 
number of very large manufacturing and construction companies.  The basis for this 
business environment was selling domestically-made products internationally while 
blocking or placing barriers in the way of international products domestically if they 
could be made at home.   
 
Another barrier that is insufficiently considered in international business is how to 
traverse the spiderweb of relationships that Neo-Confucianism has embedded in 
Korean society. Neo-Confucianism has created a society where education and 
qualifications are held in the highest value, meaning that most business and political 
leaders are alumni of the same small group of elite universities. The philosophy also 
encouraged family-based succession even in business. This restricted social mobility 
for Korean people but it also created a huge barrier to non-Korean individuals and 
business in the country as they don’t fit into the system. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
non-ethnically Korean managers at the top level of organisations will appear 
domestically in the country any time soon unless it is in a consultancy / figurehead 
capacity.  The same complex network of relationships can also block companies 
trying to do business in domestic Korean markets, unless they can successfully find a 
way to fuse both cultures without upsetting the social order.  
 
Therefore, it can be said that both Korea’s exhibited differing forms of suspicion of 
foreign influence and attempted self-reliance, due to past negative experiences with 
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international involvement in the Joseon and previous Korean Kingdoms. Building on 
this idea, it is logical that the barriers to trade in South Korea are as much 
psychological as they are practical. So, even if the official tariff-based barriers are 
removed via free trade agreements, it is likely that other barriers will be erected in 
their place at either local or Governmental levels. Barriers of this type include 
consumer-activism boycott campaigns, technical barriers to trade and negative media 
stories.  This thesis chose technical barriers to trade in ICT as the example, but the 
others would be equally valid topics for further investigation.    
 
9.2.2 Can case studies provide examples that show tariff-based trade barriers are 
sometimes replaced by Technical Barriers to Trade in the ICT Industry to protect 
domestic businesses in South Korea? 
 
In Chapter 2 of this study, the economic development model followed by South Korea 
was charted. This included details on how the infant businesses in the country were 
protected by punitive tariffs on rival imports in the domestic market. In Chapter 1, 
information was shown that displayed how South Korea dismantled many of their 
import tariffs as part of FTA agreements with various countries and regions.   
 
However, with the help of case studies, this thesis shows that the Korean Government 
has dismantled tariff-based trade barriers but erected replacement technical trade 
barriers instead to protect certain infant businesses. The three case studies are 
examples of this emerging phenomenon.  
 
The three case studies analysed were from different areas of ICT business. The first 
area was Office Suite programs in Chapter 6, the second was online transaction 
security in Chapter 7 and the third was telecommunications in Chapter 8. Each of the 
three areas involved interactions between Korean home-grown enterprises and large 
MNCs.  These interactions displayed some clear repeated patterns when the 
international companies posed a threat or an obstacle to the Korean business.  One of 
the common themes in the three case studies was a high level of Governmental 
legislation. Another is close collusion between political figures and business leaders 
with some business figures in this study even crossing over to become politicians.  An 
additional feature is an expansionist business approach where the companies try to 
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sell their products internationally quite aggressively and early. This is to be expected 
given Korea’s export-led economic history. Yet another common feature is consumer 
activism through Internet-based campaigns by Netizen groups.  
 
Of the three case studies presented, the Office Suite example had the least 
Government involvement.  When Hangul Word was first launched to domestic 
customers, they had no competitors offering the same type of program in Korea. This 
allowed them to get a good market presence quickly. The business environment 
changed when Microsoft entered the fray with a product that was in direct 
competition with the Korean product. Then, their attempts to buy out the Korean 
product triggered a reaction from the Korean media, consumers and activist groups. 
At this stage the Government still didn’t step in, but the takeover was thwarted as was 
shown in Section 6.4.4.  
 
As the battle continued between the two products, a price war erupted. Allegations 
were levelled at Microsoft that they were dumping their Office Suite in South Korea 
to gain an advantage. This was the point at which the Korean Government finally got 
involved by launching an investigation into possible dumping strategies, resulting in 
Microsoft having to amend their campus licensing system to avoid a possibly 
unfavourable court judgment. Following on from this action, the Korean Government 
then took a further step by promoting the exclusive use of the Hangul Office Suite in 
all Government-related organisations. This is another example of Government 
intervention in the ICT business area.  
 
In the Office Suite example, the protective barrier put in place by the South Korean 
Government was the requirement that official Government documents be filled in 
exclusively using Hangul Office files. The restriction effectively forced a large 
number of organisations to buy the software and use it alone for filling in 
Governmental forms. This barrier was put in place after the failed takeover attempt of 
the Korean Company by Microsoft who would have had a virtual monopoly on office 
software in the domestic market, after buying their local rival when they had financial 
problems. The barrier was enabled by the fact that Microsoft’s Office programs were 
not able to open, convert or edit the Hangul Office files because of restrictions built in 
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to the program. Conversely, the Hangul program was able to open, convert and edit 
Microsoft Office files. 
 
In the case study analysed in Chapter 7, the Korean Government was even more 
involved. This study traced the history of the SEED encryption system and how it 
became associated with Active-X for Online Transactions in South Korea. The SEED 
system itself was created by a Korean Government agency. Then, legislation was 
created mandating its use and controlling who could create software to enable it, with 
only Korean companies given permission to operate. Furthermore, the legislation was 
expanded when mobile devices arrived on the market.  This meant that the Korean 
Government was an integral part of this business area and they had tight control over 
how business was conducted.  
 
The encryption itself was not a trade barrier but when combined with the legislation 
making its use mandatory, and the fact that companies offering the software had to be 
approved and licensed, it became a trade barrier. In this case, the trade barrier 
benefitted the domestic companies offering the program but also helped Microsoft, as 
their browser was the only platform that could support the encryption system.  
 
In Chapter 8, more evidence was presented of Government involvement in the ICT 
business area. The whole domestic telecommunications industry grew out of a 
Government monopoly in South Korea. One example shown in the Section 8.3 was 
the choice of CDMA as the sole operating standard. A Korean Government agency 
helped to commercialise it along with a U.S partner and then its use was mandated 
legally. Furthermore, as covered in Section 8.5, a decision to use and develop the 
WIPI middleware standard was also taken by the Korean Government. In addition, 
the requirement on the use of Korean mapping technology was a Government law. 
 
This barrier was a middleware platform called WIPI made by the Korean Government 
to force mobile handset makers and network providers to use the same development 
system. It did create a single development system, but it also erected a barrier to 
international companies who would have needed to customise all of their phones to 
use the system just to operate in the Korean market. Again, this platform was made 
mandatory by the Korean Government using legislation. The effect of the barrier was 
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shown within this study by displaying the rapid decline of the market share 
percentages of international handset makers in the domestic Korean market after the 
legislation came into force. This was put in place alongside a mapping requirement 
that forced all phones to use Korean location services only. Both of the requirements 
together represented a formidable barrier.  
 
As seen in all three case studies, the Government is very intertwined with ICT 
business in South Korea.  The principal control mechanisms used in Korea are 
Government-funded research bodies that create home-grown standards and legislation 
to mandate the use of certain technologies. Throughout the case studies shown in this 
thesis, the effect of Government involvement is apparent. In some cases the changes 
implemented completely shifted the balance of power in the marketplace. Perhaps the 
clearest example of this was in the Section 8.4 of the telecommunications chapter, 
where the market share of international handsets virtually disappeared in a very short 
period due to Governmental involvement.  
 
The second common theme in all three case studies follows on from the first. It is the 
complicated network of relationships between business and politics in South Korea. 
In the Office Suite case study, this was illustrated by how the founder of Hancom ran 
for election and won a seat in the Korean National Assembly. However, when it 
looked like Governmental intervention might be looming in this business area, he 
stepped down. This allowed him to avoid any suggestions of a conflict of interest 
situation.  
 
In the SEED and Active-X security case study in Chapter 7, the links were even more 
prevalent. The founders of one of the three companies that benefited from the 
decision to mandate the use of their technologies became a powerful politician in 
South Korea. He managed to rise all the way up to a Presidential Election Campaign 
where he had to explain away allegations of collusion in his business area. He did this 
by announcing he planned to remove any legislation protecting his company if he was 
elected.  
 
In the Telecommunications case study covered in Chapter 8, there is less evidence of 
political-business career crossover. However, Samsung have now become so powerful 
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in South Korea that the country is now sometimes dubbed ‘the Republic of Samsung’ 
by reporters and analysts. As mentioned earlier, these career connections are a feature 
of Korea’s Neo-Confucian past and low inward immigration trends.   
 
The third common theme is that the Korean companies shown in the case studies are 
all fiercely export-orientated and committed to expansion.  As shown in Chapter 6, 
Hancom tried very hard to diversify their portfolio of products and expand outside 
Korea on many occasions. In fact, it was unsustainable expansion that got them into 
financial trouble on more than one occasion. Then, in Chapter 7, one of the main aims 
of SEED was to create a standard that could be exported outside Korea but that plan 
never worked out. The companies who created the software used to enable SEED did 
manage to use their domestic status to branch outside Korea with mixed levels of 
success. The Telecommunications study in Chapter 8 is the best example with 
Samsung and LG using their domestic market as the perfect platform to sell their 
products globally and become market leaders in many areas.  
 
This emphasis on quick expansion and exporting products is a feature that is common 
to many Korean companies. It comes from the quick economic growth period in the 
1960s where the aim of every company steered by the Government was to make 
products and sell them overseas. Korea has tended to be more successful in the sales 
of I.T hardware than software products to date though.  
 
In the Netizen Chapter, the influence of online activists was explored. Most of the 
time, Netizen Communities are small groups dedicated to certain minority interests or 
campaigns. However, when certain conditions and triggers converge, these groups 
turn into large social groups that can affect public policies and businesses at a 
National level. In Chaper Five, a number of these triggers were explored to see if 
common factors could be identified in the large-scale events. This could help to 
explain what perceptions lie within the Korean public. The evidence suggested that 
the key triggers were a perceived threat to Korean Business or cultural independence 
from a non-Korean organization or state and the Netizen activist groups were largest 
in response to U.S or Japanese activities. This shows that the influence of Korea’s 
history has left the country with a suspicion of the intentions of certain countries 
based on their past actions. Therefore, the Netizens Chapter provides a social 
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barometer into the attitudes of a large portion of the Korean public. These attitudes 
help to understand why the Korean Government and business leaders made, and will 
continue to make, certain decisions to protect local industries.     
 
The Netizens’ influence was covered again in all three of the case studies. In the 
Office Suite Chapter, an early type of Netizen lobby was a key part of the group that 
worked to save Hangul software from Microsoft. They worked together on a 
campaign to get citizen donations in order to create a venture fund that could stave off 
Microsoft’s takeover advances. In the SEED and Active-X Chapter, the Netizen 
group, Openweb, rallied against the Korean Government’s decision to mandate the 
use of SEED and therefore Active-X. Their legal campaign failed, but they continued 
to try and draw attention to the situation. In the Telecommunications Chapter, the 
influence of Netizens was less apparent. They did try to force the Government to 
remove the WIPI requirement for phones because many consumers wanted to use 
Smartphones, but it was not a huge campaign like some of the other examples shown 
within the Netizens Chapter.  
 
The Netizens in these case studies did not always take the side that was seeking to 
protect Korean business.  Perhaps this is because consumers have leveled accusations 
that some Korean companies took advantage of their protected domestic status to 
overcharge and even price-fix their products at higher prices than equivalent products 
from international companies trying to get a foothold in the market.  
 
In summary, there are common development characteristics that can be seen in the 
case studies presented in this study. The most significant ones in the context of this 
research are the extremely high level of Governmental involvement in business and 
the network of connections between business and politics. The case studies included 
in this thesis represent a small sample, but they do suggest that the commonality seen 
here could exist across a wide range of Korean businesses.  
  
In summary, this thesis has shown that the tariff-based barriers are being dismantled 
in South Korea for many countries and regions as part of FTA agreements. It has also 
been made apparent that barriers continue to be used as a strategic tactic by the 
Korean Government to restrict international companies that could compete directly 
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with domestic companies within the country. Barriers of this type are also being 
erected in other countries affecting Korea’s ability to export products but that is 
outside of the scope of this study. In the case studies put forward as part of this thesis, 
all of the barriers covered were created by the Korean Government and were 
supported by legislation that benefitted and protected certain domestic companies.  
 
 
9.3 Contributions to the Field 
 
The cross-disciplinary nature of this study brings a different perspective to the field. 
The vast majority of studies on the economic development of South Korea were 
carried out by economists by focusing solely on the Governmental policies and 
business approaches taken to nurture growing businesses. The approach taken in this 
thesis was to try and provide a bigger picture view by including historical, economic, 
cultural studies and business information research. This means that each individual 
area was presented as an overview rather than an in-depth study but it does provide all 
the pieces needed in order to get the overall view.  
 
Then, the strands were pulled together in the case studies that show how the 
constituent elements are all parts of the puzzle, and how each has its own important 
place in understanding the larger scheme of things. The case studies focused on ICT 
and business information to provide practical and contemporary examples of the 
characteristics shown in earlier chapters. The approach taken in this paper makes it a 
unique proposition in the field, certainly when it comes to the analysis of Korea’s 
economic development path.  
 
 
9.4 Limitations of the Research 
 
As with any study that attempts to cover a large scope, there are some limitations in 
this research. In the historical section, a deeper treatment of the knowledge transfer 
from China to Korea in ancient times would have given a more balanced view of 
interactions. Also, in the Neo-Confucianism Chapter, some of the other influences 
that are prominent in Korea were not covered. For example, Christians comprise 
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almost 30% of Korea’s population now, so that makes them a very important group, 
but the topic had to remain outside of the scope of this study. Moreover, Shamanism 
and Buddhism also serve as strong cultural influences in Korea and they also 
contributed to the path-dependent trajectories taken by Korean business owners but 
this study narrowed the focus to Neo-Confucianism because of its close ties to 
education and the social networks built up through shared educational experiences 
amongst the Korea elite.    
 
Another of the limitations here is that only three case studies are included. It would 
have supported the theory to have more case studies but it would have made the thesis 
too long. Another limitation alluded to earlier in the text is the fact that this study 
covered a very broad range of disciplines. Therefore, each of the areas had to be 
treated as an overview rather than as an in-depth analysis.  
 
One limitation that is often present when analysing the strategies of companies is 
access to information. Many companies are wary of presenting anything that could 
place them in a negative light even if it relates to events that took place in the past. 
Therefore, finding details on the decision-making points for companies is not easy.  
This was certainly a limitation when it comes to the case study area of this thesis, as it 
would have been nice to dig deeper into each area and further explore the possibility 
of collusion between the Government and business owners.    
 
 
 
9.5 Possibilities for further research 
 
One prevailing feature of the Internet today is user created content and web based 
collaboration. As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the central tenets in Korean Neo-
Confucianism is identifying your role before communication begins.  On the Internet, 
it is often not necessary or even desirable to give out this information at the beginning 
of an interaction. For many Korean Internet users, this has been a source of liberation 
and has revolutionised the way they communicate. However, other users find the 
absence of the age and social position language constraints that are present in 
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everyday Korean language use uncomfortable or even offensive when communicating 
online. This is a very interesting area, and is worthy of further investigation.  
 
The Netizens Chapter was in many ways a part of a potentially larger narrative. This 
is the story of citizen activism in Korea. It relates to the idea of social justice without 
legal mechanisms that is common in Neo-Confucianism. When Korean people feel 
that the idea of social justice has been compromised, it often results in a strong 
reaction. In this study, the history of social activism was touched upon but it is a 
subject that could be treated in isolation by tracing the history of social movements in 
Korea in depth. It would explore how these campaigns have evolved and made use of 
social media and other communication channels to become effective in swaying 
public opinion.  
 
In this study, case study examples from the ICT Business area were used to illustrate 
the characteristics of Korean infant enterprise startup development. Other industries 
could also be investigated to see if technical barriers to trade exist there too. One area 
that could potentially provide research evidence would be beef imports. The 
classification of beef imports based on the cuts of meat and the bone included is quite 
a technical area and has been a topic of disagreement especially between the U.S and 
South Korea. This was very briefly touched upon in the Netizen Chapter of this study 
but it would be a good topic for further research.     
 
Another area closer to the subject of this thesis would be competition between search 
engines. There is a code that is put into most Korean websites that actually blocks 
Google and most other search engines. This is a technical barrier to trade but an 
investigation would need to find out if it does this by accident or design.  
 
 
9.6 Concluding thoughts 
 
In the 1960s - 80s, the approach taken by South Korea paid clear dividends.  Small 
local enterprises were nurtured and steered into targeted industries and eventually 
grew into large global players. A new educated middle class was created and living 
standards were vastly improved in the country. There is no question that this was a 
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success.  There were a number of factors present in Korea though that suggest that it 
may not be easy for other countries to replicate their approach.  
 
One reason that South Korea was able to erect barriers against the advice and will of 
large monetary organisations and powerful countries was that they started off flying 
beneath the radar of those countries. As shown in Chapter 2, when South Korea began 
their path towards industrialisation, they were economically on a par with some 
African nations and ranked near the bottom of the list in Asia. This meant that 
powerful countries did not see them as a trade risk or threat and they were allowed to 
implement protective trade measures without much opposition. This suggests that it 
may not be easy for countries to follow in Korea’s footsteps. If others try to emulate 
Korea’s success it will harder to avoid attention because of the increasing reach of the 
media nowadays. 
 
The ICT industry is a rapidly evolving area and indications suggest that the speed at 
which it is changing is showing no sign of slowing down. Therefore, in order to 
maintain or improve their market position, Korean companies will need to respond to 
emerging customer demands quickly and identify new opportunities early. Korea, 
Western Europe and North America can now be considered mature markets in many 
of the technology fields Korean companies are active in, including smart devices and 
home consumer electronics.  So, in order to stay competitive, Korean companies will 
have to diversify their offerings and focus on making new features and services 
available early.  
 
The likelihood is that sales of Korean smart devices will stagnate considerably in the 
coming years in Western Europe and North America, as buyers will be replacing their 
smart devices at a lower volume than when they were buying them for the first time. 
However, this stagnation could be offset by a focus on emerging markets especially in 
South East Asia. Korea is very well positioned to take advantage of opportunities in 
that region because Korean Cultural products like TV Shows and Pop Music are 
already very popular across South East Asia and new products will be able to 
piggyback on Korea’s strong brand image. In addition, if Korea can continue to be 
competitive in China, exports will continue to grow there considerably as Chinese 
consumers are switching to the type of higher-end ICT products that Korea provides. 
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Also, Korea is now well-positioned to provide software solutions to certain regions. 
For example in the middle east, Arab leaders often show a preference for user 
interface designs and systems that come from East Asia for Governmental websites 
and software, as opposed to those that come from North America and Western 
Europe. Korea has already had some success in this field and it would appear that 
there is room for signification expansion. Furthermore, Korean companies are 
emerging quickly as major providers of gaming systems, especially in the Multiplayer 
PC area and Smart Device App areas, as opposed to console gaming. Again, Korean 
companies should be able to capitalise on the large domestic demand for this kind of 
software and use that as a stepping-stone to global expansion. Protectionist policies 
are likely to be put in place to ensure minimal domestic competition takes place 
before the gaming companies reach a certain size.   
 
Overall, it seems that the future of Korea’s ICT business area is reasonably bright. 
New markets and diversified offerings will sustain the area, even though activity in 
established mature markets will level off, or even decrease as competition in the area 
grows. The key business relationship for Korea is likely to be with China, and the 
USA and Western Europe will begin to be of less importance. Korea’s domestic 
market will continue to be protected from external competitors based on the use of 
technical trade barriers and other hurdles when domestic companies are threatened, in 
order to provide a platform for growth. The main threat to this strategy could come 
from trade disputes targeting these new types of barriers. However, it seems that the 
ability to raise and remove these barriers quickly will give countries room to 
maneuver and adapt to emerging conditions.  
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